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An authorization policy states the conditions under which an action is permitted
or forbidden. In this dissertation, we use formal methods to ensure that policies
written in certain languages are unambiguous and to provide provably correct algo-
rithms for reasoning about policies. For example, we describe how questions about
entailment, such as “may Alice edit the database?”, can be answered eﬃciently.
We begin by showing that a fragment of ﬁrst-order logic can be used to represent
and reason about policies. Because we use ﬁrst-order logic, policies have a clear
syntax and semantics. We show that further restricting the fragment results in a
language that is still quite expressive yet is also tractable. More precisely, questions
about entailment can be answered in time that is a low-order polynomial (indeed,
almost linear in some cases), as can questions about the consistency of policy sets.
In addition to developing our own language, we have examined two policy lan-
guages, XrML and ODRL. We focused on these languages because, when we began
our work, they seemed to have the strongest support from industry. We found that
the speciﬁcations for both languages have signiﬁcant problems, which is not sur-
prising since neither includes formal semantics. We discussed the problems that we
found with the language developers and then proposed formal semantics for each
language. We present our semantics here. In addition, we consider the complexity
of determining if a permission is implied by a set of statements in each language.We prove that the general problem for XrML is undecidable and the general prob-
lem for ODRL is decidable and NP-hard. Finally, we deﬁne fragments of both
languages that are fairly expressive and for which the problem is polynomial-time
computable.BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Vicky Weissman was raised in a suburb of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. She gradu-
ated from Shady Side Academy in 1992. She then studied Electrical Engineering
at Cornell University, graduating in 1996. After college, Vicky worked for two
years in Seattle, Washington; ﬁrst as part of the hardware design team and then
on the software side of a division of Cirrus Logic that created graphics chip. She
returned to Cornell for a Master’s of Engineering degree in Computer Science and
decided to stay for the doctorate, which is ﬁnally done.
iiiACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor Joseph Halpern. Whatever
research skills I have come from working closely with him. I am grateful for the
high standards he has tried to instill in me. Most of all, I am thankful that he was
willing to discuss everything with me, down to the last detail. To learn, I have to
understand why things are done a certain way, rather than just how they are done.
So, to teach me, Joe had to justify almost every suggestion he made, and he did.
It is his dedication and my persistence – put another way, our endless discussions
on Lithium and XrML– that taught me what I know and made Chapters 2 and 3
what they are.
Spending years debating every idea with your advisor takes emotional strength.
Joe provided some of it. Most came from Riccardo Pucella. Ric bought me my
ﬁrst research notebook and, when my work with Joe was going so slowly that I
thought I would never be published, Ric collaborated with me on a small project
that lead to my ﬁrst paper. In short, Ric looked for ways to give me evidence that
I was on my way to becoming a good researcher. On top of that, he never seemed
to get tired of reassuring me. Chapter 4 is the result of our technical discussions,
which I enjoyed immensely.
While Joe, Ric, and I were the stars of my dissertation saga, many other people
played important roles. Renee Kirkwood has stood by me since I met her during
my freshman year of college. Every member of my committee, which included Bill
Arms, Tom Bruce, Joe Halpern, and Fred Schneider, actually read my dissertation.
I know this because each member provided excellent feedback. Carl Lagoze not
only encouraged me, he taught me about project management and always took
the time to listen to my ideas and hone them with his practical knowledge. And
ivKen Birman seemed to go out of his way to let me know that I was doing well.
My last year was diﬃcult. During that time, several people let me know that
they were rooting for me. Those people include Graeme Bailey, Eric Breck, Claire
Cardie, Carla Gomes, Dexter Kozen, and Fred Schneider. I wish I knew a way to
tell them how much their encouragement, when I needed it the most, has meant
to me.
Finally, I would like to thank the many organizations and people who sup-
ported me ﬁnancially for the last several years. They include the National Science
Foundation (NSF) under grants CTC-0208535, ITR-0325453, and IIS-0534064; the
Oﬃce of Naval Research (ONR) under grants N00014-00-1-03-41 and N00014-01-
10-511; the Department of Defense’s Multidisciplinary University Research Initia-
tive (MURI), which is administered by ONR under grants N00014-01-1-0795 and
N00014-04-1-0725; and the Air Force Oﬃce of Scientiﬁc Research (AFOSR) under
grants F49620-02-1-0101 and FA9550-05-1-0055. I thank Joe for convincing these
organizations of the value of our work, thereby obtaining the grants for us. I thank
my family for making it clear that whatever I needed, they were happy to provide.
A safety net, even when it is not in use, is much appreciated.
vTABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Introduction 1
2 Lithium 10
2.1 A First-Order Logic for Reasoning About Policies . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 Intractability Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Identifying Tractable Sublanguages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.1 A Tractable Sublanguage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.2 Relaxing the Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5 Usability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.6 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3 XrML 54
3.1 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2 XrML’s Authorization Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2.1 A Description of Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2.2 An Analysis of Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2.3 A Corrected Version of Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3 Formal Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.4 Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.5 The Entire XrML Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.6 Negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.7 MPEG-21 REL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.8 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
vi4 ODRL 93
4.1 The ODRL Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.2 A Semantics Using First-Order Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.3 Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.3.1 Formal Deﬁnition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.3.2 Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.4 Discussion: Improving ODRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5 Conclusion 127
5.1 XACML . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
A Proofs for Chapter 2 133
B Proofs for Chapter 3 153
C Proofs for Chapter 4 185
Bibliography 198
viiLIST OF FIGURES
3.1 The Query Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2 The Auth Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3 The Holds Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.4 The Query2 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.5 The Auth2 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.6 The Holds2 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.1 Abstract Syntax for ODRL (Agreements) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.2 Abstract Syntax for ODRL (Prerequisites) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.3 Abstract Syntax for ODRL (Prerequisites Components) . . . . . . 99
4.4 Translation of ODRL Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.5 Translation of ODRL Prerequisites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
B.1 Tree Representation of d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
B.2 Dag Representation of d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
viiiChapter 1
Introduction
What happens if we do not protect intellectual property rights? A consequence
suggested by the Constitution of the United States is that fewer works will be
created and, as a result, society as a whole will suﬀer. Another stance, taken by
many countries of continental Europe, is that intellectual property rights must be
protected as a moral imperative [CLOO02]; so, if we do not respect such rights,
then we have acted immorally. Either way, the general consensus seems to be that
creators of intellectual property should have some control over their work.
The ﬁrst step to protecting intellectual property rights is to state precisely
what those rights are. To do this, people write authorization policies, which in-
clude legislation and contracts. Authorization policies are also used to regulate
actions outside of the intellectual property domain. Some examples are given at
the beginning of Chapter 2 and, we suspect, the reader can ﬁnd several more in
her everyday life.
An authorization policy, henceforth referred to as simply a policy, describes
the conditions under which an action, such as reading a ﬁle, is permitted or for-
bidden. Policies are typically described informally. As a result, their meaning and
consequences are not always clear to the people reading them. To better under-
stand the problem, consider the statement “only librarians may edit the on-line
catalog”. We can view this statement as a policy because it governs who may edit
the catalog, based on whether the editor is a librarian. It is not clear if this policy
permits librarians to make changes to the catalog or only forbids anyone who is not
a librarian from doing so. The policy could be rewritten to remove this particular
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ambiguity, but others are likely to exist if policies are stated in a natural language.
Of course, policies do not need to be written in a natural language. Access
control lists (ACLs) [Pﬂ97] have been used for decades to capture simple policies
in an unambiguous way. Unfortunately, ACLs lack the expressive power needed
by many of today’s digital-content providers. For example, we cannot capture the
policy “members are permitted to access the digital library”; the best we can do
using ACLs is to maintain a list that must be updated whenever the set of members
changes. Another option is to write policies in an XML-based language. Three
popular choices are XrML (eXtensible rights Markup Language) (XrML) [Con01],
ODRL (Open Digital Rights Language) [Ian01], and XACML (eXtensible Access
Control Markup Language). These languages can be given formal semantics (in
part because their syntax, unlike that of natural languages, is quite restricted) and
they do have more expressive power than ACLs. Prior to our work, however, none
of these languages had formal semantics and, as a result, policies written in any of
the languages could be ambiguous.
The formal-methods community has proposed a number of languages that have
formal semantics. Many of these languages are based on some extension of Datalog
[GMUW02]. The extensions are tractable fragments of ﬁrst-order logic that allow
a limited use of function symbols and negation. Unfortunately, the extensions do
not seem to have the necessary expressive power to capture a number of policies
that are currently written in English. For example, in the iTunes Terms of Sale
[AC04], certain actions are explicitly forbidden and others are unregulated; most
variants of Datalog cannot distinguish between the two categories. Those that can
(see for example [JSS97]) take an approach similar to XACML.
The goal of this dissertation is to provide a better system in which to write3
policies and reason about them. As a ﬁrst step, we deﬁne a language based on the
following design requirements.
1. It must have a clear syntax and semantics.
2. It must be expressive enough to capture in an easy and natural way the
policies that people want to discuss.
3. It must be tractable enough to allow interesting queries about policies to be
answered eﬃciently.
To achieve our objectives, we use a fragment of ﬁrst-order logic that we call
Lithium.
Because Lithium is a fragment of ﬁrst-order logic, it has a clear syntax and
semantics; thus, it remains to argue that the logic satisﬁes the second and third
goals listed above. Whether a logic is suﬃciently expressive to satisfy the sec-
ond objective naturally depends on the application. To evaluate our approach,
we collected policies from content vendors, libraries, and government legislation.
(A list of the collected policies is given at http://www.cs.cornell.edu/People/
vickyw/collectedPolicies.html.) We examined the policies for statements that
could not be readily captured in Lithium. In addition, we compared Lithium to
the industry-endorsed languages XACML, XrML, and ODRL. Both of these inves-
tigations lead to improvements in Lithium, and we now believe that the language
satisﬁes our second goal for a wide range of applications.
For the third goal, we focus on two key queries:
• Given a set of policies and an environment that provides all relevant facts
(e.g., “Alice is a librarian”, “Anyone who is a librarian for less than a year is4
a novice”, etc.), does it follow that a particular action, such as Alice editing
the on-line catalog, is permitted or forbidden?
• Is a set of policies consistent? (A policy set is consistent if and only if it does
not imply that an action is both permitted and forbidden.) This question is
particularly interesting for collaboration. For example, suppose that Alice is
writing the policies for her university’s new outreach program. If the union
of her policies and the university policies is consistent, then she knows that
her policies do not contradict those of the university.
The answers to these queries could be used by enforcement mechanisms and indi-
viduals who want to engage in regulated activities. More importantly, we believe
that the answers provide a reasonably good understanding of the policies, increas-
ing our conﬁdence that the formal statements capture the informal rules and the
informal rules capture the policy writer’s intent.
We use the insights gained from studying Lithium to give formal semantics to
XrML and ODRL, and to identify tractable fragments of those languages. We
examine XrML, in part, because it is becoming an increasingly popular language
in which to write software licenses. When ﬁrst released in 2000, XrML received
the support of many technology providers, content owners, distributors, and re-
tailers, including Adobe Systems, Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, Microsoft, Xerox
Corp., Barnesandnoble.com, and Time Warner Trade Publishing. In fact, Mi-
crosoft, OverDrive, and DMDsecure have publicly announced their agreement to
build products and/or services that are XrML compliant. Currently, XrML is be-
ing used by international standard committees as the basis for application-speciﬁc
languages that are designed for use across entire industries. For example, the Mov-
ing Picture Experts Group (MPEG) has selected XrML as the foundation for their5
MPEG-21 Rights Expression Language, henceforth referred to as MPEG-21 (see
http://www.xrml.org). It is clear that a number of industries are moving towards
a standard language for writing licenses and that many of these standard languages
are likely to be based on XrML.
XrML does not have formal semantics. Instead, the XrML speciﬁcation [Con01]
presents the semantics in two ways. First is an English description of the language.
Second is an English description of an algorithm that determines if a permission
follows from a set of licenses. Unfortunately, the two versions of the semantics
do not agree. To make matters worse, the algorithm has unintuitive consequences
that do not seem to reﬂect the language developers’ intent.
To address these issues, we provide formal semantics for a representative frag-
ment of XrML. In particular, we give a translation from licenses in XrML to
formulas in ﬁrst-order logic extended with a validity operator. We argue that the
translation preserves the meaning of the XrML statements by proving that the
algorithm included in the XrML document, slightly modiﬁed to correct the unin-
tuitive behavior, matches our semantics. More precisely, the algorithm says that a
permission follows from a set of licenses if and only if the translated permission is
a logical consequence of the translated licenses. We then consider the complexity
of determining if a permission is implied by a set of licenses. We show that the
general problem is undecidable but, for an expressive fragment of the language, it
is decidable in polynomial time.
ODRL is a popular open-source alternative to XrML that has been endorsed
by nearly twenty organizations including
• Nokia, a multi-industry conglomerate focused on mobile communications;
• the DAFNE project (District Architecture for Networked Editions), a re-6
search project funded by the Italian Ministry of Education, University and
Research to develop a prototype of the national infrastructure for electronic
publishing in Italy;
• the RoMEO Project (Rights MEtadata for Open archiving), created to inves-
tigate rights management of “self-archived” research in the United Kingdom
academic community.
ODRL developers are currently working with a number of communities, including
Creative Commons and Dublin Core, to address their needs. The complete list
of supporters and on-going projects can be found at www.odrl.net; however, this
small sample already illustrates the widespread impact that ODRL has on rights
management.
the ODRL speciﬁcation does not include a formal semantics, and we are not
aware of any attempts to give it a formal semantics other than ours. Rather
than including formal semantics, the ODRL speciﬁcation describes the meaning of
ODRL statements in English and, as a result, agreements written in ODRL can be
ambiguous. For example, suppose that Alice owns two printers, Printer One and
Printer Two, and Bob is a potential user. To regulate Bob’s access to the printers,
Alice and Bob write an agreement in ODRL that says only this: Bob is permitted
to use Printer One or Bob is permitted to use Printer Two. The agreement clearly
allows Bob to use at least one of the printers, but it does not say which one. If
Alice assumes the choice is hers, since the agreement does not say otherwise, and
Bob believes the choice is his, since the agreement arguably implies this, then Alice
and Bob disagree on the meaning of the agreement. Moreover, because this type
of underspeciﬁcation is possible in ODRL, Alice and Bob cannot use the ODRL
speciﬁcation to resolve the dispute.7
We believe that even conscientious well-trained people might write ambiguous
agreements because, in practice, agreements can be fairly large and complex. The
ambiguities can lead to disputes and resolving those disputes can be costly in terms
of time, money, the reputation of the writers, and more. To avoid these costs, we
propose the ﬁrst formal semantics for ODRL and deﬁne when a permission (or
prohibition) follows from a set of ODRL statements. It follows from our work that
the meaning of agreements written in ODRL are not open to interpretation.
To give ODRL formal semantics, we had to resolve the ambiguities in the
speciﬁcation. Most of the aspects were clariﬁed through discussions with Renato
Iannella, editor of the ODRL speciﬁcation and Chief Scientist at IPR systems at
the time of the speciﬁcation’s release. Unfortunately, Dr. Iannella could not answer
all of our questions, because some of them revealed subtleties in the language that
had not been considered. We highlight these ambiguities and then take what we
consider to be a reasonable approach to resolving them.
We give formal semantics to ODRL by deﬁning a translation from the key com-
ponents in ODRL to formulas in a fragment of many-sorted ﬁrst-order logic. The
formal semantics can be used as a foundation for answering queries. For example,
answering a query of the form “Does a particular permission (or prohibition) follow
from a set of ODRL statements” corresponds to deciding whether the translation
of the statements implies the permission (or prohibition). Answering this particu-
lar type of query is of obvious practical importance. Unfortunately, we show that
the problem is NP-hard. The intractability result is due, at least in part, to a
component that is not clearly deﬁned in the speciﬁcation and seems to require
further consideration by the language developers. If we remove this troublesome
construct, then we can answer our queries in polynomial time.8
The response of industry to our work has been positive. Our interactions with
the MPEG-21 development team is an example. When we ﬁrst decided to give
XrML formal semantics, the MPEG committee had released a beta version of
its language, which was XrML with minor revisions, and was preparing the ﬁnal
release. We chose to give semantics to the beta language ﬁrst (before analyzing the
oﬃcial XrML speciﬁcation, as is done here), because we hoped that any problems
we found would be corrected in the ﬁnal version of MPEG-21. This is, in fact, what
occured. The MPEG Standards Committee released their ISO standard [MPE04]
after we discussed our results with two of its members Thomas DeMartini and
Xin Wang; the shortcomings that we identiﬁed are addressed in that standard.
Most importantly, the standard has formal semantics. We conjecture that all of
our complexity results for XrML hold with minor changes for MPEG-21, although
we have not veriﬁed the details. Similar events are unfolding within the ODRL
Working Group. In particular, we have discussed our ﬁndings on ODRL with
Renato Iannella and Susanne Guth of the ODRL Working Group. Since then, work
has begun on a new version of the language. One of the seven design requirements is
that the new release must have formal semantics; we have been asked to collaborate
with the group to provide the semantics.
The work presented in this dissertation is based on four papers. Lithium is
introduced in “Using First-Order Logic to Reason about Policies” [HW03]. Our
formal semantics of XrML was ﬁrst proposed in “A Formal Foundation for XrML”
[HW04]. The research presented in both of these papers are collaborations with
Joseph Y. Halpern. Formal semantics for ODRL was ﬁrst given in “A Formal
Foundation for ODRL” [PW04]. This work was done with Riccardo Pucella. Fi-
nally, the conclusion of this dissertation is, in essence, a revision of “Towards a9
Policy Language for Humans and Computers” [WL04], which is a paper written
with Carl Lagoze.
Throughout the chapters, we assume knowledge of ﬁrst-order logic at the level
of Enderton [End72]. More speciﬁcally, we assume the reader is familiar with the
syntax of ﬁrst-order logic, including constants, variables, predicate symbols, func-
tion symbols, and quantiﬁcation; with the semantics of ﬁrst-order logic, including
relational models and valuations; and with the notions of satisﬁability and validity
of ﬁrst-order formulas. Recall that many-sorted ﬁrst-order logic is ﬁrst-order logic
modiﬁed so that each term is associated with a sort (i.e., type); variables of sort
s range over the elements of sort s; and the signatures of predicate and function
symbols restrict each argument to elements of a particular sort.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Lithium is presented in
Chapter 2. In Chapters 3 and 4, we give formal semantics to XrML and ODRL,
respectively. We conclude in Chapter 5.Chapter 2
Lithium
In Chapter 1, we give two reasons why certain actions might be restricted according
to a set of policies. The ﬁrst is to encourage creation by giving authors some control
over their works. The second is to respect the arguably moral right of a creator to
the product of her labor. Other motivations depend on circumstance. For example,
a hospital might adopt certain policies to protect their patients’ privacy, and to
comply with government regulations. As another example, the Greek Orthodox
Archdiocese of America restricts access to its website, in part, to discourage people
from using the available information in a disrespectful way [NPPW03]. As a ﬁnal
example, Jane Hunter has documented the need for indigenous peoples, such as the
Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, to restrict access to
digital content based on their traditional laws [Hun02]. In all of these examples,
the goal is to regulate actions according to a set of policies.
To satisfy the goal, we need to determine whether a requested action is permit-
ted or forbidden by the policies. It is easy to see that the answer to such a question
might depend on the environment (i.e., the context) in which the policies are evalu-
ated. For example, the policy “doctors are permitted to edit the patient database”
implies that Alice may edit the database in an environment that implies she is a
doctor. The same policy neither permits nor forbids Alice to edit the database in
an environment that is silent on whether she is a doctor. In practice, we expect
the application to maintain a database of policies and a database of environment
facts. An individual might provide additional environment facts, including certiﬁ-
cates such as a driver’s license or an employee badge, when requesting to perform
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an action.
In this chapter, we present a fragment of ﬁrst-order logic called Lithium.
Lithium is a language in which people can state policies and users can query
whether a speciﬁc action is permitted or forbidden in a given environment. We
believe, and will argue throughout this chapter, that Lithium is suﬃciently expres-
sive to capture a wide range of queries that are of practical interest. In addition,
we show that the queries can be answered eﬃciently. Our approach actually goes
beyond stating and answering queries. We can also detect inconsistencies. That
is, given a set of policies and an environment, we can determine if some action
(e.g., Alice editing the database) is both permitted and forbidden. If a policy set
is inconsistent in a given environment, then either the policy writer truly intends
to permit and forbid the same action, which seems unlikely, or there is an error in
the policies or in the environment. So, by ﬁnding inconsistencies, we can identify
errors and, by notifying the policy writer, we can help her revise the policies and
environment to better match her intent.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we formally
deﬁne our notions of policy and environment. We also give examples that illustrate
how policies can be represented in an appropriate fragment of ﬁrst-order logic.
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 focus on queries about permissions (that is, whether a speciﬁc
action is permitted given an environment and a set of policies); all our results hold
with essentially no change for queries about prohibitions. We show in Section 2.2
that such queries are, in general, hard to answer. In Section 2.3, we consider
some restrictions that we believe are usually satisﬁed in practice; under these
restrictions, the queries are tractable. Lithium is the set of queries that satisfy
the restrictions. We examine the consistency question (that is, whether some12
action is both permitted and forbidden by a set of policies) in Section 2.4. In
Section 2.5, we discuss what can be done to make Lithium accessible to users who
are not conversant with ﬁrst-order logic. Related work is discussed in Section 2.6
and concluding remarks are given in Section 2.7. Most of the proofs are in the
appendix.
2.1 A First-Order Logic for Reasoning About Policies
We use many-sorted ﬁrst-order logic with equality over some vocabulary Φ to
express and reason about policies. Let Lfo(Φ) denote the set of ﬁrst-order formulas
over the vocabulary Φ. For this paper, we assume that there are at least three
sorts, Actions (e.g., accessing a ﬁle), Subjects (the agents that perform actions;
these are sometimes called principals in the literature), and Times. While these
sorts seem natural for any policy logic, other sorts may be desired for particular
applications. These sorts, including objects and roles, may be added to the logic
without aﬀecting our results.
The vocabulary Φ is application-dependent; however, we assume that Φ con-
tains a constant now of sort Times and a binary predicate Permitted on Subjects×
Actions. The constant now denotes the current time. In practice, a global clock
would determine the interpretation of now. Permitted(t,t0) means that subject
t is allowed to perform action t0. It might be useful to add additional arguments
to Permitted, such as when the action is permitted and who is authorizing the
granting or revoking of the permission. Which arguments are added (if any) de-
pend on the application and on other choices made in the vocabulary. For example,
consider a policy p that says “Alice is permitted to append image m to ﬁle f”. We
could either take Permitted to be a binary predicate and append to be a binary13
function, and express p as “Permitted(Alice,append(m,f))”; or we could take
append to be a unary function and Permitted to be a ternary predicate, and
express p as “Permitted(Alice,append(m),f)”. Our results apply regardless of
which choice is made, because they do not depend on the arity of Permitted and
the other functions and predicates in the language. In fact, our results still hold
even if policies refer to diﬀerent variants of Permitted, with diﬀerent arities.
A policy is a closed ﬁrst-order formula of the form
∀x1 ...∀xm(f ⇒ (¬)Permitted(t,t
0)),
where f is any ﬁrst-order formula, t and t0 are terms of sort Subject and Action
respectively, and the notation (¬)Permitted indicates that the Permitted predi-
cate may or may not be negated. Deﬁning a policy in this way provides a structure
that matches our intuition, namely, that a policy is a set of conditions under which
an action is or is not permitted.
To illustrate how policies can be expressed in ﬁrst-order logic, consider the
following examples.
Example 2.1.1. The policy “only librarians may edit the catalog” can be char-
acterized by the following two formulas:
∀x(¬Librarian(x) ⇒ ¬Permitted(x,edit the catalog))
∀x(Librarian(x) ⇒ Permitted(x,edit the catalog)).
(Depending on the intended meaning of the English statement, the ﬁrst formula
by itself may characterize the policy.)
Example 2.1.2. The policy “a customer may download any article if she has paid
a fee within the past six weeks” can be rewritten as “if an individual i has paid14
the fee within the past six weeks, i is a customer, and a is some article, then i may
download a”. The policy can be encoded readily as
∀i∀t∀a((PaidFee(i,t) ∧ (now − 6 < t < now)
∧Customer(i,now) ∧ Article(a))
⇒ Permitted(i,download(a))).
Example 2.1.3. The policy set “anyone may sing” and “anyone who is allowed
to sing may dance” can be characterized by the following two formulas:
∀x(Permitted(x,sing))
∀x(Permitted(x,sing) ⇒ Permitted(x,dance)).
To determine the consequences of policies, we need to know which facts are
true in the environment (i.e., the context in which the policies are applied). For
example, if the environment implies that Alice is a librarian, then the policies
in Example 2.1.1 imply that she may edit the catalog. If the environment is
silent as to whether Alice is a librarian, then the policies in Example 2.1.1 do
not regulate her actions. The environment may include speciﬁc statements such
as “Alice is a librarian”, “The Cat in the Hat is a children’s book”, or “Sally
has a junior library card”. General statements may also be included, such as the
conditions under which a customer is considered to be in good standing and “at
all times, there is a senior staﬀ member who is on call”. All the examples we have
considered so far conﬁrm our belief that ﬁrst-order logic is suﬃciently expressive to
capture most environments that are likely to arise in practice. Thus, we formally
deﬁne an environment to be a closed ﬁrst-order formula that does not contain
the Permitted predicate. The requirement that the environment not contain
Permitted encourages the intuitive separation between the environment, which is
a description of reality, and the policies, which are the rules governing that reality.15
The two types of queries discussed in the introduction can now be formalized.
The ﬁrst query, is an individual t permitted to perform an action t0 (where t and t0
are closed terms) given an environment E and some policies p1,...,pn, amounts to
asking if the formula E ∧ p1 ∧ ... ∧ pn ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is valid. (Similarly, t is
forbidden to do t0 if and only if E∧p1∧...∧pn ⇒ ¬Permitted(t,t0) is valid.) The
second query, “Are the policies consistent?”, asks if the formula E ∧p1∧...∧pn is
satisﬁable. For ease of exposition, we focus on determining if an action is permitted
(or forbidden). As we show, it is easy to modify our techniques to handle the
consistency question.
2.2 Intractability Results
In general, the two types of queries in which we are interested cannot be answered
eﬃciently. Indeed, the problem in its full generality is easily seen to be undecidable
if the vocabulary Φ has at least one binary predicate other than Permitted (and
closed terms t and t0 of sort Subjects and Actions, respectively, so that it is possible
to actually form queries). To see this, let f be an arbitrary formula that does
not contain Permitted. Consider the policy f ⇒ Permitted(t,t0), and let the
environment be empty (i.e., true). Standard manipulations show that
true ∧ (f ⇒ Permitted(t,t
0)) ⇒ Permitted(t,t
0)
is equivalent to
f ∨ Permitted(t,t
0).
Since f does not mention Permitted, the last formula is valid iﬀ f is valid.
The validity problem for ﬁrst-order formulas is well known to be undecidable,
even if we restrict to formulas whose only nonlogical symbol is a binary predicate.16
In fact, undecidability holds if we further restrict to formulas that have a single
alternation of quantiﬁers (i.e., formulas of the form Q1x1 ...QnxnR1y1 ...Rmymf,
where Qi = ∃ and Rj = ∀ for i = 1,...,n and j = 1,...,m or vice-versa, and f
is quantiﬁer-free) [BGG97]. So, in general, we cannot determine whether a single
policy implies a permission if writing the policy as a ﬁrst-order formula requires an
alternation of quantiﬁers and a binary predicate other than Permitted. It turns
out that undecidability holds even without the assumption that Φ has a binary
predicate other than Permitted.
Theorem 2.2.1. Let L0 be the set of closed formulas of the form
(f ⇒ Permitted(c,c
0)) ⇒ Permitted(c,c
0),
where c and c0 are constants of the appropriate sorts, f has a single alternation
of quantiﬁers, and the only nonlogical symbol in f is Permitted. The validity
question for L0 is undecidable.
Not surprisingly, similar undecidability results hold if we allow formulas in
the environment to involve an alternation of quantiﬁers (provided that there is a
binary predicate in the language other than Permitted, since we do not allow
Permitted in the environment). Given Theorem 2.2.1, it seems that our only
hope is to forbid any alternation of quantiﬁers.
How much quantiﬁcation do we really need? A quantiﬁer-free environment
suﬃces to capture simple databases. Many applications, however, need a richer
environment that includes general properties, such as “men are not women” and “a
senior citizen is anyone over sixty-ﬁve years old”. For these applications, universal
quantiﬁcation is needed in the environment. In addition, almost all applications
need quantiﬁcation in their policies. To see why, notice that if we do not allow17
a policy to have any quantiﬁcation (i.e., deﬁne a policy to have the form f ⇒
Permitted(t,t0) where t and t0 are closed terms and f is quantiﬁer-free), then
each policy must govern a speciﬁc individual and action. For example, we can say
“If Alice is good, she may play outside”, but we cannot say “All good children
may play outside”. Because policies typically permit an individual to do an action
based on the attributes of that individual, we must allow policies to be universally
quantiﬁed.
All policies expressible in XrML and in ODRL, as well as the policies that we
have collected from libraries and government databases, can be written as universal
formulas (i.e., as formulas that can be written in the form ∀x1 ...∀xnf, where f
is quantiﬁer-free). Some of the policies that we collected may appear to need exis-
tential quantiﬁcation, but they can be converted to equivalent universal formulas.
Example 2.2.2 illustrates how we can apply standard ﬁrst-order transformations
to do the conversion.
Example 2.2.2. Consider the policy “anyone who is accompanied by a librarian
may enter the stacks”. A natural way to state this in ﬁrst-order logic is
∀x1(∃x2(Librarian(x2) ∧ Accompanies(x2,x1))
⇒ Permitted(x1,enter(stacks))).
This formula is logically equivalent to
∀x1∀x2((Librarian(x2) ∧ Accompanies(x2,x1))
⇒ Permitted(x1,enter(stacks))),
which uses only universal quantiﬁcation.
Note that enter is a function in Example 2.2.2. Unfortunately, it is well known
that the validity problem for existential formulas with function symbols is unde-
cidable, even if we restrict to formulas with only two existentials and one unary18
function symbol [BGG97]. The following strengthening of Theorem 2.2.1 is almost
immediate.
Theorem 2.2.3. Let L1 be the set of closed formulas of the form
∀x1∀x2(f ⇒ Permitted(c,c
0)) ⇒ Permitted(c,c
0),
where c and c0 are constants of the appropriate sort and f is a quantiﬁer-free
formula whose only nonlogical symbols are Permitted and a unary function. The
validity problem for L1 is undecidable.
Theorem 2.2.3 suggests that even if we drastically reduce quantiﬁcation, we
still need to disallow functions to get decidability. Once we severely restrict quan-
tiﬁcation and remove functions entirely, then we do get a decidable fragment, but
it is not tractable. Recall that ΠP
2 is the second level of the polynomial hierarchy,
and represents languages that can be decided in co-NP with an NP oracle.
Theorem 2.2.4. Let Φ be a vocabulary that contains Permitted, constants c
and c0 of sorts Subjects and Actions, respectively, and possibly other predicate and
constant symbols (but no function symbols). Assume that there is a bound on the
arity of the predicate symbols in Φ (that is, there exists some N such that all
predicate symbols in Φ have arity at most N). Finally, let L2 be the set of all
closed formulas in Lfo(Φ) of the form E ∧ p1 ∧ ... ∧ pn ⇒ Permitted(c,c0) such
that E is a conjunction of quantiﬁer-free and universal formulas and each policy
p1,...,pn has the form ∀x1 ...∀xm(f ⇒ Permitted(t1,t2)), where t1 and t2 are
terms of the appropriate sort and f is quantiﬁer-free.
(a) The validity problem for L2 is in ΠP
2 .
(b) If L3 is the set of formulas in L2 in which every policy’s antecedent is a
conjunction of literals, then the validity problem for L3 is ΠP
2 hard.19
(c) If L4 is the set of L2 formulas in which E is quantiﬁer-free, then the validity
problem for L4 is both NP-hard and co-NP hard.
If we do not require the arity of the predicate symbols in Φ to be bounded, then
we must replace ΠP
2 by co-NEXPTIME (co-nondeterministic exponential time) in
parts (a) and (b) [BGG97].
Theorems 2.2.1, 2.2.3, and 2.2.4 seem to suggest that the questions we are
interested in are hopelessly intractable. Fortunately, things are not nearly as bad
as they seem.
2.3 Identifying Tractable Sublanguages
The work on Datalog and its variants mentioned in the introduction demonstrates
that there are useful, tractable fragments of ﬁrst-order logic. In this section we
deﬁne Lithium, a fragment of ﬁrst-order logic characterized by a diﬀerent set of
restrictions than those considered by the Datalog community, show that these
restrictions lead to tractability, and argue that they are particularly well-suited to
reasoning about policies.
As a ﬁrst step towards deﬁning Lithium, we characterize the classes of envi-
ronments and policies that are likely to occur in practice. A basic environment
is an environment that is a conjunction of ground literals. Basic environments
are suﬃciently expressive to capture the information in databases and certiﬁcates.
While this is adequate for many applications, basic environments cannot repre-
sent general properties such as “every citizen of Germany is a member of the
European Union”. To capture these, we deﬁne a standard environment to be
an environment that is a conjunction of ground literals and closed formulas of
the form ∀x1 ...∀xn(`1 ∧ ... ∧ `k ⇒ `k+1), where `1,...,`k+1 are literals. Each20
conjunct of a standard environment is an environment fact. Note that every ba-
sic environment is a standard environment. A standard policy is a policy of the
form ∀x1 ...∀xn(`1 ∧ ... ∧ `k ⇒ Permitted(t1,t2)), where `1,...,`k+1 are liter-
als and both t1 and t2 are terms of the appropriate sort. Standard environments
and standard policies are suﬃciently expressive for all of the applications that we
have considered. A simple policy is a standard policy where none of the liter-
als in the antecedent mentions Permitted. For example, Permitted(t1,t2) ⇒
Permitted(t1,t3) is not a simple policy.
A policy base is a formula of the form E ∧ P, where E = E0 ∧ E1 is a stan-
dard environment, E0 is a conjunction of ground literals, E1 is a conjunction of
universally quantiﬁed formulas, and P is a conjunction of standard policies. In the
rest of the paper, when we write standard queries, we assume that the formulas
E, E0, E1, and P satisfy these constraints (that is, E is a standard environment
of the form E0 ∧ E1; E0 is a basic environment; and so on). We are interested in
characterizing policy bases E ∧ P for which it is tractable to determine whether
the query E ∧ P ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is valid, where t and t0 are terms of the
appropriate sort. We call such a query a standard query.
In the next section, we deﬁne a set of restrictions on standard queries that guar-
antee that validity can be determined quickly. After presenting the restrictions,
we evaluate the likelihood that the restrictions will hold in practice. In subse-
quent sections, we relax each of the restrictions to accommodate a wider range
of applications without sacriﬁcing tractability. Roughly speaking, Lithium, which
is formally deﬁned in Section 2.3.2, is the set of standard queries that satisfy the
relaxed restrictions.21
2.3.1 A Tractable Sublanguage
We use the following terms to deﬁne the initial set of restrictions. A variable
v is constrained in a clause c if v appears as an argument to Permitted in c.
For example, both x and y are constrained in the clause ∀x∀y∀z(¬R(x,z) ∨
Permitted(x,y)); z is not constrained. Two literals ` and `0 are uniﬁable
if there are variable substitutions σ and σ0 such that `σ = `0σ0. For exam-
ple, R(x,c1) and R(c2,y) are uniﬁable by substituting c2 for x and c1 for y,
while R(x,c1) and R(y,c2) are not uniﬁable (if c1 and c2 are distinct con-
stants). Let f be a formula in CNF1 and let ` be a literal in f. We say
that ` is bipolar in f if there is another literal `0 in f such that ` and ¬`0 are
uniﬁable. The pair `, `0 is called a bipolar pair. For example, consider the
formula f = ∀x(Permitted(x,nap) ⇒ Permitted(Advisor(x),nap)), which
in CNF is ∀x(¬Permitted(x,nap) ∨ Permitted(Advisor(x),nap)). Because
¬Permitted(x,nap)[x/Advisor(y)] = ¬Permitted(Advisor(x),nap)[x/y],
the literals ¬Permitted(x,nap) and Permitted(Advisor(x),nap) are bipolar
in f; together they form a bipolar pair.
Theorem 2.3.1. Let L5 consist of all standard queries of the form E ∧ P ⇒
Permitted(t,t0) such that
(1) E is basic (i.e., E is a conjunction of ground literals),
(2) there are no bipolar literals in P,
(3) equality is not mentioned in E ∧ P, and
1We say that a ﬁrst-order formula is in CNF if it has the form c1∧...∧cn, where
each ci has the form Q1x1 ...Qmxm(ϕ), each Qj ∈ {∀,∃}, and ϕ is a (quantiﬁer-
free) disjunction of literals, for i = 1,...,n and j = 1,...,m. Each ϕ is called a
clause. We sometimes identify a universal formula in CNF with its set of clauses.22
(4) every variable appearing in a conjunct p of P is constrained in p.
The validity of formulas in L5 can be determined in time O((|P||Permitted(t,t0)|+
|E|)log|E|), where |ϕ| denotes the length of ϕ, when viewed as a string of symbols.
The language L5 includes formulas such as
Student(Alice) ∧ Good(Alice)∧
∀x(Student(x) ⇒ Permitted(x,work))∧
∀x(Student(x) ∧ Good(x)
⇒ Permitted(x,play)) ⇒ Permitted(Alice,play)
(may Alice play given that Alice is a student, Alice is good, all students may work,
and all good students may play). Unlike Theorem 2.2.4(c), function symbols are
allowed by Theorem 2.3.1. Moreover, there is no assumption that the arity of
predicates and functions in the vocabulary is bounded. The price we pay for this
added generality and for cutting the complexity to linear in the number of policies
(which could well be large), linear in the length of the permission being considered
(which is almost certainly small), and not much more than linear in the size of
the database (which we expect to be relatively small, particularly if the user is
expected to provide most of the environment facts when making a request) is the
four restrictions. We now discuss the likelihood that the restrictions will hold in
practice; in subsequent sections we consider how the restrictions can be relaxed.
As we have already said, basic environments are suﬃciently expressive to cap-
ture the facts stored in databases and certiﬁcates. They are also suﬃciently ex-
pressive for library applications that we considered and for policies that can be
written in XrML or ODRL, since both languages assume a minimal environment
containing facts such as the number of times that a particular subject has done23
a speciﬁc action (e.g., printing a ﬁle) and the current time. It is true, however,
that basic environments are not always enough. For example, the documents that
describe who may collect Social Security deﬁne an aged person to be anyone 65
years old or older, who is a resident of the U.S., and is either a citizen or an alien
residing in the U.S. both legally and permanently. A basic environment cannot
capture this deﬁnition.
The second restriction, that there are no bipolar literals in P, is likely to hold
if all the policies are permitting policies (that is, their conclusions have the form
Permitted(t1,t2)) or all are denying policies (that is, their conclusions have the
form ¬Permitted(t1,t2)).
To see why, recall that a permitting policy says ‘if the following conditions
hold, then a particular action is permitted’. These conditions typically include
requirements that someone possess one or more credentials, such as a library card
or a driver’s license. It is fairly rare that not having a credential, such as not
having a driver’s license, increases an individual’s rights. Therefore, we do not
expect credentials to correspond to bipolars. Similar arguments may be made for
other types of information.
If the policy set includes a mix of permitting and denying policies, then it
seems less likely that the bipolar restriction will hold. For example, suppose that
an individual may smoke if and only if she is over eighteen years old. We could
write this statement as two policies
p1 = ∀x(GreaterThan(age(x),18) ⇒ Permitted(x,smoke)) and
p2 = ∀x(¬GreaterThan(age(x),18) ⇒ ¬Permitted(x,smoke)).
Note that p1 is a permitting policy, p2 is a denying policy, and every literal in
p1 ∧ p2 is bipolar in p1 ∧ p2.24
The third restriction, that equality is not used, is satisﬁed by most of the policies
and environment facts that we collected. However, the restriction is violated by
threshold policies (e.g., “if Alice is blackballed by at least two people, then she
may not join the club”) and by statements that say two distinct names refer to
the same individual (e.g., “Alice Smith = wifeOf(Bob Smith)”)
The last restriction, that every variable appearing in a policy p is constrained
in p, holds if an individual is granted or denied permission based solely on her
attributes and the attributes of the regulated action. Notice that the policies
in Examples 2.1.1 and 2.1.3 have this form, but the policies in Examples 2.1.2
and 2.2.2 do not. In particular, whether the policy in Example 2.2.2 allows x1 to
enter the stacks depends on an attribute of some other individual x2.
Before relaxing the restrictions, we brieﬂy discuss why they are suﬃcient for
tractability. The ﬁrst three restrictions allow us to consider each policy individ-
ually, that is, E ∧ P ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is valid iﬀ E ∧ p ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is
valid for some conjunct p in P.
Proposition 2.3.2. Suppose that E ∧ P ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is a standard query
in which E is basic, the equality symbol is not mentioned in E ∧ P, and there are
no bipolars in P. Then E ∧ P ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is valid iﬀ there is a conjunct
p of P such that E ∧ p ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is valid.
If the last restriction holds, then we can determine quickly whether E ∧ p ⇒
Permitted(t,t0) is valid for some conjunct p of P.
2.3.2 Relaxing the Restrictions
In this section, we consider the extent to which we can relax the four restrictions
given in Theorem 2.3.1, while still maintaining tractability. We consider each of25
the restrictions in turn.
Beyond Basic Environments
There is an obvious generalization of Theorem 2.3.1: we simply remove the ﬁrst
restriction and replace every reference to P with E1∧P, where E1 is the conjunction
of universal statements in E. This results in three restrictions: there are no bipolar
literals in E1∧P, equality is not mentioned in E1∧P, and every variable appearing
in a conjunct c of E1 ∧ P is constrained in c. Unfortunately, because Permitted
does not appear in the environment, the variable restriction holds only if the
environment has no quantiﬁcation. In addition, we can prove that, if there are
no bipolar literals in E1 ∧P, then E ∧P ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is valid if and only if
E is inconsistent or E0∧P ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is valid, where E0 is the conjunction
of ground literals in E. This means that a universal statement in the environment
can aﬀect the validity of a query only if it makes the environment inconsistent.
To support interesting universal statements in the environment, we must relax the
restrictions on bipolar literals and variables, which we do in Sections 2.3.2 and
2.3.2, respectively.
Relaxing the Bipolar Restriction
If we allow bipolar literals in E1 ∧P, then a permission might follow from a set of
policies without following from any single policy. In other words, the conclusion
of Proposition 2.3.2 might not hold.
Example 2.3.3. Consider two policies p1 and p2, where p1 says “Alice may cry if
she is happy” and p2 says “Alice may cry if she is not happy”. Formally,
p1 = Happy(Alice) ⇒ Permitted(Alice,cry) and26
p2 = ¬Happy(Alice) ⇒ Permitted(Alice,cry).
Clearly, p1 ⇒ Permitted(Alice,cry) is not valid, because Alice might not be
happy. Similarly, p2 ⇒ Permitted(Alice,cry) is not valid, because Alice might
be happy. But p1 ∧ p2 ⇒ Permitted(Alice,cry) is valid, because Alice is either
happy, in which case she may cry by p1, or she is not happy, in which case she may
cry by p2. So Alice’s right to cry doesn’t follow from either policy individually, but
follows from both policies together, essentially because p1∧p2 includes the bipolar
pair (Happy(Alice),¬Happy(Alice)).
Example 2.3.3 shows how we can use bipolar literals to infer a statement,
namely Alice may cry, from two clauses, namely p1 and p2. Resolution [NS97]
generalizes the reasoning in this example. To understand how resolution works,
let c be the clause ∀x1 ...∀xn(` ⇒ d) and let c0 be the clause ∀x0
1 ...∀x0
m(`0 ⇒ d0),
where ` and `0 are literals. Suppose that σ and σ0 are variable substitutions such
that `σ = ¬`0σ0. It is easy to see that c ∧ c0 ⇒ dσ ∨ d0σ0 is valid. Using standard
terminology, we call c and c0 the parents of the resolvent dσ ∨ d0σ0, and we say
that c and c0 resolve on `σ to create dσ ∨ d0σ0.2 The closure under resolution of a
universal formula f, denoted R(f), is the smallest set of clauses that includes the
clauses in f (when f is in CNF) and is closed under resolution, that is if e is the
resolvent of two distinct clauses in R(f), then e is in R(f). Roughly speaking, the
resolvents in R(f) are all the clauses that can be inferred from the clauses in f.
Our interest in resolution is motivated in part because we can prove that a stan-
2Actually, the resolvent is created using a particular substitution, called a most
general uniﬁer, which is essentially the substitution that replaces variables with
constants only when necessary. For example, the most general uniﬁer for c =
∀y(¬R(y) ⇒ S(y)) and c0 = ∀x(R(f(x)) ⇒ S(g(x))) substitutes f(x) for y, instead
of substituting Alice for x and f(Alice) for y. So, the resolvent of c and c0 is
∀x(S(f(x)) ∨ S(g(x))). (See [NS97] for details.)27
dard query q of the form E0∧E1∧P ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) that does mention equality
is valid iﬀ there is a clause c ∈ R(E1 ∧ P) such that E0 ∧ c ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is
valid. The role of the bipolar restriction in the language L5 is also best understood
in the context of resolution. Part of our approach to guaranteeing tractability
involves keeping R(E1 ∧ P) small. If there are no bipolar literals in E1 ∧ P, then
R(E1 ∧ P) includes only the conjuncts of E1 and P; there are no resolvents. We
can also prove that R(E1 ∧P) is still fairly small if each conjunct in E ∧P has at
most one bipolar literal. As a result, we maintain tractability if there is at most
one bipolar literal in each conjunct (see Theorem 2.3.7). However, if even a single
conjunct of E1 ∧ P has two bipolars, and the other conjuncts have at most one
bipolar each, then R(E1 ∧ P) can be inﬁnite.
Example 2.3.4. Suppose we have two policies; the ﬁrst is “Alice may play” and
the second is “for all individuals x1 and x2, if x1 may play and x2 is x1’s boss, then
x2 may play”. We can write these policies as
p1 = Permitted(Alice,play)
p2 = ∀x1∀x2(Permitted(x1,play) ∧ BossOf(x2,x1) ⇒ Permitted(x2,play))
It is not hard to see that for any integer n, the closure of p1∧p2 includes the clause
(
_
i=1,...,n
¬BossOf(xi,xi−1)) ∨ ¬BossOf(x0,Alice) ∨ Permitted(xn,play),
which says that if x0 is Alice’s boss, x1 is x0’s boss, ..., and xn is xn−1’s boss, then
xn may play.
While many policy bases that arise in practice have no more than one bipolar
literal in each clause, we have found two relatively common situations in which this
is not the case. The ﬁrst is when policies refer to properties that are, intuitively,
deﬁned in the environment. The second is when the policy set includes both28
permitting and denying policies (that is, the set has policies with Permitted in
the conclusion and policies with ¬Permitted in the conclusion).
To see why the bipolar restriction might be violated in the presence of deﬁni-
tions, consider a video store that has three types of customers: regular, gold, and
platinum. Every adult member is permitted to send queries to the store’s helpdesk,
where adulthood is deﬁned by the state in which the individual resides. In New
York, an individual is an adult if she is over twenty-one years old. In Alaska, an
individual is an adult if she is over eighteen. Formally,
p1 = ∀x(Adult(x) ∧ Member(x) ⇒ Permitted(x,query helpdesk))
e1 = ∀x(Over21(x) ∧ InNY(x) ⇒ Adult(x))
e2 = ∀x(Over18(x) ∧ InAK(x) ⇒ Adult(x))
e3 = ∀x(RegMember(x) ⇒ Member(x))
e4 = ∀x(GoldMember(x) ⇒ Member(x))
e5 = ∀x(PlatinumMember(x) ⇒ Member(x))
Roughly speaking, e1 and e2 deﬁne the notion of being an adult, while e3, e4,
and e5 deﬁne the notion of being a member. These deﬁnitions are used in p1 to
regulate who may send queries to the helpdesk. It is easy to see that p1 has two
bipolar literals in p1 ∧e1 ∧...∧e5, namely Adult(x) and Member(x) Therefore,
the bipolar restriction does not hold in this example. More generally, if a policy p
mentions k terms that are deﬁned in the environment, then p will include k bipolar
literals.
Deﬁnitions in this spirit arise frequently in government legislation, including the
US Code (see http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ for an electronic version)
and the Privacy Rule [oHS00]. For example, Title 1 Chapter 1 Section 1 of the
US Code says “the words ‘insane’ and ‘insane person’ and ‘lunatic’ shall include29
every idiot, lunatic, insane person, and person non compos mentis”. (Observe
that ∀x(Idiot(x) ⇒ Insane(x)) is part of this deﬁnition; the rest can be similarly
encoded.) So handling deﬁnitions is a matter of practical importance. Perhaps the
simplest approach is to rewrite the policy p1 so as to replace the deﬁned predicates
in the antecedent by their deﬁnitions. This will result in an equivalent policy base
with no bipolars. The eﬀect of replacing Adult and Member by their deﬁnitions
in our example is to replace p1 by the six policies in PNY ∪ PAK, where
PNY = {∀x(Over21(x) ∧ InNY(x) ∧ Pr(x)
⇒ Permitted(x,query helpdesk)) :
Pr ∈ {RegMember,GoldMember,PlatinumMember}}
PAK = {∀x(Over18(x) ∧ InAK(x) ∧ Pr(x)
⇒ Permitted(x,query helpdesk)) :
Pr ∈ {RegMember,GoldMember,PlatinumMember}}
Notice that there are no bipolars in
V
p∈PNY ∪PAK p and the policies permit the same
actions as p1 ∧ e1 ∧ ... ∧ e5.
Our translation illustrates a potential problem with this approach: it can blow
up the size of the policy set. Suppose that a policy p has m bipolar literals and
that literal i is deﬁned using ci clauses. Rewriting would result in replacing policy
p by c1 × ··· × cm policies. Each of the new policies can also be longer than p,
although the total length of each one can be no more than |E1|, where E1 is the
ﬁrst-order part of the environment. Is this so bad? Examples in the social security
database and in the Privacy Rule suggest that typically m is less than three and i
is less than ﬁve, in which case deﬁnitions do not signiﬁcantly reduce the eﬃciency
of our procedures.30
In practice, we can often improve eﬃciency by removing deﬁnitions that are
irrelevant when answering queries in a given environment. Continuing our earlier
example, suppose that E0 is the environment that results from Alice by presenting
certiﬁcates that show she is a regular member who is over eighteen and in Alaska
(i.e., E0 = RegMember(Alice)∧Over18(Alice)∧InNY(Alice)). It is easy to
see that we can remove e1, e4, and e5 without changing the set of permissions that
are implied by the policy base. In practice, we believe that this single optimization
will usually result in each ci being one (i.e., every predicate is deﬁned by at most one
clause), in which case our approach to handling deﬁnitions does not increase the
number of policies mentioned in the query. As an aside, this optimization is one of
many that are well-known in the theorem-proving community. We suspect that, by
applying the appropriate optimizations, we can answer queries substantially faster
than is indicated by the worst-case complexity results given in Theorem 2.3.7.
We next show how we can deal with policy bases that have both permitting and
denying policies. This task would be easy if we could consider only the permitting
policies (ignoring the denying policies) when determining if an action is permitted.
Unfortunately, if we do this, then we might not answer queries correctly.
To see why, consider an environment E that says “Alice is a student” and a
policy set P = {p1,p2,p3}, where p1 says “faculty members may chair committees”,
p2 says “students may not chair committees”, and p3 says “anyone who is not a
faculty member may take naps”. We can write these policies as
p1 = ∀x(Faculty(x) ⇒ Permitted(x,chair committees)),
p2 = ∀x(Student(x) ⇒ ¬Permitted(x,chair committees)),
p3 = ∀x(¬Faculty(x) ⇒ Permitted(x,nap)).31
Clearly, p1 and p3 are permitting policies and p2 is a denying policy. Because p1
is equivalent to ∀x(¬Permitted(x,chair committees) ⇒ ¬Faculty(x)), p1 and p2
together imply that no student is a faculty member. (Intuitively, students cannot
be faculty members, because no one can be both permitted and not permitted
to chair committees.) Because students are not faculty members, Alice, being a
student, is not a faculty member and, by p3, may take a nap. We cannot determine
that Alice may nap if we consider only the permitting policies, because to derive
the permission we need the environment fact that is implied by p1 ∧ p2.
If each fact implied by a permitting and denying policy together were deriv-
able from either the environment or a single policy, then we could separate the
permitting policies from the denying policies. Intuitively, this is because the in-
teraction would not provide any information that was not already known. To
formalize this intuition, note that each implied fact corresponds to a resolvent of
a permitting and denying policy. In the previous example, the implied fact that
students are not faculty members corresponds to the resolvent of p1 and p2, namely
∀x(Faculty(x) ⇒ ¬Student(x)). Therefore, if every resolvent of a permitting and
denying policy is already implied by the environment or a single policy, then we
can separate the policies. Continuing our example, we could separate the policies
if the environment said that students were not faculty members. A closer analysis
shows that we need to consider only those resolvents that are created by resolving
on a literal that mentions Permitted.
To formalize all of this, we need to discuss permitting and denying policies
in a bit more detail. Observe that a policy such as ∀x(Permitted(Alice,a) ⇒
Permitted(Bob,a)) is logically equivalent to both a permitting policy and a deny-
ing policy, where ∀x(¬Permitted(Bob,a) ⇒ ¬Permitted(Alice,a)) is the deny-32
ing policy. We say that a policy is pure if it is not logically equivalent to both
a permitting and a denying policy. For example, policies that do not mention
Permitted in the antecedent (which is the case for almost all the policies we have
collected) are guaranteed to be pure.
Theorem 2.3.5. Suppose that E is a standard environment, P is a conjunction of
pure permitting policies, and D is a conjunction of (not necessarily pure) denying
policies such that, for every resolvent f created by resolving a conjunct of P and
a conjunct of D on a literal that mentions Permitted, either E ⇒ f is valid
or q ⇒ f is valid for some conjunct q of P ∧ D. Then, for all terms t and
t0 of the appropriate sort, E ∧ P ∧ D ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is valid iﬀ E ∧ P ⇒
Permitted(t,t0) is valid.
We can always add clauses to a policy base to obtain an equivalent policy base
that satisﬁes the antecedent of Theorem 2.3.5. Therefore, the key question is not
“how likely are these conditions to hold in practice”, but “how many clauses are
we going to have to add in practice so that these conditions hold”. Example 2.3.4
shows that we may need to add an inﬁnite number of policies to the set. However, in
practice, policies are often simple. (Recall that a policy p is simple if the antecedent
of p does not mention Permitted.) If every policy in a policy base is simple, then
every resolvent is an environment fact and there is, at most, one resolvent per pair
of permitting and denying policies. So, if the policy base mentions n policies, all
simple, then we can satisfy the antecedent of Theorem 2.3.5 by adding at most n2
clauses to the environment.
Adding clauses to the environment, however, can have an unfortunate con-
sequence. Suppose that E, P, and D are as deﬁned in Theorem 2.3.5 and E0
is E extended so that the antecedent of Theorem 2.3.5 holds. Then the policy33
bases E0 ∧ P and E0 ∧ D might violate the bipolar restriction, even if E ∧ P
and E ∧ D do not. To illustrate the problem, recall our earlier example in which
policy p1 says “faculty members may chair committees”, p2 says “students may
not chair committees”, and p3 says “anyone who is not a faculty member may
take a nap”. Consider a policy set that consists of p1, p2, p3, and a policy p4
that says “anyone who is not a student may not enter the student-only website”
(∀x(¬Student(x) ⇒ ¬Permitted(x,enter student site))). To satisfy the con-
ditions of Theorem 2.3.5, we could add a clause e to the environment that says
“students are not faculty” (e = ∀x(Students(x) ⇒ ¬Faculty(x)). By Theo-
rem 2.3.5, we can now separate the permitting and denying policies. However,
determining if a permission is denied might be an intractable problem because the
denying policies together with e violate the bipolar restriction; e has two bipolar
literals in e ∧ p2 ∧ p4.
In this example, we can avoid the problem by satisfying the antecedent of
Theorem 2.3.5 in another way. Rather than adding e to the environment,
we could replace p1 by the policy p0
1 = ∀x(Faculty(x) ∧ ¬Student(x) ⇒
Permitted(x,chair committees)), which says that faculty members who are
not students may chair committees. Note that every clause in p0
1 ∧ p3 has at most
one literal that is bipolar in p0
1 ∧ p3, and every clause in p2 ∧ p4 has at most one
literal that is bipolar in p2 ∧p4. So the antecedent of Theorem 2.3.5 holds and the
resulting policy bases satisfy the bipolar restriction. We suspect that, in practice,
a policy base E∧P ∧D either satisﬁes the bipolar restriction or can be converted to
an equivalent policy base E0∧P ∧D that satisﬁes the antecedent of Theorem 2.3.5
and has the property that both E0 ∧ P and E0 ∧ D satisfy the bipolar restriction.
We have not, however, done an extensive check.34
Instead of adding these clauses to the environment automatically, it might be
better to verify the changes with the policy maker. To see why, recall the two
policies “faculty members may chair committees” and “students may not chair
committees”. We could satisfy the antecedent of Theorem 2.3.5 by adding the fact
“no student is a faculty member” to the environment. But suppose that there is (or
could one day be) a student who is also a faculty member. Then the policy maker
may want to revise the policies to take this into account, rather than allowing
the environment to (possibly) become inconsistent. In general, we expect that the
additional facts needed to satisfy the antecedent of Theorem 2.3.5 will be ones
that either the user would agree should have been there all along or are ones that
should not be there and in fact suggest that the policies should be rewritten.
Dealing With the Equality Restriction
To explain how we can relax the equality restriction, we need two deﬁnitions. We
say that a standard query q of the form E0∧E1∧P ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is equation-
free if no conjunct of E0∧E1∧P, when written in CNF, has a disjunct of the form
t = t0. (Note that an equation-free query may mention equality in its antecedent,
but only in the scope of negation when the antecedent is written in CNF. Thus,
for example, the query a 6= b ∧ (c = d ⇒ Permitted(t,t0)) ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is
equation-free.) It is easy to see that Theorem 2.3.1 applies to equation-free queries;
it is only positive occurrences of = that cause problems.
We can actually go slightly beyond equation-free queries. If F0 is the conjunc-
tion of equality statements in E0, then q is equality-safe provided that E1 ∧ P
(when written in CNF) has no clause with a disjunct of the form t = t0 and it
is not the case that F0 ⇒ t = t0 is valid, where t and t0 are closed terms that35
appear in E0 and either t is a subterm of t0 or both t and t0 mention function
symbols. For example, q is not equality-safe if E0 includes the conjunct c = f(c),
the conjunct f(c) = f0(c0), or both f(c) = c0 and c0 = f0(c0) (since these together
imply f(c) = f0(c0)).
Note that the notion of equality-safe is a generalization of equation-free; an
equality-safe query can have some conjuncts in E0 where equality does not ap-
pear in the scope of a negation, as long as not too much can be inferred from
those equality statements. The following proposition shows that we can eﬃciently
convert an equality-safe query q to an equation-free query q0 such that q is valid
iﬀ q0 is valid. Thus, we can determine the validity of an equality-safe query by
ﬁrst transforming it to an equation-free query and then applying the techniques
discussed previously.
Proposition 2.3.6. If q is an equality-safe standard query, then there is a standard
query q0 of the form E0
0 ∧E0
1 ∧P 0 ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) such that (a) q is valid iﬀ q0
is valid, (b) q0 is equation-free, and (c) |q0| = O(|q||L0
q), where L0
q is the length of
the longest term in q. Moreover, we can ﬁnd such a q0 in time O(|q|).
Example A.0.9 in the appendix illustrates the procedure for converting q to q0,
and shows problems that arise if we allow queries that are not equality-safe. The
example also shows that the transformation procedure can increase the number of
bipolar literals. Since we need to restrict the number of bipolars for tractability,
our theorems must refer to the number of bipolars after the transformation. We
say that ` and `0 are uniﬁable relative to a set E of equality statements if there are
variable substitutions σ and σ0 such that it follows from E that `σ = `0σ0. For ex-
ample, P(a) and P(b) are uniﬁable relative to a = b, and Permitted(Alice,nap)
and Permitted(wifeOf(x),nap) are uniﬁable relative to Alice = wifeOf(Bob).36
Similarly, we can talk about a literal ` being bipolar in a formula f relative to E.
If every conjunct in E1∧P has at most one literal that is bipolar in E1∧P relative
to the equality statements in E0, then after the transformation each conjunct will
have at most one bipolar literal, which is what we need for tractability.
As we show in Theorem 2.3.7, we can handle equality-safe formulas. This
suﬃces to handle the use of equality in all of the library and government policies
that we collected, as well as the uses of equality in XrML and ODRL.
The Eﬀect of Unconstrained Variables
Let q be a standard query of the form E0 ∧ E1 ∧ P ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) that
satisﬁes the four restrictions of Theorem 2.3.1 (possibly relaxed as discussed in
Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.2). These restrictions essentially guarantee that (a) q is valid
if and only if there is a clause c in R(E1∧P) such that E0∧c ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is
valid and (b) R(E1∧P) is relatively small. (This is made precise in Section 2.3.2.)
The role of the variable restriction is to ensure that, for each c in R(E1 ∧ P), we
can quickly determine whether E0 ∧ c ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is valid. We now relax
the variable restriction in a way that preserves this property.
Let c be a conjunct of E1 ∧ P. A variable v is constrained in c relative to q
if v appears as an argument to a literal that mentions Permitted, is a disjunct
of c, and is not bipolar in E1 ∧ P relative to the equality statements in E0. For
example, consider the query “may Alice read ﬁle A” given that Alice is Ms. Jones,
Alice may copy any ﬁle to any destination, and if Ms. Jones may copy a ﬁle to a
destination, then she may read that ﬁle. We can write this query as
q = (Alice = Ms. Jones) ∧ p1 ∧ p2 ⇒ Permitted(Alice,Read(ﬁle A)),37
where
p1 = ∀x1∀x2(Permitted(Alice,copySrcDst(x1,x2))), and
p2 = ∀x1∀x2(Permitted(Ms. Jones,copySrcDst(x1,x2))
⇒ Permitted(Ms. Jones,Read(x1))).
Note that Permitted(Ms. Jones,Read(x1)) is the only literal in p1 ∧ p2 that is
not bipolar in p1 ∧ p2 relative to Alice = Ms. Jones. It follows that no variable
is constrained in p1 relative to q; x1 is constrained in p2 relative to q; and x2 is not
constrained in p2 relative to q.
If every literal in every conjunct c of E1 ∧ P mentions at most one variable
that is not constrained in c relative to q, then it is not hard to show that every
literal in every clause c0 in R(E1 ∧ P) mentions at most one variable that is not
constrained in c0. (Recall that a variable is constrained in a clause c, as opposed
to being constrained in c relative to a query, if it appears in c as an argument
to Permitted). It turns out that this property is suﬃcient to ensure that we
can quickly determine the validity of E0 ∧ c ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) for each c in
R(E1 ∧ P). It can also be shown that if every conjunct c of E1 ∧ P mentions at
most k variables that are not constrained in c relative to q, then every clause c in
R(E1 ∧ P) mentions at most 2k variables that are not constrained in c. In this
case, it can be shown that the validity of E0 ∧ c ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) for a clause
c in R(E1 ∧ P) can be determined in time exponential in 2k. (All these claims
are made precise in Theorem 2.3.7.) It follows that if k is less than three, which
is likely to be the case in practice, then we can remove the variable restriction
entirely and still answer queries in a reasonable period of time.38
Putting It All Together
With all this machinery, we can ﬁnally deﬁne the fragment of ﬁrst-order logic
that we believe to be appropriate for expressing policies. Lithium consists of all
equality-safe standard queries E0 ∧ E1 ∧ P ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) such that every
conjunct in E1 ∧P has at most one literal that is bipolar in E1 ∧P relative to the
equality statements in E0.
We can quickly determine whether a query q is in Lithium. To determine if
q is equality-safe, we create equivalence classes for the terms in E0, which takes
linear time, and then verify that each class has at most one term that is not
a constant, which also takes linear time. To determine if the bipolar restriction
holds, we choose a term from each equivalence class to represent the class (choosing
a term that is not a constant if possible) and replace each term in the query by its
representative. The bipolar restriction holds if each conjunct c of E1 ∧ P has at
most one literal that is bipolar in E1 ∧ P, which we can check in quadratic time.
The discussion in Sections 2.3.2, 2.3.2, and 2.3.2 suggests that queries in Lithium
are tractable. The following theorem makes this precise. We prove the theo-
rem only for equation-free Lithium queries, but by Proposition 2.3.6, it applies to
equality-safe queries as well (although the complexity statements would have to
be changed to take into account the possible increase in size when converting from
equality-safe to equation-free queries).
Let Lf be the length of the longest clause in a CNF formula f, and let L0
f be
the length of the longest term in f.
Theorem 2.3.7. The validity of an equation-free Lithium query q = E0∧E1∧P ⇒
Permitted(t,t0) with m terms in E0 can be determined in time O((|E0| + T|E1 ∧
P|2)log|E0|), where T = mLE1∧PL0
E1∧P|Permitted(t,t0)| if every literal in every39
conjunct c of E1 ∧ P mentions at most one variable that is not constrained in
c relative to q; otherwise, T = m2kLE1∧PL0
E1∧P|Permitted(t,t0)|, where every
conjunct c of E1 ∧ P has at most k variables that are not constrained in c relative
to q.
Theorem 2.3.7 shows that Lithium is tractable. Is it suﬃciently expressive? The
bipolar restriction holds in all of the applications that we considered, provided that
deﬁnitions and mixed policy sets are handled as described in Section 2.3.2. We be-
lieve that our examples are representative, and that in fact the restriction will hold
in practice. The restriction to equality-safe queries is likely to hold for applications
that do not include a threshold policy; that is, a policy of the form “if k instances
of P hold then subject t1 may do action t0”. If an application includes threshold
policies, then the restriction is still likely to hold provided that the environment
stores the number of relevant instances of P that hold rather than the instances
themselves. For example, the threshold policy “if two people blackball Alice, then
she may not join the club” can be written in Lithium if the environment stores the
number of people who blackball Alice (e.g., numOfBlackballers = 2), instead of
who blackballs Alice (e.g., Blackballs(Bob,Alice)∧Blackballs(Carol,Alice)).
2.4 Consistency
Recall that a policy set is inconsistent if it both permits and forbids the same
action. By detecting inconsistencies, we can warn policy writers that their policies
probably do not match their intentions. We expect that this ability will be partic-
ularly important if the policy set is large or if it is created and maintained by more
than one person. In addition, we can verify that a policy base P is consistent with
a policy base P 0 by checking that P ∪ P 0 is consistent. For example, suppose that40
access to a patient’s medical ﬁle is regulated by the hospital’s policies and state
law. If the union of the two policy bases is consistent, then the hospital’s policies
do not contradict state law. (Note that the converse is not necessarily true.)
Clearly, E∧P is not consistent iﬀ both E∧P ⇒ Permitted(c,c0) and E∧P ⇒
¬Permitted(c,c0) are valid, for arbitrary constants c and c0. Thus, if the two
queries are in Lithium, then we can apply our previous techniques to show that we
can eﬃciently check consistency. However, we can say even more. If the condition
of Theorem 2.3.5 (or the corresponding condition for determining prohibitions) is
met, then we automatically have consistency, provided that E is consistent.
Theorem 2.4.1. Suppose that E is an environment, P is a conjunction of pure
permitting policies, and D is a conjunction of (not necessarily pure) denying poli-
cies such that the antecedent of Theorem 2.3.5 holds. Then E∧P ∧D is satisﬁable
iﬀ E is satisﬁable.
Thus, in addition to making it feasible to check the consequences of policies,
our conditions essentially prevent users from writing inconsistent policies. This is
a major beneﬁt of adhering to these restrictions!
2.5 Usability
In this section, we consider ways to make Lithium accessible to people who are
not conversant with ﬁrst-order logic. The restrictions on bipolars and equality in
Lithium might be diﬃcult to explain to non-logicians, but we suspect that teaching
people to write standard queries can be done quickly, particularly if syntactic sugar
is used to help the medicine do down.
We are currently designing usability tests to verify that computer programmers41
can learn to translate English sentences to standard (sugared) queries quickly. The
“sugaring” involves, for example, rewriting “∀x1 ...∀xn(`1 ∧ ... ∧ `k ⇒ `k+1)” as
“type1 x1;...,type1 xn;if `1 and ... and `k then `k+1”, where typei is the sort
of variable xi. We are focusing on programmers because, if this community can
read and write queries, then they can build user interfaces for other communities,
along with translators that convert user input to queries. Of course, input entered
through a user interface can also be translated directly to a (non-sugared) standard
query. For example, it should be possible to write a form-based interface that
allows users to enter queries, which can then be translated directly to Lithium.
Such a form-based interface was sketched in the conference version of the paper
[HW03]. We have not pursued it because we feel it is better to write an interface
for programmers.
The key question is how we should explain the bipolar and equality restrictions
to policy writers. One option is to deﬁne a fragment of Lithium that is easy to
explain to non-logicians and fairly expressive. For example, let S be the set of stan-
dard queries in which the environment is basic (a conjunction of Permitted-free
literals), the policies are simple (Permitted is not mentioned in the antecedent),
and the antecedents of policies are negation-free. It is easy to see that every query
in S is in Lithium. Another example is Rosetta [WL04]. Rosetta is a fragment
of (somewhat stilted) English in which queries can be written. All queries that
can be expressed in Rosetta are guaranteed to be convertible to Lithium. Finally,
graphical interfaces can be designed in such a way that every query written using
the interface can be translated to Lithium. We conjecture that the Information
Rights Management system that is part of Microsoft’s Oﬃce, Professional Edi-
tion 2003 [Mic03] is an example of this approach, although we have not veriﬁed42
that all policies written through these interfaces satisfy the bipolar and equality
restrictions. In short, we believe that, for many applications, there is a fragment
of Lithium that is both suﬃciently expressive and accessible to users with minimal
training. Which fragment is appropriate depends on the capabilities of the users
and the needs of the application.
Another approach is to give policy writers guidelines and tools to help them
write policy bases that satisfy our requirements. For example, we might suggest
that policy writers try to minimize their use of negation, equality, and universal
formulas in the environment. We can provide tools to check if proposed policy
bases are likely to lead to queries that are in Lithium. In practice, we expect policy
writers to deﬁne the universal formulas in the environment and the policies (i.e.,
E1∧P); individuals then present certain credentials (i.e., E0) along with a request
(i.e., Permitted(t,t0)). In this setting, we can check if the bipolar restriction and
equality restriction are satisﬁed by E1 ∧ P and, if so, we can conclude that every
query of the form E0 ∧E1 ∧P ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is in Lithium provided that E0
is equality-free. This allows us to identify potential problems at “compile time”
and alert the policy writer, who might then choose to change the policies and
environment to more closely adhere to the guidelines.
Perhaps the simplest solution is to not do anything at all. We believe, and have
argued throughout this paper, that queries in practice are likely to be in Lithium.
So users might not need to understand the restrictions on bipolar literals and
equality, because they will naturally write queries that satisfy our requirements.
We can build a veriﬁer to check that a user’s query is either in Lithium or can be
converted to Lithium using the techniques discussed in Section 2.3.2. If a query is
in Lithium, then the user is assured that her question will be answered eﬃciently.43
Otherwise, the veriﬁer issues a warning. The warning could be ignored since our
algorithm for answering queries might still run eﬃciently or, since warnings are
likely to be rare, an expert could be consulted.
We expect that all of these strategies will allow naive users to express their
queries in Lithium easily. It is up to the application developers to decide which
approach is best in their setting.
2.6 Related Work
There has been a great deal of work on policy languages. Since we cannot hope to
review all of the work in only a few pages, we restrict our attention to some of the
best-known approaches and to those that seem most similar to Lithium.
The classic approach in the Computer Science community is arguably the one
taken by UNIX. Every policy in UNIX can be expressed as a formula of the
form ∀x(R(x,r) ⇒ Permitted(x,act(r))), where R ∈ {User,Group,Other},
act ∈ {read,write,execute}, and r is a constant typically representing a ﬁle
or directory. The corresponding environment can be written as a conjunction of
ground literals. It is easy to see that every query in UNIX can be written in
Lithium. However, UNIX follows the Principle of Fail-safe Defaults [SS75], so the
UNIX approach to answering a query is somewhat diﬀerent than that taken by
Lithium. In particular, UNIX assumes that every action not explicitly permitted
is forbidden. Thus, with an empty environment (true), the UNIX response to the
query ¬Permitted(Alice,read(ﬁle f)) would be yes, while the Lithium response
would be no (it does not logically follow from true that Alice is not permitted to
edit ﬁle f. We can modify Lithium to give the same answers to queries as UNIX,
simply by saying that the answer to a query of the form ¬Permitted(t,t0) given44
a policy base b is yes iﬀ b ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is not acceptably valid; that is,
a prohibition holds if and only if the corresponding permission does not. Since
we know how to determine whether a permission holds, we can determine if a
prohibition holds according to the revised deﬁnition. This modiﬁed version of
Lithium can also capture the way policies are evaluated using access control lists.
We believe that we can also capture whether a permission follows in SPKI/SDSI
[EFL+99a, EFL+99b] from a collection of certiﬁcates in Lithium, although we have
not checked the details.
Perhaps the most talked-about policy language in industry today is the XML-
based language XACML [Mos05]. Every XACML query can be written as a
standard query in which all policies are simple (the antecedents of policies are
Permitted-free) and the environment is basic (a conjunction of Permitted-
free ground literals). There are two signiﬁcant diﬀerences between XACML and
Lithium. The ﬁrst is that users of XACML are expected to provide an algorithm
for determining whether a permission is granted, denied, or unregulated by a policy
base, as a function of whether the permission is granted, denied, or unregulated
by the individual polices in that policy base. For example, the deny-overrides
algorithm (which is one of the built-in algorithms provided by XACML) says a
permission is denied if it is denied by any single policy, is permitted if it is not
denied by any single policy and is permitted by at least one, and is unregulated oth-
erwise. Lithium essentially allows only one algorithm, which is logical consequence
(a choice which cannot in fact be expressed in XACML, since it may depend on the
interaction between the policies in a policy base). We could, of course, modify the
way Lithium handles queries to match any particular algorithm, although doing
this may result in losing many of the unique features of Lithium.45
The second key diﬀerence between XACML and Lithium is the treatment of
negation. In XACML, the semantics of negation is somewhat nonstandard. For
example, in XACML, the policies “if Alice is good, then she may play” and “if Alice
is not good, then she may play” together do not necessarily imply that Alice may
play. The policies imply the permission only if the environment says either that
Alice is good or that she is not good. So, given a set of XACML policies, we can
replace every literal of the form ¬R(t1,...,tn) by NotR(t1,...,tn), where NotR
is a fresh predicate symbol, without changing the meaning of the policies. Thus,
although XACML seems to allow the unrestricted use of negation, it is actually
less expressive than Lithium in its use of negation. Moreover, we believe that the
nonstandard usage of negation may well confuse users.
Another XML-based language that has received widespread support in industry
is XrML [Con01]. XrML and Lithium are incomparable in expressive power. XrML
is less expressive in that it does not allow negation. This means in particular
that it cannot express denying policies and cannot capture a policy that grants a
permission based on whether a condition does not hold. In addition, the conclusion
of every environment fact that is not a ground literal is of the form R(p), where
R is a unary predicate symbol and p is a principal. On the other hand, XrML
is more expressive than Lithium in that a policy can grant a permission based
on the answers to various queries. For example, in XrML, Alice’s babysitter can
write the policy “Alice is permitted to do some action a if the permission follows
from her mother’s policies and from her father’s policies”. We can extend Lithium
to include such policies as well. Let Lithium+ be Lithium extended with a Val
operator, where Val(ϕ) is true if ϕ is valid. We can write the babysitter’s policy
in Lithium+ as ∀x(Val(EM ∧ PM ⇒ Permitted(Alice,x)) ∧ Val(ED ∧ PD ⇒46
Permitted(Alice,x)) ⇒ Permitted(Alice,x)), where EM∧PM and ED∧PD are
the policy bases of Alice’s mother and father respectively. We can place restrictions
on Lithium+ similar in spirit to those on Lithium to ensure that it is tractable, yet
expressive enough to capture the policies that users want in practice; see [HW04]
for details.
The policy languages that are perhaps closest in spirit to Lithium are the ap-
proaches that are based on some variant of Datalog. Examples of such languages
include Delegation Logic [LGF03], the RT (Role-based Trust-management) frame-
work [LMW02], Binder [DeT02], SD3 [Jim01], FAF (Flexible Authorization Frame-
work) [JSSS01], and Cassandra [BS04]). Datalog is an eﬃcient well-understood rea-
soning engine that is restricted to function-free negation-free Horn clauses; these
restrictions are made to ensure tractability. The variants, such as safe stratiﬁed
Datalog [GMUW02] or Datalog with constraints, allow limited use of functions and
negation while preserving tractability.
The main diﬀerence between Lithium and these Datalog-based languages is in
the use of functions and negation. There are relatively few policy languages that
include functions symbols, but those that do (e.g. [BBFS98, LM03, BS04]) seem to
favor Datalog with constraints. By using this variant of Datalog, many structured
resources, such as directories, can be expressed using functions. However, function
symbols may not appear in intentional predicates (predicates whose relations are
computed by applying Datalog rules, as opposed to being stored in a database).
For example, the policy “every authorized individual may copy a classiﬁed ﬁle from
one secure server to another” when written as
∀x1 ...∀x4(Auth(x1) ∧ Classiﬁed(x2) ∧ SecureSrvr(x3) ∧ SecureSrvr(x4)
⇒ Permitted(x1,copySrcDst(x2,x3,x4)))47
is not in Datalog with constraints. Also, for tractability, additional restrictions
are often made. For example, Li and Mitchell [LM03] do not allow formulas in
constraints to have more than one variable and Becker and Sewell [BS04] require
that every argument of a function in a query be variable-free.
There are a number of policy languages that allow a limited use of negation.
Jajodia, Samarati, Sapino, and Subrahmanian [JSSS01] base their policy language
on Datalog with negation, which is a variant of Datalog that allows unrestricted
use of negation in the body of rules. Datalog with negation is tractable because
it makes the closed-world assumption: if we cannot prove that a positive literal is
true, we take it to be false. Unfortunately, the closed-world assumption can lead to
unintuitive (and probably unintended) results. For example, consider the policy “if
Alice does not have bad credit, then she may apply for a loan”, and suppose that
the reasoning engine determines whether an individual has bad credit by reviewing
her credit report. If Alice has bad credit and does not present her credit report,
then a reasoning engine that makes the closed-world assumption will incorrectly
assume that Alice does not have bad credit and thus will allow her to make a loan
application.
Several policy languages (e.g. [DeT02, LGF03, LMW02, Jim01]) are based
on safe stratiﬁed Datalog. Safe stratiﬁed Datalog allows some use of negation in
the body of rules and does not make the closed world assumption. However, the
restrictions on negation still prevent it from capturing some permitting policies of
interest. For example, the policy
∀x(¬BadCredit(x) ⇒ Permitted(x,apply for loan))
(anyone without bad credit may apply for a loan) cannot be expressed. More
importantly, denying policies cannot be expressed in safe stratiﬁed Datalog because48
the language does not allow negation in the conclusion of rules.
This limitation may not seem to be particularly troublesome. After all, the
standard approach is to assume that every permission not explicitly granted is
denied. (For example, this is done in relational databases [GW76], almost all
of the Datalog-based languages, UNIX, SPKI/SDSI [RL96, EFL+99a, EFL+99b],
and KeyNote [BFL96].) However, in many contexts, it is diﬃcult to believe that
policymakers really want to forbid every action that they do not explicitly permit,
so there is a mismatch between a policymaker’s intentions and the interpretation
of the policy base. This becomes a problem when diﬀerent policymakers want
to compare policy bases or combine them. The following examples illustrate the
concern.
Example 2.6.1. Suppose that a hospital wants to verify that its policies comply
with federal regulations; that is, the hospital wants to check that, if the government
permits an action, then the hospital permits it and, if the government forbids
an action, then the hospital forbids it. If the policies are written in a language
that captures only permissions, assuming all other actions are forbidden, then
compliance checking is essentially impossible. In particular, if the hospital permits
any action that is not regulated by the government (e.g., nurses may park in Lot A,
all staﬀ are welcome to drink the coﬀee in the lounge), then the hospital will appear
to be non-compliant because it permits an action that is not explicitly permitted
by the government and, thus, is implicitly forbidden. In short, because we cannot
distinguish forbidden actions from unregulated ones, compliance checking reduces
to determining whether one policy set is essentially identical to another.
Example 2.6.2. Consider a group of libraries that want to merge their policies so
that patrons are governed by the same regulations, regardless of which library they49
visit. When merging the policy sets, we clearly want to detect conﬂicts (e.g. one
library lets minors check out adult books and another does not). Unfortunately,
if a language can state only what is permitted, then this will be impossible. If
we put the permitting policies from each library into one large set, then that set
will be consistent (it is satisﬁed in the model that permits everything), regardless
of which policies are in the set. Alternatively, we could require that no library
permits an action that another forbids (which is what we want to do) under the
assumption that every unregulated action is forbidden. It is not hard to see that
this approach will always detect a conﬂict between sets of library policies unless
the sets are essentially identical.
The issues involved with comparing and merging policy bases have by and large
been ignored, but we believe they will become increasingly signiﬁcant. It seems
unlikely that a policy language will be able to support these features unless the
language can express both permitting and denying policies.
Although we do not know of a Datalog variant that allows negation in the
conclusions of rules (thereby allowing denying policies), some languages seem to
capture something comparable. For example, in FAF, actions are either positive
or negative; the statement “principal p can do negative action act” means p is
forbidden to do act. Another option in the same spirit is to have the predicate
symbol Forbidden in the language, in addition to Permitted. A consequence
of this approach is that it is not logically inconsistent for an action to be both
permitted and forbidden. (Note that this is also the case for XACML, due to its
nonstandard interpretation of negation.) To handle inconsistencies, FAF expects
the policy writer to create overriding policies such as “if an action is both permitted
and forbidden, then it is forbidden”. If an inconsistency is detected when answering50
a query, then the overriding policy is applied. Similar approaches are taken by
Chomicki et al. [CLN00] and Ioannides and Selis [IS92]. The main problem with
capturing prohibitions in this way is that the answers to queries might not match a
policy writer’s expectations. Policy writers typically do not intend to write policies
that both permit and forbid the same action. Rather than identifying such policies
and alerting the policy writer, potential errors are patched with overriding policies.
In addition, these overriding policies are required even for consistent policy bases,
which seems rather burdensome.
Lithium deals with this issue in what is arguably a better way. Given a policy
base written in Lithium, we can detect conﬂicts and determine why they occur at
“compile time” rather than at “run time”, when a particular query is evaluated.
Using this information, the policy writer can modify the environment and policies
to more closely match her intentions. Moreover, if the antecedent of Theorem 2.4.1
holds, then the policy base is inconsistent if and only if the environment alone is
inconsistent. Thus, we can often determine when there is no conﬂict that needs to
be addressed.
The use of function symbols and negation is not the only diﬀerence between
Lithium and other policy languages. Unlike Lithium, many languages have explicit
support for groups and roles. A group is a set of subjects such that if a group has a
property, then every member of the group has the property (cf. [ABLP93, JSSS01]).
In role-based access control models [FBK99, HV01, LMW02, SCFY96] roles are
an intermediary between individuals and rights. More speciﬁcally, an individual
obtains a right by assuming a role that is associated with that right. For example,
Alice may need to assume the role of Department Chair in order to obtain the
budget.51
Predicate symbols can be used to capture groups and roles in ﬁrst-order logic.
For example, if we want to say that Alice is a member of the faculty and any
faculty member may chair committees, then we can represent the group using
the predicate Faculty. The environment fact is encoded as Faculty(Alice); the
policy is then
∀x(Faculty(x) ⇒ Permitted(x,chair committees)).
Similarly, the policy “Alice, acting as the Department Chair, may sign the budget”
can be written as
Dept Chair(Alice) ⇒ Permitted(Alice,sign the budget).
The fact Dept Chair(Alice) would be added to the environment when Alice
assumes the role and would be removed when she relinquishes it. Alternatively, we
could add a sort Roles to our logic along with the predicate As (as suggested by
Lampson, Abadi, Burrows, and Wobber [LABW92]), where As(e,r) means that
entity e is acting as role r (in other words, e has assumed role r). Continuing our
example, “Alice, acting as the Department Chair, may sign the budget” could be
written in the logic as
As(Alice,Dept Chair) ⇒ Permitted(Alice,sign the budget).
The second encoding for roles may be more in keeping with the spirit of the role-
based model, but we believe that both approaches are reasonable (and our results
apply to both choices). In short, Lithium supports groups and roles implicitly.
Lithium, as well as the Datalog variants, all use a fragment of ﬁrst-order logic
to express policies. Other approaches use a modal logic. Formal work on deontic
logic (the logic of “obligation” and “permission”) goes back to von Wright [Wri51].52
Glasgow, MacEwen, Panangaden [GMP92] were the ﬁrst to base a formal logic of
security on deontic logic. The logic of access control consider by Lampson et al. and
Abadi et al. [LABW92, ABLP93] can also be viewed as a modal logic, with a says
operator. These approaches can be translated into ﬁrst-order logic, but they have
features that take them beyond Lithium. For example, Abadi et al. have a calculus
of principals; Glasgow, MacEwen, and Panangaden deal with obligation as well as
permission. We believe that many of these features could be added to Lithium,
but we have not explored this issue.
The KeyNote system [BFIK98], which is based on PolicyMaker [BFL96], is
more ﬂexible than Lithium in that the application can invoke policies written in
a number of diﬀerent languages. There are programs that determine if a policy
applies to a query. Because KeyNote essentially views these programs as black
boxes, it is quite limited in its ability to reason about policies. As discussed by
Blaze, Feigenbaum, and Strauss [BFS98], the system needs to put restrictions on
the programs to ensure correct analysis. This is in fact done in KeyNote, but at
the price of a substantial reduction in the expressive power of the language.
Finally, we remark that the design of Lithium was heavily inﬂuenced by the
work of Halpern, van der Meyden, and Schneider [HvdMS99]. They identify some
key issues that must be addressed when developing a policy language, evaluate
various solutions that have been proposed in the literature, and recommend direc-
tions for future research. Our design incorporates three of their suggestions. In
particular, we write policies in ﬁrst-order logic; deﬁne sorts for principals, actions,
and time; and use a Permitted predicate that takes an individual and an action
argument. (This usage of Permitted is much in the spirit of how it is used in
modal deontic logic.)53
2.7 Conclusion
We have presented a fragment of ﬁrst-order logic called Lithium that seems well-
suited to reasoning about policies. Unlike previous approaches, Lithium allows
nearly unrestricted use of function symbols while still preserving tractability. More-
over, Lithium can express prohibitions explicitly, making it possible to detect cer-
tain errors, namely policies that are inconsistent or imply a fact that is missing
from the environment, to determine if one policy set complies with another, and
to capture the merger of policies. We are currently working with the Naval Re-
search Laboratory to build a policy engine that is based on Lithium. The engine
will answer queries about whether an action is permitted and will check policy
compliance.
We would like to extend the work in at least four ways. First, we suspect that
we can increase the expressive power of Lithium by further relaxing the bipolar
restriction. The general idea is to answer queries without computing the entire
closure of the policies and environment under resolution (i.e. R(E1 ∧P)). Second,
we would like to extend Lithium to capture obligations, as well as permissions.
Third, we want to ﬁnd ways to answer queries about policies written in Lithium
that change over time. For example, we would like to be able to determine which
permissions change in response to a particular change in a policy set, and we
would like to be able to detect if, by modifying the policies in a speciﬁc way
during runtime, a sequence of actions is permitted that is not permitted under the
original or revised policies. Finally, we would like to conduct a formal usability
study to test our belief that a large fragment of Lithium can be made accessible
to non-logicians by an appropriate use of syntactic sugar.Chapter 3
XrML
XrML, like Lithium, is a language for reasoning about policies. XrML diﬀers from
Lithium in four essential ways. The ﬁrst is that negation is not mentioned in the
antecedent or in the conclusion of XrML policies. The second is that XrML does
not make the same distinction between environment and policies that is maintained
in Lithium. In particular, an XrML policy can say that a principal has a property
(e.g., is a student) if certain conditions hold and an XrML environment gives only
basic facts; that is, it can be represented as a conjunction of positive Permitted-
free ground literals. The third signiﬁcant diﬀerence is that an XrML policy can
say that, if certain conditions hold, then a principal p is permitted to issue a policy
pol. If p exercises this right, then pol is added to the set of policies used during
query evaluation. Finally, an XrML policy can grant a permission based on who
has issued certain policies. For example, in XrML, we can write the policy “if
Cornell University says that Alice is a student, then she is permitted to register
for classes”, where Cornell University says that Alice is a student if the policies
issued by Cornell University imply this fact. In addition to these fundamental
diﬀerences, XrML and Lithium use diﬀerent terminology. In particular, a policy
in XrML is called a grant, and a grant g together with a principal who issued g is
called a license.
The XrML speciﬁcation introduces the components of the language and gives
an algorithm for determining whether a particular permission follows from a set
of grants and licenses in a given environment. Both the language components and
the algorithm are described in English and, as a result, they are open to interpre-
5455
tation. In such circumstances, the hope is that any ambiguity in the description
of the components can be resolved by looking at the algorithm and vice-versa.
Unfortunately, some aspects of the language are clearly inconsistent and even the
algorithm alone has certain unintuitive consequences. The goal of this chapter is
to address these issues.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we present a
representative fragment of XrML. In Section 3.2 we review XrML’s algorithm for
answering queries. After considering some examples in which the algorithm’s be-
havior is unintuitive and almost certainly unintended, we propose corrections that
we believe captures the designers’ intent. Formal semantics for XrML are given in
Section 3.3, and the revised algorithm is shown to be sound and complete with re-
spect to the semantics. In Section 3.4 we show that the problem of determining if a
permission follows from a set of licenses is undecidable. We also discuss a fragment
of the language that is both tractable and relatively expressive. In Section 3.5 we
outline how our results can be modiﬁed to apply to the entire language, including
extensions that are within the XrML framework. MPEG-21 REL, which is an
international standard based on XrML, is described in Section 3.7. We conclude
in Section 3.8. All of the proofs are in the appendix.
3.1 Syntax
XrML is an XML-based language; it follows XML-conventions. Rather than
present that syntax, we use an alternative syntax that is more concise and, we
believe, more intuitive. In this section, we introduce our syntax for a representa-
tive fragment of XrML (the rest of the language is discussed in Section 3.5) and
describe the key diﬀerences between the syntax used in the XrML speciﬁcation56
and that used here.
At the heart of XrML is the notion of a license. A license is a (principal, grant)
pair, where the license (p,g) means p issues (i.e., says) g. For example, the license
(Alice, Bob is smart) means “Alice says ‘Bob is smart’”.
A grant has the form ∀x1 ...∀xn(condition → conclusion), which intuitively
means that the condition implies the conclusion under all appropriate substitu-
tions. Conditions and conclusions are deﬁned as follows.
• A condition has the form d1∧...∧dn, where each di is either true or Said(p,e)
for some principal p and conclusion e. Roughly speaking, the condition true
always holds and the condition Said(p,e) holds if p issues a grant that says
e holds if a condition d holds, and d does, in fact, hold.
• A conclusion has either the form Permitted(p,r,s) or the form Pr(p), where
Pr is a property, p is a principal, r is a right (i.e., an action), and s is a
resource. The conclusion Permitted(p,r,s) means p may exercise r over
s. For example, Permitted(Bob,edit,budget report) means Bob may edit
the budget report. The conclusion Pr(p) means p has the property Pr. For
example, the conclusion Attractive(Bob) means Bob is attractive.
We abbreviate the grant ∀x1 ...∀xn(true → e) as ∀x1 ...∀xne. Also, we try to con-
sistently use d, possibly subscripted, to denote a generic condition and e, possibly
subscripted, to denote a generic conclusion.
Consider the following example. Suppose that Alice issues the grant “Bob
is smart” and Amy issues the grant “if Alice says that Bob is smart, then he
is attractive”. We can write the ﬁrst license in our syntax as (Alice,g1), where
g1 = Smart(Bob) (recall that this is an abbreviation for true → Smart(Bob)),57
and we can write the second as (Amy,g2), where g2 = Said(Alice,Smart(Bob)) →
Attractive(Bob). Because (Alice,g1) is in the set of issued licenses, the condition
Said(Alice,Smart(Bob)) holds. It follows from this fact and the license (Amy,g2)
that Said(Amy,Attractive(Bob)) holds as well.
The sets of principals, properties, rights, and resources depend on the partic-
ular application. For example, a multimedia application might have a principal
for each employee and each customer; properties such as “hearing impaired” and
“manager”; rights such as “edit” and “download”; and a resource for each object
such as a movie. We assume the application gives us a ﬁnite set primitivePrin of
principals and a ﬁnite set primitiveProp of properties. We then deﬁne the compo-
nents in our language as follows.
• The set P of principals is the result of closing primitivePrin under union.
(Here and elsewhere we identify a principal p ∈ primitivePrin with the single-
ton {p} and write {p1,...,pn} rather than {p1}∪...∪{pn}.) The interpreta-
tion of a principal {p1,...,pn} depends on context; that is, the interpretation
depends on whether the principal appears as the ﬁrst argument in a Said
condition, in a conclusion, or in a license. We discuss this later in the paper
(primarily in Section 3.4).
• The set of properties is primitiveProp. We assume that every property in
primitiveProp takes a single argument and that argument is of sort Princ.
For example, primitiveProp can include the property Employee, where
Employee(x) means principal x is an employee, but it cannot include the
property MotherOf, where MotherOf(x,y) means principal x is the mother
of principal y, nor can it include the property Vehicle, where Vehicle(x)
means resource x is a vehicle (e.g., a motorcycle, car, or truck). The results58
in this paper continue to hold if we extend the language to include properties
that take multiple arguments of various sorts (i.e., principals, rights, and re-
sources). It is also easy to show that closing primitiveProp under conjunction
adds no expressive power to the language. Closing under negation does add
expressive power; we return to this issue in Section 3.6.
• The only right in our language is issue and the only resources are grants.
Intuitively, if a principal p has the right to issue a grant g, and p does issue
g, then g is a true statement. Including additional rights and resources in
our language does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the discussion.
We formally deﬁne the syntax according to the following grammar.
license ::= (princ,grant)
grant ::= ∀var ...∀var(cond → conc)
var ::= xp | xr
cond ::= true | Said(princ,conc) | cond ∧ cond
conc ::= Pr(princ) | Permitted(princ,right,rsrc)
princ ::= {p} | {xp} | princ ∪ princ
right ::= issue
rsrc ::= grant | xr,
where Pr is an element of primitiveProp, p is an element of primitivePrin, xp is an
element of prinVar, which is the set of variables ranging over primitive principles,
and xr is an element of rsrcVar, which is the set of variables ranging over resources.
For the remainder of this chapter we assume that the ﬁrst argument in a license is
a singleton. Because the XrML document treats the license ({p1,...,pn},g) as an
abbreviation for the set of licenses {(p,g) | p ∈ {p1,...,pn}}, it is easy to modify
our discussion to support all of the licenses included in the grammar.59
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the grammar presented here is
not identical to that described in the XrML document. The main diﬀerences are
listed below.
• Instead of assuming that the application provides a set of primitive principals,
XrML assumes that the application provides a set K of cryptographic keys;
the set of primitive principals is {KeyHolder(k) | k ∈ K}. We could take
primitivePrin to be this set; however, our more general approach leads to
a simpler discussion. Moreover, our results do not change if we restrict
primitive principals to those of the form KeyHolder(k).
• XrML does not have conclusions of the form Pr(p). To capture properties,
XrML uses a right called PossessProperty and considers the properties
given by the application to be resources. The conclusion Pr(p) in our gram-
mar corresponds to the conclusion Permitted(p,PossessProperty,Pr) in
XrML. We have two types of conclusions because we believe the grammar
should help distinguish the conceptually diﬀerent notions of permissions and
properties, rather than confounding them.
• Instead of writing AllPrincipals(p1,...,pn), allConds(c1,...,cn), and
allConds(), we use the more standard notations {p1,...,pn}, c1 ∧ ... ∧ cn,
and true, respectively. Instead of writing PrerequisiteRight(p,e), we use
the shorter and, we believe, more appropriate notation Said(p,e).
• As discussed previously, XrML abbreviates a set of licenses {(pi,gj) | i ≤
n,j ≤ m} as the single license ({p1,...,pn},{g1,...,gm}). For ease of expo-
sition, we do not do this.60
3.2 XrML’s Authorization Algorithm
The XrML document includes a procedure that we call Query to determine if a
conclusion follows from a set of licenses (and some additional input that is discussed
below). In this section we present and analyze the parts of the algorithm that
pertain to our fragment.
Before describing the algorithm, we note that some aspects of Query are inef-
ﬁcient. This is acknowledged in the XrML document, which explains that Query
was designed with clarity as the primary goal; it is the responsibility of the language
implementors to create eﬃcient algorithms with the same input/output behavior
as Query. (In Section 3.4, we show that it is highly unlikely that such an eﬃcient
algorithm exists.)
3.2.1 A Description of Query
The input to Query is a closed conclusion e (i.e., a conclusion with no free vari-
ables), a set L of licenses (p,g) such that p is variable-free, and a set R of grants;
Query returns true if e is implied by L and R, and returns false otherwise. To
explain the intuition behind L and R, we ﬁrst note that the procedure treats
a predeﬁned set of principals as trusted. If a trusted principal issues the grant
g, then g is in R and it is assumed to be true. If the license (p,g) is in L,
then p issued g (i.e., p says g) and p is not an implicitly trusted principal. To
clarify the inferences that are drawn from R and L, suppose that the grant g is
QueenOfSiam(Alice), which means Alice is Queen of Siam, and the grant g0 is
Permitted(Alice,issue,g), which means Alice may issue g. If g ∈ R, then we
assume that Alice really is queen. If (Alice,g) is in L, then Alice says that she is61
Query(e,L,R):
D := Auth(e,L,R)
if Holds(d,L) = true for a condition d ∈ D
then return true
else return false
Figure 3.1: The Query Algorithm
the queen, but we cannot conclude that she is royalty from this statement alone.
If (Alice,g) is in L and g0 is in R, then we assume that Alice has the authority to
declare herself queen, because g0 ∈ R; we assume that she exercises that authority,
because (Alice,g) ∈ L; and we conclude that Alice is queen, because this follows
from the two assumptions.
Query begins by calling the Auth algorithm. Auth takes e, L, and R as
input; it returns a set D of closed conditions (i.e., conditions with no free variables).
Roughly speaking, a closed condition d is in D if d, L, and R together imply e.
To determine if a condition in D holds, Query relies on the Holds algorithm.
The input to Holds is a closed condition d and a set L of licenses; Holds(d,L)
returns true if the licenses in L imply d, and returns false otherwise. If Holds(d,L)
returns true for some d in D, then Query returns true, indicating that L implies
e. Query is summarized in Figure 3.1.
We now discuss Auth and Holds in some detail. To deﬁne Auth, we ﬁrst
consider the case where L = ∅. Deﬁne a closed substitution to be a mapping from
variables to closed expressions of the appropriate sort. Given a closed substitution
σ and an expression t, let tσ be the expression that arises after all free variables62
x in t are replaced by σ(x). Roughly speaking, Auth(e,∅,R) returns the set D of
closed conditions such that each condition in D, in conjunction with the grants in
R, implies e. That is, d ∈ D iﬀ there is a grant g = ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → eg) in R and a
closed substitution σ such that d = dgσ and eg implies e. Auth determines whether
eg implies e in a somewhat nonstandard way. In particular, it makes the subset
assumption, which says that any property or permission attributed to a principal
p is attributed to every principal that includes p. In other words, if p ⊆ p0, then
Pr(p) implies Pr(p0) and Permitted(p,r,s) implies Permitted(p0,r,s). Thus,
Auth(Pr(p),∅,R) =
{d | for some g = ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → Pr(pg)) ∈ R and closed substitution σ,
dgσ = d and pgσ ⊆ p} and
Auth(Permitted(p,r,s),∅,R) =
{d | for some g = ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → Permitted(pg,rg,sg)) ∈ R and
closed substitution σ,dgσ = d,pgσ ⊆ p,rgσ = r, and sgσ = s}.
Suppose that L 6= ∅. Then we reduce to the previous case by tak-
ing Auth(e,L,R) = Auth(e,∅,R0), where, intuitively, R0 is the set of le-
gitimate grants; that is, R0 consists of the grants in R and the grants
issued by someone who has the authority to do so. It seems reason-
able to call Query(Permitted(p,issue,g),L,R) to determine if a princi-
pal p has the authority to issue a grant g. However, if Auth calls
Query(Permitted(p,issue,g),L,R) to construct R0, then the algorithm will not
terminate, because Query calls Auth, leading to an inﬁnite call tree. So, instead
of calling Query(Permitted(p,issue,g),L,R), the XrML algorithm determines
if p is permitted to issue g by checking if Holds(d,L) = true for some d in the
set Auth(Permitted(p,issue,g),L − {(p,g)},R). We discuss the consequences63
of this solution in Section 3.2.2. In summary,
R0 = R ∪ R00, where
R00 = {g | for some (p,g) ∈ L and condition d,
d ∈ Auth(Permitted(p,issue,g),L − {(p,g)},R) and
Holds(d,L) = true}
Pseudocode for Auth is given in Figure 3.2.
We deﬁne Holds(d,L) by induction on the structure of d. If d is true, then
Holds(d,L) = true. If d = Said(p,e), then Holds(d,L) = true iﬀ p issues
a grant ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → eg) such that, for some substitution σ, egσ = e and
Holds(dgσ,L) = true. In this context, a principal {p1,...,pn} issues a grant g if
pi issues g for some i = 1,...,n. If d = d1 ∧ ... ∧ dn, where each di is true or a
Said condition, then Holds(d,L) =
V
i=1,...,n Holds(di,L). Pseudocode for Holds
is given in Figure 3.3.
Example 3.2.1. In Section 3.1, we argued informally that Amy says Bob is attrac-
tive if the set of licenses is L = {(Alice,g1),(Amy,g2)}, where g1 = Smart(Bob)
and g2 = Said(Alice,Smart(Bob)) → Attractive(Bob). The formal algorithm
gives the same conclusion. Speciﬁcally, Holds(Said(Amy,Attractive(Bob)),L)
sets RAmy = {g2} and calls Holds(Said(Alice,Smart(Bob)),L). Dur-
ing this call RAlice is set to {g1} and Holds(true,L) is called. Because
Holds(true,L) = true, Holds(Said(Alice,Smart(Bob)),L) = true and, thus,
Holds(Said(Amy,Attractive(Bob)),L) = true.
Suppose that a trusted principal says that Amy has the authority to is-
sue g2 (i.e., if Amy says g2, then g2 holds). Then we can conclude that
Bob really is attractive, because Query(Attractive(Bob),L,R) = true, where
R = {Permitted(Amy,issue,g2)}. Speciﬁcally, Query begins by calling64
Auth(e,L,R):
D := ∅
if L = ∅ then
% Find D, the conditions under which R implies e
if e = Pr(p)
for each grant ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → Pr(pg)) ∈ R
D := D ∪ {d | dgσ = d and pgσ ⊆ p, for some closed substitution σ}
if e = Permitted(p,r,s)
for each grant ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → Permitted(pg,rg,sg)) ∈ R
D := D ∪ {d | dgσ = d,pgσ ⊆ p,rgσ = r, and sgσ = s,
for some closed substitution σ}
else
% Find R0
R0 := R
for each license (p,g) ∈ L
L0 := L − {(p,g)}
D0 := Auth(Permitted(p,issue,g),L0,R)
if Holds(d,L) = true for a condition d ∈ D0
then R0 := R0 ∪ {g}
% Find D, the conditions under which R0 implies e
D := Auth(e,∅,R0)
return D
Figure 3.2: The Auth Algorithm65
Holds(d,L):
if d = true
then return true
if d = Said(p,e)
then
Rp = {g | for some principal p0,(p0,g) ∈ L and p0 ∈ p}
D := {d0 | for some grant ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → eg) ∈ Rp and
closed substitution σ, dgσ = d0 and egσ = e}
if Holds(d0,L) = true for a condition d0 ∈ D
then return true
else return false
if d = d1 ∧ ... ∧ dn, where each di is true or a Said condition
then return
V
i=1,...,n Holds(di,L)
Figure 3.3: The Holds Algorithm66
Auth(Attractive(Bob),L,R). Auth(Attractive(Bob),L,R), in turn, calls
Auth(Attractive(Bob),∅,R0), where R0 = {g2,Permitted(Amy,issue,g2)}.
Auth(Attractive(Bob),∅,R0) = {Said(Alice,Smart(Bob))}. So, Bob is attrac-
tive if the condition Said(Alice,Smart(Bob)) holds. To determine if the condition
holds, Query calls Holds(Said(Alice,Smart(Bob)),L). We have already shown
that Holds(Said(Alice,Smart(Bob)),L) = true; we evaluated this call during
our analysis of Holds(Said(Amy,Attractive(Bob)),L). So Bob is indeed attrac-
tive.
Query as described here and in the XrML speciﬁcation is somewhat ambigu-
ous. For example, the speciﬁcation does not say in which order the conditions in D
should be tested to see if at least one condition in D holds. As a result, there are
a number of possible executions of a call Query(e,L,R), depending on the imple-
mentation of Query. It is easy to see that, for a particular input, every execution
that terminates returns the same output. However, as we show in Example 3.2.4,
whether Query terminates can depend on how it is implemented. A similar is-
sue arises with Auth and Holds. We talk about an execution of Query, Auth,
or Holds only if the choice of execution aﬀects whether the algorithm terminates.
For example, we write Query(e,L,R) = true if every execution of Query(e,L,R)
returns true.
3.2.2 An Analysis of Query
In this section we present ﬁve examples in which Query gives unexpected results.
Example 3.2.2 reveals a mismatch between Query and the informal language de-
scription; the discrepancy exists because Auth makes the subset assumption and
the informal language description does not. Example 3.2.3 demonstrates that a67
license (p,g) should not be removed from the set of licenses when determining if p
is permitted to issue g. Examples 3.2.4, 3.2.5, and 3.2.6, show that a reasonable
implementation of Query does not terminate on all inputs, for three quite dif-
ferent reasons: Example 3.2.4 shows that on some inputs Holds makes inﬁnitely
many identical calls, Example 3.2.5 shows that on some inputs the call tree for
Query includes an inﬁnite path of distinct nodes; and Example 3.2.6 shows that
on some inputs the call tree for Query includes a node with inﬁnitely many distinct
children.
Example 3.2.2. Suppose that Alice is quietly walking beside her two giggling
daughters, Betty and Bonnie. Are the three of them a quiet group? Intuitively,
they are not, because Betty and Bonnie are giggling. According to Query, how-
ever, the answer is yes. Since Alice is quiet and Auth makes the subset assump-
tion, Query concludes that the principal {Alice,Betty,Bonnie} is quiet; that is,
Query(Quiet({Alice,Betty,Bonnie}),∅,{Quiet(Alice)}) = true.
Example 3.2.3. Suppose that Alice says that she is smart, and if Alice says
that she is smart, then she is permitted to say that she is smart. Is Al-
ice smart? Intuitively, she is, because Alice is permitted to say that she is
smart and she does so. But consider Query(Smart(Alice),L,R), where L =
{(Alice,g)}, R = {Said(Alice,Smart(Alice)) → Permitted(Alice,issue,g)},
and g = Smart(Alice). Query(Smart(Alice),L,R) begins by calling
Auth(Smart(Alice),L,R). Auth checks whether or not Alice is permitted to
issue g. It determines that Alice may not issue g, because the permission does not
follow from R and L − {(Alice,g)}. Since Alice is not permitted to issue g, Auth
sets R0 = R and returns ∅. Because Auth returns ∅, Query returns false.68
Example 3.2.4. Suppose that Alice issues the grant “if I say Bob is smart, then he
is” and Alice is permitted to issue this grant. Can we conclude that Bob is smart?
To answer the question using Query, let e = Smart(Bob), g = Said(Alice,e) ⇒ e,
L = {(Alice,g)}, and R = {Permitted(Alice,issue,g)}. We are interested in the
output of Query(e,L,R). Query(e,L,R) begins by calling Auth(e,L,R), which
returns the set D = {Said(Alice,e)}. Query then calls Holds(Said(Alice,e),L),
which sets RAlice = {g} and calls Holds(Said(Alice,e),L) again. It is easy to see
that an inﬁnite number of calls to Holds(Said(Alice,e),L) are made during the
execution of Query(e,L,R) and thus the execution does not terminate.
It is tempting to conclude that a set L of licenses and a set R of grants imply
a conclusion e only if Query(e,L,R) terminates and returns true. Unfortunately,
whether Query(e,L,R) terminates can depend on the order in which the calls
to Holds are made. To see why, consider a slight modiﬁcation of the previous
example where we add the grant {Smart(Bob)} to R. Intuitively, this means that
an implicitly trusted principal says that Bob is smart. It now seems reasonable
to expect that every execution of Query(e,L,R0) returns true, where R0 = R ∪
{e}, and e, L, and R are as deﬁned in the original example. Surely the issued
grants imply that Bob is smart, since a grant issued by a trusted principal says
just that! However, only some of the executions terminate. Every execution of
Query begins by calling Auth(e,L,R0), and every execution of Auth(e,L,R0)
returns {Said(Alice,e),true}. If an execution of Query next calls Holds(true,L),
then that execution of Query returns true. On the other hand, if the execution
calls Holds(Said(Alice,e),L) and then waits for the call to return before calling
Holds(true,L), then the execution does not terminate for the same reason that
every execution of Query(e,L,R) does not terminate.69
Example 3.2.5. Suppose that Alice says “for all grants g, if I say I am al-
lowed to issue the grant Permitted(Alice,issue,g), then I am allowed to
issue g”, and Alice is allowed to issue that statement. Is Alice allowed
to issue the grant Nap(Alice)? To answer this question using Query,
some abbreviations are useful. For all grants g, we abbreviate the condi-
tion Said(Alice,Permitted(Alice,issue,Permitted(Alice,issue,g))) as d(g)
and we abbreviate the grant Permitted(Alice,issue,g) as h(g). We exe-
cute Query(e,L,R), where e = Permitted(Alice,issue,Nap(Alice)), R =
{Permitted(Alice,issue,∀x(d(x) ⇒ Permitted(Alice,issue,x)))}, and L =
{(Alice,∀x(d(x) ⇒ Permitted(Alice,issue,x)))}. Query(e,L,R) begins
by calling Auth(e,L,R), which returns {d(Nap(Alice))}. Next Query calls
Holds(d(Nap(Alice)),L), which calls Holds(d(h(Nap(Alice))),L), which calls
Holds(d(h(h(Nap(Alice)))),L), and so on. It is not hard to see that, for all
integers n > 0, Holds(d(hn(Nap(Alice))),L) is called, where h1(g) = h(g) and
hn(g) = h(hn−1(g)), for all grants g. It follows that Holds does not terminate and,
thus, Query does not terminate.
Example 3.2.6. Suppose that Alice may say that she is trusted if Bob says
that Alice may issue some grant (any grant at all). May Alice say that she is
trusted? To answer this question using Query, we run Query(e,∅,R), where e =
Permitted(Alice,issue,Trusted(Alice)), R = {∀x(d(x) → e)}, and d(x) =
Said(Bob,Permitted(Alice,issue,x)). Query begins by calling Auth(e,∅,R),
which returns D = {d(g) | g is a grant}. We show below that D is an inﬁnite set,
so every execution of Auth that tries to compute D does not terminate. Even if
D is deﬁned without explicitly listing all of its elements, Query must determine if
some element in D holds. In fact, none do. Thus, any approach to testing if some70
condition in D holds by explicitly testing each condition will not terminate.
It remains to show that D = {d(g) | g is a grant} is an inﬁnite set. The key
observation is that inﬁnitely many distinct grants can be expressed in the language,
even if the vocabulary consists of only one property Pr and one principal p. To
see why, deﬁne grants gn, n ≥ 1, inductively by taking g1 = true → Pr(p) and
gn+1 = Said(p,Permitted(p,issue,gn)) → Pr(p) for all n > 0. Since each of
these grants is clearly distinct, D is inﬁnite.
3.2.3 A Corrected Version of Query
In this section we revise Query to correct the problems observed in Section 3.2.2.
One of the corrections is fairly straightforward. We resolve the mismatch illustrated
in Example 3.2.2 by removing the subset assumption from Auth. We note that
the language is suﬃciently expressive to force the subset assumption, if desired,
by including the following grants in R:
g = ∀x1∀x2∀x3(Permitted(x1,issue,x2) → Permitted(x1 ∪ x3,issue,x2))
gi = ∀x1∀x2(Pri(x1) → Pri(x1 ∪ x2)),for i = 1,...,n,
where x1, x2, and x3 are variables of the appropriate sorts and Pr1,...,Prn are
the properties in the language. We now consider Examples 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.5, and
3.2.6, in turn.
The problem illustrated in Example 3.2.3 lies in the deﬁnition of R0. Recall that
we deﬁne Auth(e,L,R) = Auth(e,∅,R0). Roughly speaking, R0 should consist of
the set of grants in R together with those issued by someone who has the authority
to do so. In other words, R0 should be R ∪ {g | for some principal p ,(p,g) ∈
L and Query(Permitted(p,issue,g),L,R) = true}. However, when computing
Query(Permitted(p,issue,g),L,R), Auth is given the argument L − {(p,g)}71
Query2(e,L,R,E):
D := Auth2(e,L,R,E)
if Holds2(d,L,∅) = true for a condition d ∈ D
then return true
else return false
Figure 3.4: The Query2 Algorithm
rather than L. Our solution is to do the “right” thing here, that is, we compute
Query(Permitted(p,issue,g),L,R). But now we have to deal with the problem
of termination, since a consequence of our change is that Query(e,L,R) terminates
only if the set L = ∅. To ensure termination, we modify Auth so that no call is
evaluated twice. Speciﬁcally, the revised Auth takes a fourth argument E that
is the set of closed conditions that have been the ﬁrst argument to a previous
call; Auth(e,L,R,E) returns ∅ if e ∈ E. Because the revised Auth calls Query,
which calls Auth, we modify Query to take E as its fourth argument. A closed
condition e is implied by a set L of licenses and a set R of grants if the modiﬁed
Query algorithm returns true on input (e,L,R,∅). Pseudocode for the revised
version of Query, which we call Query2, and for the revised version of Auth,
which we call Auth2, are given in Figures 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. Query2 refers
to the algorithm Holds2, which is Holds modiﬁed to correct the behavior seen in
Example 3.2.4 (discussed below).
The type of nontermination seen in Example 3.2.4 occurs because Query tries
to verify that a condition of the form Said(p,e) holds by checking if Said(p,e)
holds. To correct the problem, we modify Holds to take a third argument S that72
Auth2(e,L,R,E):
if e ∈ E
then return ∅
else
E0 := E ∪ {e}
R0 := R
for each license (p,g) ∈ L
if Query2(Permitted(p,issue,g),L,R,E0) = true
then R0 := R0 ∪ {g}
D := ∅
for each grant ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → eg) ∈ R0
D := D ∪ {d | dgσ = d and egσ = e, for some closed substitution σ}
return D
Figure 3.5: The Auth2 Algorithm
is the set of Said conditions that have been the ﬁrst argument to a previous call;
that is, S is the set of Said conditions that are currently being evaluated. If the
revised Holds is called with a ﬁrst argument d that is in S (which means that
the call was made when trying to determine whether d holds), then the algorithm
returns false, thereby halting the cycle. Pseudocode for the revised version of
Holds, which we call Holds2, is given in Figure 3.6.
It is easy to see that the problem illustrated by Example 3.2.4 does not occur
during the execution of Holds2. Moreover, the following theorem shows that
Holds2 is correct in the sense that every execution of Holds and Holds2 have73
Holds2(d,L,S):
if d = true
then return true
if d = d1 ∧ ... ∧ dn
then return
V
i=1,...,n Holds2(di,L,S)
if d = Said(p,e) and d ∈ S
then return false
if d = Said(p,e) and d 6∈ S
then
S0 = S ∪ {d}
Rp = {g | for some principal p0,(p0,g) ∈ L and p0 ∈ p}
D := {d0 | for some grant ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → eg) ∈ Rp and
closed substitution σ, dgσ = d0 and egσ = e}
if Holds2(d0,L,S0) = true for a condition d0 ∈ D
then return true
else return false
Figure 3.6: The Holds2 Algorithm74
the same input/output behavior on the inputs for which both executions terminate
and, if an execution of Holds terminates for a particular input (d,L), then some
execution of Holds2(d,L,∅) terminates as well.
Proposition 3.2.7. For all closed conditions d and sets L of licenses,
(a) every execution of Holds(d,L) that terminates returns the same output,
(b) every execution of Holds2(d,L,∅) that terminates returns the same output,
(c) if an execution of Holds(d,L) terminates by returning the truth value t, then
an execution of Holds2(d,L,∅) terminates by returning t.
Now consider Examples 3.2.5 and 3.2.6. To address the type of nontermination
seen in these examples, we might hope to ﬁnd an algorithm Query3 that returns
the same output as Query2 on inputs for which an execution of Query2 termi-
nates and returns false on all other inputs. Returning false when no execution
of Query2 terminates gives an intuitively reasonable answer; moreover, this ap-
proach is essentially what is done in MPEG-21 REL (see Section 3.7 for details).
Unfortunately, as we show shortly (see Theorem 3.4.1) this approach will not work
in general; there is no algorithm Query3 with these properties, since whether
Query2 terminates on a given input is undecidable.
Since we cannot “ﬁx” Query2, the best we can do is deﬁne some restrictions
such that, if the restrictions hold for a particular query, then the problems seen
in Examples 3.2.5 and 3.2.6 do not occur for that query. We now describe some
conditions that are suﬃcient and that we suspect often hold in practice.
To describe our approach for avoiding the problem seen in Example 3.2.5, let g
and g0 be the grants ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → eg) and ∀x1 ...∀xm(dg0 → eg0) respectively.75
The license (p,g) aﬀects the license (p0,g0) if and only if there are closed substitu-
tions σ and σ0 such that a condition of the form Said(p00,egσ) is mentioned in dg0σ0
and p ⊆ p00. For example, consider the license set L = {(Alice,g1),(Amy,g2)},
where g1 = Smart(Bob) and g2 = ∀x(Said(Alice,Smart(x)) ⇒ Attractive(x)).
The license (Alice,g1) aﬀects the license (Amy,g2) because the conditions are
satisﬁed if σ is a closed substitution and σ0 is a closed substitution such that
σ0(x) = Bob. A set L of licenses is hierarchical if there exists a strict par-
tial order ≺ on the licenses in L such that, for all license `,`0 ∈ L, if ` aﬀects
`0 then ` ≺ `0. Continuing our example, L is hierarchical because the ordering
(Alice,g1) ≺ (Amy,g2) satisﬁes the requirements. Observe that no hierarchical
license set includes the license (Alice,Said(Alice,e) ⇒ e) because this license
aﬀects itself. The license set in Example 3.2.5 is not hierarchical for essentially the
same reason. It is not hard to see that by restricting the set of queries (e,L,R,E)
to those in which L is hierarchical, we avoid the type of circularity that causes the
problem seen in Example 3.2.5. In the next result and elsewhere, we use #(X) to
denote the cardinality of a set X.
Proposition 3.2.8. If d is a closed condition, L is a hierarchical set of licenses,
S is a set of closed Said conditions, and T is the call tree of an execution of
Holds2(d,L,S), then the height of T is at most 2#(L) + 1.
We further restrict the language to avoid the problem seen in Example 3.2.6.
To understand our restriction, recall that Auth(e,L,R) ﬁrst extends R to R0 by
adding all the grants that are issued by someone who has the authority to do
so. Since all the grants in R0 − R are in L, the set R0 must be ﬁnite. Then Auth
creates the possibly inﬁnite set RΣ consisting of all substitution instances of grants
in R0, and returns {d | d → e ∈ RΣ}. (For simplicity here, we are assuming that76
Auth does not use the subset assumption; the subset assumption does not aﬀect
our discussion.) Since Auth considers only the grants in RΣ whose conclusion
matches the ﬁrst input to Auth, we could certainly replace RΣ by R0
Σ, where
R
0
Σ = {dgσ → e | ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → eg) ∈ R0,σ is a closed substitution, and
egσ = e}.
Because e is closed, R0
Σ is ﬁnite if, for every grant g in R0, if the condition of
g mentions a free variable x, then either x ranges over a ﬁnite set or x appears
in the conclusion of g. Our solution is simply to restrict the language so that
every grant has this property. Since, in our fragment, there are inﬁnitely many
resources (grants) and only ﬁnitely many principles, this amounts to restricting
the language so that if ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → eg) is a grant, then every free variable of
sort Rsrc that appears in dg also appears in eg. We call a grant restrained if it
has this property; we call a license (p,g) restrained if g is restrained. Thus, for
example, ∀x∀y(Said(∅,Permitted(x,issue,y)) → Permitted(Alice,issue,y))
is restrained, but neither
∀y∀z(Said(∅,Permitted(Alice,issue,y)) → Permitted(Alice,issue,z))
nor the grant ∀x(d(x) ⇒ e) in Example 3.2.6 is restrained. It is easy to see that,
for all restrained grants g = ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → eg) and closed conclusions e, if n
is the number of primitive principals in the language and |g| is the length of g,
then there are at most n|g| grants of the form dgσ → egσ such that σ is a closed
substitution and egσ = e. Thus, by considering only restrained grants and licenses,
we solve the problem raised in Example 3.2.6.77
3.3 Formal Semantics
In this section we provide formal semantics for the XrML fragment described in the
previous section; we translate licenses in the grammar to formulas in a modal many-
sorted ﬁrst-order logic. The logic has three sorts: Princ, Right, and Rsrc. The
vocabulary includes the following symbols, where primitivePrin is the application-
provided set of primitive principals and primitiveProp is the application-provided
set of properties:
• a constant p of sort Princ for every principal p ∈ primitivePrin;
• a constant issue of sort Right;
• a ternary predicate Permitted that takes arguments of sort Princ, Right,
and Rsrc;
• a unary predicate Pr that takes an argument of sort Princ for each property
Pr ∈ primitiveProp;
• a function ∪ : Princ × Princ −→ Princ;
• a function fg : s1 × ... × sn −→ Rsrc for each grant g in the language; if
x1,...,xn are the free variables in g, then xi is of sort si, for i = 1,...,n. If
g is closed, then the corresponding function is a constant that we denote as
cg; and
• a modal operator Val that takes a formula as its only argument.
Intuitively, Pr(p) means principal p has property Pr, and Val(ϕ) means formula ϕ
is valid.78
Notice that every principal in the grammar corresponds to a term in the lan-
guage, because ∪ is a function symbol.
The semantics of our language is just the standard semantics for ﬁrst-order
logic, extended to deal with Val. We restrict attention to models for which ∪
satisﬁes the following standard properties:
U1. ∀x((x ∪ x) = x)
U2. ∀x1∀x2((x1 ∪ x2) = (x2 ∪ x1))
U3. ∀x1∀x2∀x3((x1 ∪ (x2 ∪ x3)) = ((x1 ∪ x2) ∪ x3))
U4. ∀x((x ∪ ∅) = x)
We call such models acceptable. Val(ϕ) is true in a model m if ϕ is true in all
acceptable models. If a formula ϕ is true in all acceptable models, then we say
that ϕ is acceptably valid. Thus, Val(ϕ) is true in an acceptable model iﬀ ϕ is
acceptably valid.
The translation takes four ﬁnite sets as parameters. They are a set L of licenses,
a set A of closed resources, a set S of closed Said conditions, and a set E of closed
conclusions. Roughly speaking, L is the set of licenses that have been issued; A
is the set of resources that are relevant to a particular application; S is the set of
Said conditions that are assumed not to hold; and E is the set of conclusions that
are assumed not to hold. (The roles of each parameter should become clearer in the
course of deﬁning the translation and the subsequent discussion.) The translation
is deﬁned below, where sL,A,S,E is the translation of the string s given input L, A,
S, and E.
• If Permitted(p,issue,g) ∈ E or (p,g) 6∈ L, then (p,g)L,A,S,E = true.79
• If Permitted(p,issue,g) 6∈ E and (p,g) ∈ L, then
(p,g)
L,A,S,E = Permitted(p,issue,cg) ⇒ g
L,A,S,E.
Note that we assume g is closed, because this assumption is built into Query.
• (dg → eg)L,A,S,E = ((
V
e∈E ¬Val(eL,A,S,E ⇐⇒ eL,A,S,E
g )) ∧ dL,A,S,E
g ) ⇒
eL,A,S,E
g .
• (∀xϕ)L,A,S,E =
V
t∈T(ϕ[x/t])L,A,S,E, where T = A if x is of sort Rsrc, and
T = P if x is of sort Princ. (Recall that P is the set of principals.)
• trueL,A,S,E = true.
• If Said(p,e)L,A,S,E ∈ S, then Said(p,e)L,A,S,E = false.
• If Said(p,e)L,A,S,E 6∈ S, then Said(p,e)L,A,S,E = Val((
V
g∈Rp gL,A,S0,∅) ⇒
eL,A,S0,∅), where Rp = {g | (p0,g) ∈ L for a p0 ∈ p} and S0 = S∪{Said(p,e)}.
• (d1 ∧ d2)L,A,S,E = d
L,A,S,E
1 ∧ d
L,A,S,E
2 .
• Permitted(p,r,s)L,A,S,E = Permitted(p,r,s∗), where s∗ = s if s is a vari-
able of sort Rsrc, s∗ = cs if s is a closed grant, and s∗ = fs(x1,...,xn) if s is
an open grant with free variables x1,...,xn.
• Pr(p)L,A,S,E = Pr(p).
• for every principal p, {p}L,A,S,E = p.
Note that Said(p,e)L,A,S,E does not depend on E. This matches our intuition
that the meaning of a Said condition depends only on what principals have said,
rather than on what is actually true. By adding Said(p,e) to S, we ensure that
the meaning of the condition does not depend on itself. Finally, observe that80
Said(p,e)L,A,S,E is deﬁned in terms of the translation of potentially more complex
expressions. Nevertheless, the following result shows that the translation is well
deﬁned.
Theorem 3.3.1. For all strings s in the language and all ﬁnite sets L of licenses,
A of closed resources, S of closed Said conditions, and E of closed conclusions,
sL,A,S,E is well deﬁned.
We believe that our semantics captures the intended meaning of XrML ex-
pressions, as implied by the speciﬁcation. To make this precise, we show
that Query2 agrees with the semantics on all queries. Speciﬁcally, we show
that for all terminating executions X of Query2(e,L,R,E), X returns true
iﬀ
V
`∈L `L,A,∅,E ∧
V
g∈R gL,A,∅,E ⇒ eL,A,∅,E is acceptably valid, where A =
A(e,L,R,E,X) is the set of closed resources that appear in the ﬁrst argument
of a call to Query2, Auth2, or Holds2 during execution X. Intuitively, A
is the set of resources relevant to answering the query (e,L,R,E). For ex-
ample, suppose that, during a particular execution X of Query2(e,L,R,E),
Holds2(Said(p,Permitted(p0,issue,Permitted(p00,issue,g))),L,S) is called.
Then A(e,L,R,E,X) includes Permitted(p00,issue,g) and g. Notice that if X
is a terminating execution, then A(e,L,R,E,X) is ﬁnite.
Theorem 3.3.2. Suppose that (e,L,R,E) is a query and X is a terminating
execution of Query2(e,L,R,E). Then X returns true iﬀ
^
`∈L
`
L,A,∅,E ∧
^
g∈R
g
L,A,∅,E ⇒ e
L,A,∅,E
is acceptably valid, where A = A(e,L,R,E,X).81
3.4 Complexity
To answer a query (e,L,R,E), we need to determine whether an execution of
Query2(e,L,R,E) returns true. We claimed earlier that the problem of answering
queries is, in general, undecidable. We now formalize this claim. Recall that a grant
g is restrained if every variable of sort Rsrc mentioned in the antecedent of g is
mentioned in the conclusion of g. We say that a grant g is in a set L of licenses if
(p,g) ∈ L for some principal p. A grant g is in R ∪ L, for some set R of grants, if
g is in R or g is in L.
Theorem 3.4.1. Determining whether some execution of Query2(e,L,R,E) re-
turns true is undecidable for the set of queries (e,L,R,E) such that at most one
grant in R ∪ L is not restrained.
Let L0 be the set of queries (e,L,R,E) such that every grant in R ∪ L is
restrained. In this section, we examine the computational complexity of answering
queries for fragments of L0.
We ﬁrst show that the problem of answering queries for the full language L0 is
NP hard for two quite diﬀerent reasons. The ﬁrst stems from the fact that, if there
are n primitive principals, we can construct 2n principals using the ∪ operator.
The second is that, to answer a query, we might need to determine if exponentially
many closed Said conditions hold.
We use the following deﬁnitions to state our results. L1 is the set of queries that
do not mention the ∪ operator. A grant g is n-restricted if the number of variables
of sort Princ that are mentioned in the antecedent of g and not in the conclusion of
g is at most n. Ln
2 is the set of queries (e,L,R,E) such that all grants in R∪L are
n-restricted. A call Holds2(d,L,S) is h-bounded if the call tree for every execution82
of Holds2(d,L,S) has height at most h. Note that Proposition 3.2.8 shows that
if L is a hierarchical set of licenses, then Holds2(d,L,S) is (2#(L)+1)-bounded.
Lh
3 is the set of queries (e,L,R,E) such that if an execution of Query2(e,L,R,E)
calls Holds2(d,L,S), then Holds2(d,L,S) is h-bounded. The next result shows
that deciding if at least one execution of Query2 returns true is hard, even if we
restrict to queries in L0 that satisfy any two of the following: the union operator
is not mentioned (i.e., restrict to L1), the query is n-restricted for some ﬁxed n, or
all calls made during an execution of the query are h-bounded for some ﬁxed h.
(We show shortly that the set of queries in L0 that satisfy all three restrictions is
tractable.)
For a formula ϕ, let |ϕ| be the length of ϕ when viewed as a string of symbols.
For a set S, let |S| be the length of S; that is |S| = Σs∈S|s|. Finally, we abbreviate
primitivePrin, the set of primitive principals, as P0.
Theorem 3.4.2. The problem of deciding whether at least one execution of
Query2(e,L,R,E) returns true for (e,L,R,E) ∈ L0 ∩ L ∩ L0 is NP-hard for
L,L0 ∈ {L1,L0
2,L2
3}.
If we make all three restrictions (that is, restrict to queries in L0∩L1∩Ln
2 ∩Lh
3,
for some ﬁxed n and h), then determining whether a query returns true is decid-
able in polynomial time. However, as we might expect in light of Theorem 3.4.2,
the degree of the polynomial depends on n and h, and the polynomial involves con-
stants that are exponential in n and h. Note that, for queries in L0∩L1∩Ln
2 ∩Lh
3,
all executions of Query2 terminate and return the same answer. Termination is
fairly easy to show since every call tree of an execution of Query2(e,L,R,E) has a
ﬁnite branching factor if (e,L,R,E) ∈ L0, and has ﬁnite height if (e,L,R,E) ∈ Lh
3.
The fact that all executions of Query2(e,L,R,E) return the same output for all83
queries (e,L,R,E) ∈ L0 ∩ L1 ∩ Ln
2 ∩ Lh
3 follows easily from Proposition 3.2.7(b).
Theorem 3.4.3. For ﬁxed n and h, if (e,L,R,E) ∈ L0 ∩ L1 ∩ Ln
2 ∩ Lh
3 then
determining whether Query2(e,L,R,E) returns true takes time O(|L||E|+(|R|+
|L|)(|L|h−1(|L| + |R| + |e|)2)).
The big-O notation is hiding some rather complex (and uninformative) terms that
are functions of n and h; we spell these out in the appendix.
In practice, we believe that queries are often in L0 and, as shown in Proposi-
tion 3.2.8, if we restrict to queries where the set L of licenses has size at most h
and is hierarchical (which we expect in practice will often be the case), than all call
trees that arise are guaranteed to have height at most 2h + 1. Thus, in practice,
we expect that we can restrict to queries in Ln
2 and Lh
3 for relatively small values of
n and h. Moreover, even for larger values of n and h (say, as large as 10), as long
as the union operator does not appear, we expect that queries can be answered
eﬃciently, because the upper bound is quite conservative.
How reasonable is it to restrict to queries in L1 that do not mention the ∪
operator? We believe that XrML without the ∪ operator is suﬃciently expressive
for many applications. To examine the eﬀect of not using the ∪ operator, note
that principals appear as the ﬁrst argument in a license, in a Said condition, and
in a conclusion.
• According to the XrML documentation, the license ({p1,...,pn},g) is an
abbreviation for the set of licenses {(p,g) | p ∈ {p1,...,pn}}. It follows
that we can restrict the ﬁrst argument of licenses to primitive principals and
variables without sacriﬁcing any expressive power. (In fact, we can restrict
the ﬁrst argument of licenses to only primitive principals, because Query
assumes that if (p,g) is a license in L, then p is variable-free.)84
• We can replace a condition of the form Said({p1,...,pn},e), where p1,...,pn
are primitive principals, by Said({p1,...,pn}∗,e), where {p1,...,pn}∗ is a
new primitive principal, and then expand the set L of issued licenses by
adding a new license ({p1,...,pn}∗,g) for every license (p,g) already in L,
where p ∈ {p1,...,pn}. It is not hard to show that this results in at most
a quadratic increase in the number of grants. Thus, as long as the ﬁrst
argument to Said is variable-free, we can express it without using ∪.
• To understand the impact of our restriction on conclusions, we need
to consider the meaning of statements such as Trust({Alice,Bob})
and Permitted({Alice,Bob},issue,g). According to the XrML
document,Trust({Alice,Bob}) means Alice and Bob together (i.e., when
viewed as a single entity) is trusted; Permitted({Alice,Bob},issue,g)
means Alice and Bob is permitted to issue g. However, the XrML document
does not explain precisely what it means for Alice and Bob to be viewed as
a single entity. Indeed, it seems to treat this notion somewhat inconsistently
(recall the inconsistent use of the subset assumption). There are other dif-
ﬁculties with sets. Notice that if {Alice,Bob} is permitted to issue a grant,
then presumably g holds if {Alice,Bob} issues g. However, according to the
XrML documentation, the license ({Alice,Bob},g) is simply an abbreviation
for the set of licenses {({Alice},g),({Bob},g)}. So it is unclear whether a
principal that is not a singleton can issue a license. Furthermore, if princi-
pals that are not singletons can issue grants and {Alice,Bob} is permitted
to issue a grant g, then it seems reasonable to conclude that g holds if g
is issued by both Alice and Bob, but it is not clear whether g holds if it is
issued by only Alice (or by only Bob).85
There may well be applications for which these notions have an obvious and
clear semantics. But we suspect that such applications typically include
only a relatively small set of groups of interest. In that case, it may be
possible to simply take these groups to be new primitive principals, and
express the relationship between the group and its elements in the language.
(This approach has the added advantage of forcing license writers to be clear
about the semantics of groups.)
In short, we are optimistic that many applications do not need the union function.
3.5 The Entire XrML Language
XrML has several components that are not in our fragment. Most have been
excluded simply for ease of exposition. In this section we list the main omissions,
brieﬂy discussing each one.
• XrML supports patterns, where a pattern restricts the terms over which a
variable ranges. For example, if the variable x is restricted to the pattern
“ends in Simpson”, then x ranges over the terms that meet this syntac-
tic constraint (e.g., x ranges over {HomerSimpson,MargeSimpson,...}).
Patterns in XrML correspond to properties in our fragment. We could rep-
resent the example in our fragment by having the property Simpson in the
language and having the set of grants determine which terms have the prop-
erty. XrML also allows a pattern to be a set of patterns. We can express a set
of patterns as a conjunction of patterns. Since we can express conjunctions
of properties in our fragment, we can also capture sets of patterns.
• XrML supports delegable grants. A delegable grant g can be viewed as a con-86
junction of a grant g0 in our fragment and a set G of grants that, essentially,
allow other principals to issue g0. For example, the delegable grant “Doctor
Alice may view Charlie’s medical ﬁle and she may also give the right to view
the ﬁle to her colleague, Doctor Bob” can be viewed as the conjunction of the
grant “Doctor Alice may view Charlie’s medical ﬁle” and the grant “Alice is
permitted to issue the grant ‘Doctor Bob may view Charlie’s medical ﬁle’ ”.
Thus, we can express delegable grants in our framework.
• XrML supports grantGroups, where a grantGroup is a set of grants. We can
extend our syntax to support grantGroups by closing the set of grants (as
currently deﬁned) under the union operator. Note that our proposed treat-
ment of grantGroups is quite similar to our current treatment of principals.
• XrML includes rights, resources, and conditions that are not in our frag-
ment. There should be no diﬃculty in extending our translation to handle
these new features, and proving an analogue of Theorem 3.3.2. But we might
not be able to answer queries in the extended language. The problem is that
XrML allows resource terms to be formed by applying functions other than
∪. For example, MPEG-21 REL extends XrML by deﬁning a container re-
source that is a sequence of resources. This naturally translates to a function
container:Rsrc × Rsrc −→ Rsrc, so that the container hs1,s2,s3i is trans-
lated as container(s1,container(s2,s3)). Allowing such functions makes the
problem of deciding if a conclusion follows from a set of XrML licenses and
grants undecidable, for much the same reason that the validity problem for
negation-free Datalog with function symbols is undecidable [NS97].
• XrML allows an application to deﬁne additional principals, rights, resources,87
and conditions within the XrML framework. Obviously, we cannot analyze
terms that have yet to be deﬁned; however, we do not anticipate any diﬃculty
in extending the translation to deal with these terms and getting an analogue
of Theorem 3.3.2.
• XrML allows licenses to be encrypted and supports abbreviations via the
Inventory component. However, the XrML procedure for determining if a
permission follows from a set of licenses assumes that all licenses are unen-
crypted and all abbreviations have been replaced by the statements for which
they stand. In other words, these features are engineering conveniences that
are not part of understanding or reasoning about licenses.
3.6 Negation
We believe that many license writers will ﬁnd it important to deny permissions
explicitly and to state conclusions based on whether a permission is granted, de-
nied, or neither granted nor denied by a particular principal. For example, Alice’s
mother might want to say “Alice is not permitted to enter the adult website”, a
teacher might want to say “if the university does not object, then Alice is permit-
ted to audit the class”, and a lawyer might want to say “if the hospital permits an
action that the government forbids, then the hospital is not compliant”.
We can write these statements in XrML by using special “negated predi-
cates”. For example, we can write Prohibited(Alice,enter,adult website)
to capture “Alice is not permitted to enter the adult website”1; we can write
1Since XrML allows the application to deﬁne only additional principals, rights,
resources, and conditions, we cannot add Prohibited to XrML without extending
the framework, but the extension is so minor that we ignore it here; moreover,
there are no implications as far as complexity goes.88
NotSaid(University,Prohibited(Alice,audit,class)) to capture “the univer-
sity does not say that Alice is not permitted to audit the class” (i.e., the university
does not object to Alice auditing); and we can write NotCompliant(Hospital)
to capture “the hospital is not compliant”. We remark that this approach of
using “negated predicates” has appeared before in the literature [JSS97, BS04];
it is essentially the technique used by XACML [Mos05], another popular license
language.
Adding negated predicates to XrML is straightforward; reasoning about state-
ments in the extended language is not. One problem is that we have to han-
dle statements that are intuitively inconsistent. For example, consider the grants
Permitted(Alice,issue,g) and Prohibited(Alice,issue,g), which say that Al-
ice is permitted and prohibited to issue the grant g. It is not clear what we should
conclude from these grants. In particular, it is not clear if Alice should be allowed
to issue g. (The languages that include negated predicates typically require the
policy writer to specify how inconsistencies should be resolved.)
Other problems arise if we extend XrML so that the set of conditions includes
Pr(p) and NotPr(p), in addition to Said(p,e) and true.
Example 3.6.1. Suppose that a company allows employees to access their server
and allows nonemployees access if they sign a nondisclosure agreement. If Alice
cannot prove that she is an employee, can she still get access to the server by
signing a nondisclosure agreement? Intuitively, she should be able to, because
Alice is either an employee, in which case she has permission, or she is not an
employee, in which case she still has permission because she signed the waiver.
However, if we express the query in the obvious way (using negated predicates),89
then Alice is not permitted, because
SignedWaiver(Alice)
∧ ∀x(Employee(x) ⇒ Permitted(x,access,server))
∧ ∀x(NotEmployee(x) ∧ SignedWaiver(x) ⇒ Permitted(x,access,server))
⇒ Permitted(Alice,access,server)
is not valid.
To address the unintuitive behavior shown in Example 3.6.1, we could re-
place the negated predicates by a negation operator, which is the standard ap-
proach in logic. Let XrML¬ be XrML extended so that the set of conditions
includes ¬Said(p,e) as well as Said(p,e), and the set of conclusions includes
¬Pr(p) and ¬Permitted(p,r,s), as well as Pr(p) and Permitted(p,r,s). There
is no problem extending the semantics of XrML to XrML¬. Moreover, by re-
placing NotEmployee in Example 3.6.1 by ¬Employee, we get the intuitively
correct answer. The downside of allowing negation is intractability. Recall that
L0∩L1∩L0
2∩L2
3 is a small fragment of XrML: the licenses in this fragment do not
mention the ∪ operator, every variable in the antecedent of a grant appears in its
conclusion, and the execution tree for all calls to Holds2 has height at most two.
Theorem 3.4.2 shows that queries in L0∩L1∩L0
2∩L2
3 are tractable; however, as we
now show, adding negation to this relatively small language makes it intractable.
Theorem 3.6.2. Let (e,L,R,E) be a tuple in L0∩L1∩L0
2∩L2
3 extended to include
negated Said conditions and negated conclusions. The problem of deciding whether
^
`∈L
`
L,A,S,E ∧
^
g∈R
g
L,A,S,E ⇒ e
L,A,S,E90
is valid is NP-hard. This result holds even if e, all of the licenses in L, and all of
the conclusions in E are in XrML, all but one of the grants in R is in XrML, and
the one grant that is in in XrML¬ – XrML is of the form ∀x1 ...∀xn(¬e).
We are currently investigating whether there is a tractable fragment of XrML¬
that is suﬃciently expressive to capture the grants and licenses that are of practical
importance. We expect that some ideas from our work on Lithium [HW03] will
prove useful in this regard.
3.7 MPEG-21 REL
MPEG-21 is an international standard that is based on XrML. In [HW04], we
give semantics to a beta version of MPEG-21. All of the problems discussed in
Section 3.2.2 are present in the beta version. We reported these issues to Xin Wang
and Thomas DeMartini of the MPEG-21 working group before the ﬁnal version
was released, and our concerns were addressed in the ﬁnal version (although not
exactly as speciﬁed in Section 3.2.3).
The key diﬀerences between XrML and MPEG-21 are as follows.
• MPEG-21 (consistently) makes the subset assumption; that is, a principal
{p1,...,pn} has all of the properties and permissions of principal pi, for
i = 1,...,n.
• A Said condition takes a trustRoot s and a conclusion e. No deﬁnition
of trustRoot is given in the speciﬁcation; rather, it is assumed that the
application will associate with every trustRoot s, set L of licenses, and set
R of grants a set G(s,L,R) of grants. Said(s,e) holds if the set L of issued91
licenses and G(s,L,R) together imply e, where R is the set of grants that
implicitly hold.
• Rather than deﬁning an algorithm, MPEG-21 says that L and R imply e if
there is a proof tree that shows the result holds. Roughly speaking, a proof
tree t shows that L and R imply e if (a) t includes a grant g that implies e
if certain conditions hold; (b) for each of these conditions, t includes a proof
tree showing that the condition does, in fact, hold, and (c) either g is in R
or, for some principal p, (p,g) is in L and t includes a proof tree showing
that p is permitted to issue g.
We believe that the translation and corresponding proof of correctness given in
Section 3.3 can be modiﬁed in a straightforward way to apply to MPEG-21. If this
is indeed the case, then an appropriately modiﬁed Query2 can be used to answer
queries about licenses and grants that are written in MPEG-21.
3.8 Concluding Remarks
XrML is a popular language that does not have formal semantics. Since there are
no formal semantics, we cannot argue that the XrML algorithm is incorrect, but
its behavior on certain input does seem unreasonable. To address the problem,
we modiﬁed the algorithm, provided formal semantics for XrML in a way that
we believe captures the designers’ intent, and showed that the modiﬁed algorithm
corresponds to our semantics in a precise sense.
In a broader context, our work emphasizes the need for license languages to
have formal semantics. Our analysis of XrML shows that even carefully crafted
languages are prone to ambiguities and inconsistencies if they do not have formal92
semantics.
We have examined only a fragment of XrML. A key reason for XrML’s popu-
larity is that the framework is extensible; applications can deﬁne new components
(i.e., principals, rights, resources, and conditions) to suit their needs. We do not
believe there will be be any diﬃculty in giving semantics to the extended language.
The real question is whether we can ﬁnd useful tractable extensions. As we have
already seen, functions pose no semantic diﬃculties, but adding them makes the
problem of answering queries in XrML undecidable. Another obvious and desir-
able feature is negation. Currently, XrML does not support negation in either
the condition or conclusion of grants. This is a signiﬁcant expressive weakness.
Without negation, license writers cannot forbid an action explicitly nor can they
say that a conclusion holds if a permission is denied or unregulated by a particular
principal. While it is easy to extend XrML to include negation, doing so without
placing further restrictions on the language makes it intractable. We suspect that
we can use our earlier work [HW03] to ﬁnd a fragment of XrML with negation that
is tractable and substantially more expressive. We hope to pursue this in future
work.Chapter 4
ODRL
ODRL, at a high level, is simply another language for reasoning about policies.
ODRL is diﬀerent from both XrML and Lithium in that, in ODRL, every policy
is part of an agreement. An agreement says that the owner of a speciﬁc resource
r gives a particular set of principals access to r and that access is governed by a
set of policies.
The agreement framework leads to other diﬀerences between the languages. In
particular, since every ODRL policy gives the members of a particular set of users
access to a speciﬁc resource, we cannot write certain policies in ODRL such as
“everyone is permitted to download the movie trailer” and “Alice is permitted to
download every resource that is in the public domain”. In addition, because the
resource owner only grants rights to certain users, denying policies (i.e., policies
that forbid actions) are fairly rare; they occur only when a set of users is granted
an exclusive right. For example, an agreement can say that Pixar gives Disney the
exclusive right to distribute the movie “Cars”. The agreement implies that Disney
may distribute “Cars” and everyone else is forbidden to distribute the movie.
ODRL has other unique features. For example, the antecedent of an ODRL
policy can mention disjunction and negation without restriction. So ODRL is not
comparable, and in particular is not subsumed, by either Lithium or XrML.
The ODRL speciﬁcation consists of an English description of the language
components. It does not include formal semantics nor is an algorithm given for
determining if a set of agreements imply a particular permission in a given envi-
ronment. In this chapter, we rectify both of these omissions.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we present
a representative fragment of ODRL. In Section 4.2, we give a semantics to this
fragment by translating expressions in the language to formulas in ﬁrst-order logic.
In Section 4.3, we deﬁne when a set of ODRL statements implies a permission (or
prohibition); show that determining whether a particular implication holds is, in
general, NP-hard; and ﬁnd a tractable fragment of the language. We give a general
critique of ODRL, along with suggested improvements, in Section 4.4. We conclude
in Section 4.5.
4.1 The ODRL Language
We describe ODRL by giving an abstract syntax for a representative fragment of
the language. Using this abstract syntax, rather than the XML-based syntax of
ODRL, simpliﬁes the presentation and discussion of our semantics. To illustrate
the diﬀerences between the two notations, consider the statement “If Mary Smith
pays ﬁve dollars, then she is allowed to print the eBook ‘Treasure Island’ twice
and she is allowed to display it on her computer as many times as she likes”. (A
similar expression is discussed in [GNS03].) We can write the statement in ODRL
as
<agreement>
<asset>
<context>
<uid> Treasure Island </uid>
</context>
</asset>
<permission>95
<display>
<constraint>
<cpu>
<context>
<uid> Mary’s computer </uid>
</context>
</cpu>
</constraint>
</display>
<print>
<constraint> <count> 2 </count> </constraint>
</print>
<requirement>
<prepay>
<payment>
<amount currency="AUD"> 5.00</amount>
</payment>
</prepay>
</requirement>
</permission>
<party>
<context>
<name> Mary Smith </name>
</context>
</party>96
</agreement>
In our syntax, we write the statement as
agreement
for Mary Smith
about Treasure Island
with prePay[5.00] −→ and[cpu[Mary0s Computer] =⇒ display,
count[2] =⇒ print].
Our syntax is given in Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. We now discuss its main features
and then present a summary of the key diﬀerences between our syntax and that
of ODRL.
The central construct of ODRL is an agreement. An agreement says that a
principal (i.e., an agent or a group) prinu is allowed to access an asset according
to a set of policies (i.e., rules). Typically, prinu is called the agreement’s user. For
example, suppose that an agreement says “Alice is allowed to play ‘Finding Nemo’,
if she ﬁrst pays ﬁve dollars”. Then, the user is Alice, the asset is ‘Finding Nemo’,
and the policy is “The user may play the asset, if she pays ﬁve dollars”.
The set of principals and assets is application-dependent. For example, a digital
library might have a principal for each patron and an asset for each publication.
We assume that the application provides a set Assets of assets, as well as a set
Subjects of subjects. The set of principals is deﬁned inductively: every subject
in Subjects is a principal and every group (i.e., set) of principals is a principal.
Roughly speaking, if a policy applies to a principal prin, then the policy applies
to every subject in prin.
Every agreement includes a policy set. A policy set consists of a prerequisite
and a policy. Roughly speaking, if the prerequisite holds, then the policy holds;97
agr ::= agreement
agreement for prinu
about a with ps
prin ::= principal
s subject
{prin1,...,prinm} group
a ∈ Assets asset
s ∈ Subjects subject
ps ::= policy set
prq −→ p primitive policy set
prq 7−→ p primitive exclusive policy set
and[ps1,...,psm] conjunction (m ≥ 1)
p ::= policy
prq =⇒id act primitive policy
and[p1,...,pm] conjunction (m ≥ 1)
act ::= action
play play asset
print print asset
display display asset
id ∈ PolIds policy identiﬁer
Figure 4.1: Abstract Syntax for ODRL (Agreements)98
prq ::= prerequisite
true
cons constraint
req requirement
cond condition
and[prq1,...,prqm] conjunction (m ≥ 1)
or[prq1,...,prqm] disjunction (m ≥ 1)
xor[prq1,...,prqm] exclusive disjunction (m ≥ 1)
Figure 4.2: Abstract Syntax for ODRL (Prerequisites)
that is, the policy is taken into consideration when answering questions about
what is and what is not permitted. In addition, a policy set can be tagged as
being exclusive.
An exclusive policy set indicates that only the agreement’s user (the subjects
comprising the principal) may perform the actions regulated by the policy set;
every other subject is forbidden from doing the regulated actions. Policy sets are
closed under conjunction. Roughly speaking, this allows a single agreement to
include multiple policy sets.
A policy consists of a prerequisite, an action, and a unique identiﬁer. The policy
says that, if the prerequisite holds, then the agreement’s user may perform the
action to the agreement’s asset. (We use the identiﬁers to simplify the translation.
They are optional in ODRL.) The set of policies is closed under conjunction. For99
cons ::= constraint
prin principal
forEachMember[prin;cons1,...,consm] constraint distribution (m ≥ 1)
count[n] number of uses (n ∈ N)
prinhcount[n]i number of uses by prin (n ∈ N)
req ::= requirement
prePay[r] prepayment (r ∈ R+)
attribution[s] attribution to subject s
inSeq[req1,...,reqm] ordered constraints (m ≥ 1)
anySeq[req1,...,reqm] unordered constraints (m ≥ 1)
cond ::= condition
not[ps] suspending policy set
not[cons] suspending constraint
Figure 4.3: Abstract Syntax for ODRL (Prerequisites Components)100
simplicity, we often omit the identiﬁer if it is not relevant to our examples and we
restrict the set of actions to play, print, and display.
A prerequisite is either true, a constraint, a requirement, or a condition. The
prerequisite true always holds. For simplicity, we abbreviate policy sets of the
form true −→ p as p, and we abbreviate policies of the form true =⇒ act as act.
Constraints are facts that are outside the user’s inﬂuence. For example, there is
nothing that Alice can do to meet the constraint “The user is Bob”. Requirements
are facts that are typically within the user’s power to meet. For example, Alice
can meet the requirement “The user has paid ﬁve dollars” by making the payment.
Although the distinction between constraints and requirements is not relevant when
answering questions about what is and is not permitted, it is relevant for other
types of queries. In particular, it provides key information when determining what
a principal can do to obtain a permission. Finally, conditions are constraints that
must not hold. The statement “The user is not Bob” is an example of a condition.
The set of prerequisites is closed under conjunction, disjunction, and exclusive
disjunction (i.e., under and, or, and xor). Conjunction allows a single policy or
policy set to have multiple prerequisites. For example, we use conjunction to write
the policy “If the user pays one dollar and acknowledges Alice as the creator of
ﬁle f, then the user may copy f”. Disjunction and exclusive disjunction are used
to abbreviate policies and policy sets in a natural way. For example, consider the
policy “If the user pays ﬁve dollars then the user may watch the movie and if
the user is Alice, then the user may watch the movie”. Using disjunction, we can
abbreviate the policy as “If the user pays ﬁve dollars or the user is Alice, then the
user may watch the movie”.101
Our fragment of ODRL includes two primitive forms of constraints: user con-
straints and count constraints. A user constraint is a principal prin; a subject s
meets the constraint if s ∈ prin. A count constraint refers to a set P of policies,
and is parameterized by an integer n. The constraint holds if n is greater than the
number of times the user of the agreement has invoked the policies in P to justify
her actions. If the constraint appears in a policy p, then P = {p}. Otherwise, the
constraint appears in some policy set ps and P is the set of policies mentioned in
ps.
Example 4.1.1. Consider the following agreement:
agreement for {Alice,Bob} about The Report with and[p1,p2],
where p1 is count[5] =⇒id1 print and p2 is and[Alice,count[2]] =⇒id2 print. (Recall
that and[p1,p2] is an abbreviation for the policy set true −→ and[p1,p2].) The
agreement says that asset The Report may be printed a total of ﬁve times by
either Alice or Bob, and twice more by Alice. That is, if Alice and Bob have used
policy p1 to justify their printing of The Report a1 and b1 times, respectively, then
either may do so again if a1 + b1 < 5. Similarly, if Alice and Bob have used the
policy p2 to justify printing a2 and b2 times, respectively, then Alice may do so
again if a2 + b2 < 5. Note that, since Bob does not satisfy the constraint of being
Alice, b2 is 0, so the second policy amounts to giving Alice the permission to print
The Report twice (in addition to any printings made by invoking other policies).
A count constraint that appears in a policy set is interpreted in a similar way.
Example 4.1.2. Consider the following agreement:
agreement for {Alice,Bob} about The Report with count[5] −→ and[p1,p2],102
where p1 is print and p2 is display. The agreement says that Alice and Bob may
invoke policies p1 and p2 a total of ﬁve times to justify the printing or displaying of
asset The Report. That is, if Alice and Bob have used policy p1 to justify the print
action ap and bp times respectively, and have used policy p2 to justify the display
action ad and bd times respectively, then either of them may print or display again
if ap + bp + ad + bd < 5.
The constraint forEachMember takes a principal prin (usually a group) and a
list L of constraints; it holds if each principal in prin satisﬁes each constraint in L.
ODRL supports nested constraints, where a constraint is used to modify an-
other constraint. To illustrate how our approach can accommodate nested con-
straints, consider the constraint prinhcount[n]i, which is interpreted like a count[n]
constraint, except that it applies to the principal prin rather than to the user of
the agreement. Thus, the constraint holds if n is greater than the number of times
prin has used the policies to justify her actions.
Example 4.1.3. Consider the following agreement:
agreement for {Alice,Bob} about The Report with ps,
where ps is true −→ p and p is Alicehcount[1]i =⇒ print. The agreement says that
if Alice has not invoked policy p to print asset The Report, then she may do so;
until she does, Bob may use p to print The Report any number of times.
Example 4.1.4. Consider the following agreement:
agreement for {Alice,Bob,Charlie} about The Report with ps,
where ps is and[{Alice,Bob},{Alice,Bob}hcount[5]i] −→ and[p1,p2], p1 is print,
and p2 is display. The agreement says that Alice and Bob may invoke policies p1103
and p2 a total of ﬁve times to justify printing and displaying asset The Report.
Since Charlie does not satisfy the prerequisite {Alice,Bob}, he cannot invoke p1
or p2.
There are two primitive requirements, prePay and attribution. The prePay re-
quirement takes an amount of money as a parameter; it holds if the user pays the
speciﬁed amount. The attribution requirement takes a subject s as a parameter; it
holds if s is properly acknowledged (e.g., as the writer, producer, etc.). The set
of requirements is closed under the inSeq construct, which says the requirements
must be met in a particular order (e.g., acknowledge, then pay), and under the
anySeq construct, which says the requirements can be met in any order.
Finally, there are two types of conditions, negated constraints and negated
policy sets. The condition not[cons] holds if and only if the constraint cons does
not hold. For example, not[Alice] holds if and only if the user is not Alice. Similarly,
the condition not[ps] holds if and only if the policy set ps does not hold. But what
does it mean that a policy set (and, in particular, a policy) does not hold? Consider
the policy “If Alice pays ﬁve dollars, then she is permitted to play ’Finding Nemo’
”. There are at least two reasonable interpretations of when the policy does not
hold. Under the ﬁrst interpretation, the policy does not hold if Alice cannot get
the permission by paying ﬁve dollars. In other words, we could interpret not[ps]
to mean that a certain set of agreements does not imply ps. A problem with this
interpretation is that we do not know which agreements should be used to evaluate
the condition. Under the second interpretation, which we favor, the policy does
not hold if Alice has paid ﬁve dollars and is not permitted to play the movie.
In other words, the condition amounts to the logical negation of the policy. We
choose this interpretation because it is simple, fairly intuitive, and, as we shall see,104
leads to semantics that matches the semantics for negated constraints. (This is
encouraging because, in the ODRL speciﬁcation, the discussion of negated policy
sets is essentially identical to the discussion of negated constraints.)1
Example 4.1.5. Consider the following agreement:
agreement
for {Alice,Bob}
about ebook
with count[10] −→
and[forEachMember[{Alice,Bob};count[5]] =⇒id1 display,
forEachMember[{Alice,Bob};count[1]] =⇒id2 print].
The agreement says that Alice and Bob may each display the asset ebook up to
ﬁve times, and they may each print it once. However, the total number of actions,
either displays or prints, done by Alice and Bob may be at most ten.
Example 4.1.6. Consider the following agreement:
agreement
for {Alice,Bob}
about latestJingle
with inSeq[prePay[5.00],attribution[Charlie]] 7−→
(Alicehcount[10]i =⇒id play).
1It is worth noting that we could modify our interpretation without contradict-
ing the speciﬁcation. Continuing with our example, one variation is to have the
condition hold if Alice paid ﬁve dollars and is not explicitly permitted to play the
movie. Another variation is to have the condition hold if Alice paid ﬁve dollars and
is explicitly forbidden to play the movie. We can handle all of the variations by
extending our semantics in a fairly straightforward way (using a validity operator);
see [HW04] for details.105
The agreement says that after paying ﬁve dollars and then acknowledging Charlie,
Alice is permitted to play the asset latestJingle up to ten times. Moreover, any
subject that is neither Alice nor Bob is forbidden from playing latestJingle. (Bob’s
right is unregulated.)
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the syntax presented here dif-
fers from the one described in the ODRL speciﬁcation. The key diﬀerences are
discussed below.
Authorship. An ODRL agreement includes a principal called the owner.
Roughly speaking, the owner is the principal who is granting the permissions that
are mentioned in the agreement. While this information can be useful in practice
(e.g., for auditing), our syntax does not mention the owner of an agreement because
the identity of the owner does not aﬀect the legitimacy of an ODRL agreement—an
agreement holds regardless of who created it.
Oﬀers. In addition to agreements, ODRL includes oﬀers, which are essentially
agreements without users. Intuitively, an oﬀer is a contract (governing the use
of an asset) that does not apply until it is accepted by a user; once accepted, it
becomes an agreement. We can interpret oﬀers much as we do agreements.
Permissions versus Policies. The ODRL speciﬁcation uses the term permis-
sion to refer to actions, policies, and policy sets, as deﬁned here. We introduce the
distinction to clarify the exposition and to emphasize the two-tiered structure of
ODRL. Notice that it is the two layers in the framework that allow a prerequisite
to apply to multiple policies.
Contexts. ODRL uses contexts to assign additional information to agree-
ments, prerequisites, and other entities. A context might include a unique iden-
tiﬁer, a human-readable name, an expiration date, and so on. We represent the106
context elements that are included in our fragment directly in the syntax. Adding
full contexts to our syntax is straightforward, but it does not add any insight.
Moreover, we believe it obscures the main issues.
Prerequisites. Payments and other requirements in ODRL take a number
of arguments. For instance, payments can take an amount and a percentage to
be collected for taxes. We restrict every prerequisite to at most one argument
for simplicity; it is easy to extend our approach to include multiple arguments.
As we have already mentioned, ODRL supports nested constraints. These can be
handled in a manner similar to that used for prinhcount[n]i.
(Sequences and Boolean Connectives.) In ODRL, sequences (inSeq, anySeq)
and Boolean connectives (and, or, xor), which are called containers in the ODRL
speciﬁcation, apply to a number of entities. For simplicity, we associate the three
containers with prerequisites, and associate sequences with requirements. The gen-
eral case is a straightforward extension. In particular, the extension of containers
to policies in the obvious way helps resolve the ambiguity discussed in the intro-
duction; the policy “Bob may use Printer One or Bob may use Printer Two” gives
Bob the right to use either printer as he chooses. According to discussions with
Renato Iannella, this is the interpretation intended by the language developers.
Right Holders. In ODRL, right holders have a royalty annotation, indicating
the amount of royalty that they receive. This does not reﬂect an obligation on the
part of the agreement’s user, since payment obligations are captured by require-
ments. Instead, the annotations record how the payments are distributed. Since
we are primarily interested in capturing permissions, we do not consider royalty
annotations, and as a result, do not distinguish right holders from other principals.107
Revocation. Finally, the ODRL speciﬁcation mentions revocation, however it
is not clearly deﬁned. A revocation invalidates a previously established agreement.
Unfortunately, answers to key questions, such as who can revoke an agreement,
under what conditions, and subject to what penalties, are not discussed in the
ODRL speciﬁcation. As it stands, a revocation simply indicates that an agreement
has been nulliﬁed, and thus may be ignored.
4.2 A Semantics Using First-Order Logic
In this section, we formalize the intuitive description of ODRL given in Section 4.1.
Speciﬁcally, we present a translation from agreements to formulas in many-sorted
ﬁrst-order logic with equality. We assume sorts Actions, Subjects, Assets, PolIds,
and SetPolIds (for sets of policy identiﬁers), and deliberately identify a sort with
the set of values of that sort. We further assume sorts Reals and Times; Real to
represent real numbers, and Times to represent time. We interpret real numbers
in the standard way. For simplicity, we take sort Times to be the nonnegative
real numbers extended with the special constant ∞ representing inﬁnity. Again,
we interpret such extended nonnegative real numbers in the standard way; in
particular, t < ∞ for every nonnegative real number t diﬀerent from ∞.
The vocabulary includes:
• A predicate Permitted on Subjects × Actions × Assets, where the literal
Permitted(s,act,a) means s is permitted to perform action act on asset a.
• A predicate Paid on Reals × SetPolIds × Times. The literal Paid(r,I,t)
means an amount r was paid towards the policies corresponding to the set I
of policy identiﬁers at time t.108
• A predicate Attributed on Subjects × Times. The literal Attributed(s,t)
means s was acknowledged at time t.
• Constants of sort PolIds, SetPolIds, Subjects, and Assets; we also assume
constants play, display, and print of sort Actions.
• Variables of sort Times and a variable x of sort Subjects.
• A function count : Subjects × PolIds → Reals. Intuitively, count(s,id) is
the number of times subject s used the policy with identiﬁer id to justify an
action.
• Standard functions for addition (+) and comparison (<,≤) of real numbers
and extended real numbers.
Before presenting the translation, we deﬁne some useful auxiliary functions.
The function subjects returns the set all subjects appearing in a principal:
subjects(s) , {s}
subjects({prin1,...,prink}) , ∪
k
i=1subjects(prini).
The function principals returns the set of principals that are members of a given
principal; if the principal is a subject, the function returns the singleton set con-
sisting of that subject:
principals(s) , {s}
principals({prin1,...,prink}) , {prin1,...,prink}.
The function ids takes a policy p, and returns the set of policy identiﬁers that are109
mentioned in p:
ids(pr1 ... prm =⇒id act) , {id}
ids(and[p1,...,pm]) ,
m [
i=1
ids(pi).
The translation proceeds by induction on the structure of the agreement. The
translation is given in Figures 4.4 and 4.5; we discuss its key features below.
An agreement is translated into a conjunction of formulas of the form:
∀x(prerequisites(x) ⇒ P(x)),
where P(x) is itself a conjunction of formulas of the form
prerequisites(x) ⇒ (¬)Permitted(x,act,a)
and x is a variable of sort Subjects that is free in P(x). (We use the notation
(¬)Permitted(·) to indicate that the formula Permitted(·) might be negated.)
The translation of a policy set ps is a formula [[ps]]prinu,a, where prinu is the
agreement’s user and a is the asset. A (nonexclusive) primitive policy set prq −→ p
translates to an implication: if the user is in prinu and the prerequisite holds, then
the policy holds. An exclusive primitive policy set is translated as a nonexclusive
primitive policy set in conjunction with a clause that captures the prohibition
(i.e., every subject that is not mentioned in the agreement’s user is forbidden from
performing the actions). Conjunctions of policy sets translate to conjunctions of
the corresponding formulas. (In the translation, we follow the convention that
Vm
i=1 fi is true when m = 0.) Note that the translation of a policy set is deﬁned
in terms of a check that the user is in prinu, the translation of a policy, and the
translation of a prerequisite. We now consider each of these in turn. The formula110
[[agreement for prinu about a with ps]] , [[ps]]prinu,a
[[prq −→ p]]prinu,a , ∀x(([[prinu]]x ∧ [[prq]]
ids(p),prinu,a
x ) ⇒ [[p]]
+,prinu,a
x )
[[prq 7−→ p]]prinu,a , ∀x(([[prinu]]x ∧ [[prq]]
ids(p),prinu,a
x ) ⇒ [[p]]
+,prinu,a
x )
∧∀x(¬[[prinu]]x ⇒ [[p]]−,a
x )
[[and[ps1,...,psm]]]prinu,a ,
Vm
i=1[[psi]]prinu,a
[[s]]x , x = s
[[{prin1,...,prink}]]x , ([[prin1]]x ∨ ... ∨ [[prink]]x)
[[prq =⇒id act]]
+,prinu,a
x , ([[prq]]
{id},prinu,a
x ) ⇒ Permitted(x,[[act]],a)
[[and[p1,...,pm]]]
+,prinu,a
x ,
Vm
i=1[[pi]]
+,prinu,a
x
[[prq1 ... prqm =⇒id act]]−,a
x , ¬Permitted(x,[[act]],a)
[[and[p1,...,pm]]]−,a
x ,
Vm
i=1[[pi]]−,a
x
[[play]] , play
[[display]] , display
[[print]] , print
Figure 4.4: Translation of ODRL Agreements111
[[true]]
I,prinu,a
x , true
[[prin]]
I,prinu,a
x , [[prin]]x
[[forEachMember[prin;cons1,...,consm]]]
I,prinu,a
x ,
V
(prin0,i)∈Pm[[consi]]I,prin0,a
x
where Pm = principals(prin) × {1,...,m}
[[count[n]]]
I,prinu,a
x , (
P
(id,s)∈I×(subjects(prinu)) count(s,id)) < n
[[prinhcount[n]i]]
I,prinu,a
x , (
P
(id,s)∈I×(subjects(prin)) count(s,id)) < n
[[req]]
I,prinu,a
x , [[req]]I
0,∞
where [[prePay[r]]]I
t,t0 , ∃t00(t ≤ t00 < t0 ∧ Paid(r,I,t00))
[[attribution[s]]]I
t,t0 , ∃t00(t ≤ t00 < t0 ∧ Attributed(s,t00))
[[inSeq[req1,...,reqk]]]I
t1,tk+1 ,

  
  
[[req1]]I
t1,tk+1 if k = 1
∃t2 ...∃tk(t1 < ··· < tk+1 ∧
Vk
i=1[[reqi]]I
ti,ti+1) if k ≥ 2
[[anySeq[req1,...,reqk]]]I
t,t0 ,
Vk
i=1[[reqi]]I
t,t0
[[not[ps]]]
I,prinu
x , ¬([[ps]]prinu,a)
[[not[cons]]]
I,prinu
x , ¬[[cons]]
I,prinu
x
[[and[prq1,...,prqm]]]
I,prinu
x ,
Vm
i=1[[prqi]]
I,prinu
x
[[or[prq1,...,prqm]]]
I,prinu
x ,
Wm
i=1[[prqi]]
I,prinu
x
[[xor[prq1,...,prqm]]]
I,prinu
x ,
Wm
i=1([[prqi]]
I,prinu
x ∧ (
Vm
j=1,j6=i ¬[[prqj]]
I,prinu
x ))
Figure 4.5: Translation of ODRL Prerequisites112
[[prin]]x is true if and only if the subject denoted by the variable x is in the principal
prin.
There are two translations for policies: a positive translation, where the per-
missions described by a policy are granted, and a negative translation, where they
are forbidden. The positive translation of a policy p is denoted [[p]]
+,prinu,a
x , where
prinu is the user of the agreement, a is the asset, and x is a variable that ranges
over the subjects. A policy of the form prq =⇒ act translates to an implication: if
the prerequisite holds, then the subject represented by x is permitted to perform
the action act on the asset a. The negative translation of a policy p is a formula
[[p]]−,a
x , where a is the asset, and x is the variable that ranges over the subjects.
If p is prq =⇒ act, then the translation says that x is forbidden to do act to a,
regardless of whether prq holds. The positive and negative translations of policies
are deﬁned in terms of the translation of actions, which is simply the constant
corresponding to the action. As with policy sets, conjunctions of policies translate
to conjunctions of the corresponding formulas.
The translation of a prerequisite prq is a formula [[prq]]I,prin,a
x , where I is a set
of policy identiﬁers, prin is a principal, a is an asset, and x is a variable of sort
Subjects. Intuitively, I includes (the identiﬁer of) the policies that are implied
by the prerequisites and prin is the principal to which the prerequisites apply
(the agreement’s user, unless overridden within a forEachMember constraint). A
Boolean combination of prerequisites translates to the Boolean combination of the
formulas obtained by translating each prerequisite in turn. A user constraint prin
translates to a formula that is true if the current subject x is a member of prin.
The translation of the other constraints is more complicated. A forEachMember
constraint translates to a formula that is true if, intuitively, each constraint in113
forEachMember is met by each subject mentioned in the constraint (i.e., each
member). A constraint count[n] translates to a formula that is true if the sub-
jects mentioned in prinu have invoked the policies identiﬁed in I a total of i times
where i is less than n. Similarly, a prinhcount[n]i constraint translates to a formula
that is true if the total number of times that a subject in prin has invoked a policy
whose identiﬁer is in I is less than n.
Requirements have a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent translation than other prerequisites
because of their dependence on time (e.g., inSeq[prePay[r],attribution[s]] holds if r is
paid before s is acknowledged). To handle time correctly, we translate [[req]]I,prin,a
x
to [[req]]I
0,∞, where [[req]]I
t,t0 is an auxiliary translation that returns a formula that
is true if the events speciﬁed by requirement req occur within the interval of time
between t and t0. If req is a primitive requirement (i.e., a payment or attribution),
then we translate [[req]]I
t,t0 to a formula that is true if the relevant payment or
attribution occurred at some time between t and t0. An inSeq requirement is
satisﬁed if there exists appropriate successive times between t and t0 at which
each subrequirement is satisﬁed. Similarly, an anySeq requirement is satisﬁed if
the subrequirements are satisﬁed in some order (possibly simultaneously) between
times t and t0.
Conditions are translated by negating the translation of either the policy set
or the constraint speciﬁed as the argument. Recall that, in ODRL, we can capture
statements such as “If Alice is not permitted to print the report, then she is
permitted to display it”. We can also write “If Alice is permitted to print the
report, then she is permitted to display it”, since xor[true,not[ps]] is equivalent
to ps. It follows from our semantics that the ﬁrst statement alone gives Alice
the display permission if she is explicitly forbidden to print the report; the two114
statements together imply that Alice may display the report, regardless of which
print permissions are granted or denied.
Another subtlety arises in the interpretation of sequence requirements, partic-
ularly nested sequence requirements. To illustrate the issue, consider the nested
requirement anySeq[inSeq[req1,req2],req3]. What are the allowed sequences of
requirements req1, req2, and req3? One possibility, the one we adopt, is that
inSeq[req1,req2] is satisﬁed if req1 happens before req2. Thus, the following se-
quences are allowed: hreq1 req2 req3i, hreq1 req3 req2i, and hreq3 req1 req2i. Al-
ternatively, one could say that inSeq[req1,req2] is satisﬁed if req1 and req2 happen
consecutively. Under this interpretation, only the following sequences are allowed:
hreq1 req2 req3i and hreq3 req1 req2i. We can capture this last interpretation by
taking:
[[anySeq[req1,...,reqk]]]
I
t1,tk+1 ,

  
  
[[req1]]I
t1,tk+1 if k = 1
∃t2 ...∃tk(t1 < ··· < tk+1 ∧
W
π∈Sk
Vk
i=1[[reqπ(i)]]I
ti,ti+1) if k ≥ 2,
where Sk is the set of all permutations of sets of k elements.
Our translation is admittedly complex; however, it is not clear that a simpler
translation is possible, due to the distributed nature of agreements (e.g., a count
constraint can implicitly refer to policy identiﬁers that occur throughout the en-
closing policy set). To conclude this section, we translate Examples 4.1.5 and 4.1.6
from Section 4.1.
Example 4.2.1. Recall the agreement in Example 4.1.5, which says that Alice
and Bob may each display the asset ebook up to ﬁve times, and they may each
print it once.115
agreement
for {Alice,Bob}
about ebook
with count[10] −→
and[forEachMember[{Alice,Bob};count[5]] =⇒id1 display,
forEachMember[{Alice,Bob};count[1]] =⇒id2 print]
translates to the formula
∀x((x = Alice ∨ x = Bob) ⇒
count(Alice,id1) + count(Alice,id2)+
count(Bob,id1) + count(Bob,id2) ≤ 10 ⇒
((count(Alice,id1) < 5 ∧ count(Bob,id1) < 5) ⇒
Permitted(x,display,ebook))∧
((count(Alice,id2) < 1 ∧ count(Bob,id2) < 1) ⇒
Permitted(x,print,ebook))).
Example 4.2.2. Recall the agreement in Example 4.1.6, which says that after
paying ﬁve dollars and then acknowledging Charlie, Alice is permitted to play the
asset latestJingle up to ten times. Moreover, any subject that is neither Alice nor
Bob is forbidden from playing latestJingle.
agreement
for {Alice,Bob}
about latestJingle
with inSeq[prePay[5.00],attribution[Charlie]] 7−→
(Alicehcount[10]i =⇒id play)116
translates to the formula
∀x((x = Alice ∨ x = Bob) ⇒
∃t1∃t2(t1 < t2 ∧ Paid(5.00,t1) ∧ Attributed(Charlie,t2)) ⇒
(x = Alice ∧ count(Alice,id) < 10 ⇒
Permitted(x,play,latestJingle))∧
(¬(x = Alice ∨ x = Bob) ⇒ ¬Permitted(x,play,latestJingle))).
These examples illustrate that, despite the complexity of the translation, the
structure of formulas obtained from the translation follows closely that of the
agreements.
4.3 Queries
Our formal semantics provides a foundation for reasoning about agreements in a
rigorous way. Because of their obvious usefulness, we focus on queries of the form
“may subject s do action act to asset a”. In this section, we formally deﬁne such
queries; then we examine the complexity of answering them.
4.3.1 Formal Deﬁnition
Whether a permission (or prohibition) follows from a set of agreements can de-
pend on certain facts about the application. For our fragment of ODRL, the
relevant facts are which payments have been made, which acknowledgments have
been given, and the number of times each policy has been used to justify an ac-
tion. We encode this information in an environment, which is a conjunction of
positive ground literals, each of the form Attributed(s,t) or Paid(s,I,t), and
equalities of the form count(s,id) = n. Based on the type of information stored in117
the environment (both for our fragment and for all of ODRL), it seems reasonable
to make a form of closed-world assumption: we assume all environment facts are
known. That is, if a positive Permitted-free ground literal is not a conjunct of
the environment then we assume it does not hold, with two exceptions. First, if
there is a subject s and policy identiﬁer id such that no conjunct of E has the form
count(s,id) = n, then we assume count(s,id) = 0. Second, if the environment to-
gether with the standard interpretation of +, ×, =, <, and ≤ imply that a positive
literal holds, then we assume that it does. For example, if s and s0 are subjects, id
and id0 are policy identiﬁers, and no conjunct of E has the form count(s,id) = n
or count(s0,id
0) = n, then we assume count(s,id) = 0, count(s0,id
0) = 0, and
count(s,id) = count(s0,id0).
Suppose that we are interested in determining whether a set A of agreements
implies that a subject s may do action act to asset a in environment E. We
represent such a query as a tuple (A,s,act,a,E). Answering the query corresponds
to establishing the validity of a formula with respect to a particular class of models,
which are identiﬁed using the following deﬁnitions. Recall that a Herbrand model
is a model whose domain consists of the closed terms in the language. Recall that
a model m interprets the symbols +, ×, =, <, and ≤ in the standard way if it
satisﬁes the axioms of real closed ﬁelds [Tar51] over the sorts Reals and Times—in
the latter case, the axioms are modiﬁed in the standard way to deal with ∞. For
all environments E, let F(E) be the set of formulas made up of E itself, the real
closed ﬁelds axioms (extended to deal with ∞), and formulas count(s,id) = 0 for
every subject s and policy identiﬁer id such that count(s,id) is not a conjunct of
E. Finally, for all queries q = (A,s,act,a,E), deﬁne a model M to be E-relevant
if:118
(1) M is a Herbrand model;
(2) M satisﬁes every formula in F(E);
(3) M satisﬁes a positive Permitted-free ground literal ` only if M0 does not
satisfy F(E), where M0 is the model that is identical to M except that M0
does not satisfy `.
By restricting our attention to E-relevant models, we limit our focus to exactly
those Herbrand models that satisfy the environment E under the closed world
assumption. We believe that these are the only models that should be considered
during query evaluation.
Because an environment consists only of positive facts, an environment E is
inconsistent if and only if E has two conjuncts count(s,id) = n1 and count(s,id) =
n2 with n1 6= n2. Thus, an environment E is consistent if and only if there exists
an E-relevant model. When evaluating a query q = (A,s,act,a,E), we consider
only those models that are E-relevant. A formula is E-valid if it holds in every
E-relevant model.
We now have the necessary foundation to give an answer to a query q =
(A,s,act,a,E). Deﬁne the formulas:
f
+
q ,
^
agr∈A
[[agr]] ⇒ Permitted(s,act,a)
f
−
q ,
^
agr∈A
[[agr]] ⇒ ¬Permitted(s,act,a).
The answer to the query depends on the E-validity of f+
q and f−
q .
• If both f+
q and f−
q are E-valid, then either the environment is inconsistent,
in which case all formulas are E-valid, or the agreements are inconsistent in119
the environment. Either way, an appropriate answer to the query seems to
be “Query inconsistent”.
• If f+
q is E-valid and f−
q is not, the answer is “Permission granted” because,
roughly speaking, the permission necessarily follows from the agreements in
the given environment.
• Similarly, if f−
q is E-valid and f+
q is not, then the answer is “Permission
denied”.
• Finally, if neither f+
q nor f−
q is valid, then the agreements in the given en-
vironment do not imply that the permission is granted, nor do they imply
that the permission is denied. So the answer is “Permission unregulated”.
4.3.2 Complexity
We now consider the computational complexity of answering queries. It turns out
that we can design an algorithm that takes a query and returns the correct answer;
however, it seems unlikely that any algorithm will run eﬃciently on all input.
Theorem 4.3.1. The problem of deciding for a query q = (A,s,act,a,E) whether
f+
q is E-valid is decidable and NP-hard. Similarly, the problem of deciding for a
query q = (A,s,act,a,E) whether f−
q is E-valid is decidable.
Since answering a query q amounts to determining the E-validity of f+
q and f−
q ,
the ﬁrst of which cannot be done eﬃciently, answering a query cannot be done
eﬃciently.
The proof of Theorem 4.3.1 suggests that the intractability result holds, at
least in part, because ODRL includes conditions of the form not[ps], where ps is a120
policy set. It might be possible to modify our translation of not[ps] in such a way
that the revised semantics matches the speciﬁcation and answering queries in the
revised language is tractable (i.e., solvable in polynomial time). This is because,
as discussed in Section 4.1, the description of not[ps] in the ODRL speciﬁcation is
open to interpretation. In addition, we could identify a large tractable fragment of
ODRL, as interpreted here. However, we believe that neither of these endeavors
is particularly interesting because, having discovered that a component of the
language is not clearly speciﬁed and a natural interpretation leads to intractability,
it seems likely that the meaning of that component will be revised. In fact, based
on our discussions with the ODRL Working Group, we suspect that conditions of
the form not[ps] will not be included in the next version of ODRL. So, for the rest
of this discussion, we restrict our attention to the fragment of ODRL that does
not include these conditions.
Let Q1 be the set of queries (A,s,act,a,E) such that no agreement in A men-
tions a prerequisite of the form not[ps]. We now show that we can answer a query
q = (A,s,act,a,E) in Q1 eﬃciently. As a ﬁrst step, we consider the special case
in which the set of agreements is a singleton. For any expression e (either in our
ODRL syntax or in ﬁrst-order logic), let |e| be the length of e when viewed as a
string of symbols. For a set A of agreements, let |A| be Σagr∈A|agr|.
Lemma 4.3.2. There are algorithms that, given a query q = ({agr},s,act,a,E)
in Q1:
(a) determine whether f+
q is E-valid in time O(|E||agr|6), and
(b) determine whether f−
q is E-valid in time O(|E| + |agr|).
It follows from Lemma 4.3.2 that Q1 is tractable, provided that a permission121
(or prohibition) follows from a set of agreements if and only if it follows from a
single agreement in the set. Unfortunately, this is not necessarily true.
Example 4.3.3. Let A = {agr,agr0}, where agr is
agreement for Alice about ﬁle with print
and agr0 is
agreement for Bob about ﬁle with true 7−→ print.
Observe that agr gives Alice permission to print the ﬁle and agr0 forbids Alice
from printing it, since the agreement gives Bob the right exclusively. Because
the agreements contradict each other, f+
q and f−
q are E-valid for all queries q =
(A,s,act,a,E). So the answer to the query (A,Charlie,print,ﬁle,E) is “Query
inconsistent”, whereas the answer to the query ({agr},Charlie,print,ﬁle,E) and
to the query ({agr0},Charlie,print,ﬁle,E) is “Permission unregulated”.
If we consider only those queries in Q1 for which the set of agreements holds
in at least one relevant model, then we get the desired results.
Lemma 4.3.4. Suppose that q = (A,s,act,a,E) is a query in Q1 such that
V
agr∈A[[agr]] is satisﬁed in at least one E-relevant model. For every agr ∈ A,
let qagr be the query ({agr},s,act,a,E). Then
(a) f+
q is E-valid if and only if f+
qagr is E-valid for some agr ∈ A and
(b) f−
q is E-valid if and only if f−
qagr is E-valid for some agr ∈ A.
It follows from Lemma 4.3.2 and 4.3.4 together that answering a query q =
(A,s,act,a,E) Q1 can be done eﬃciently, provided that
V
agr∈A[[agr]] is satisﬁed122
in at least one E-relevant model. Moreover, if this is not the case, then the
query can be answered immediately. If
V
agr∈A[[agr]] does not hold in any E-
relevant model then both f+
q and f−
q are E-valid, so the answer to q is “Query
inconsistent”. Therefore, we can answer queries in Q1 eﬃciently provided we can
quickly determine whether the agreements are satisﬁed in at least one
relevant model.
Lemma 4.3.5. There is an algorithm that, given a query q = (A,s,act,a,E) in
Q1, determines whether
V
agr∈A[[agr]] is satisﬁed in at least one E-relevant model
in time O(|E||A|8).
Putting all of these results together, we can conclude that answering queries in
Q1 is tractable.
Theorem 4.3.6. There is an algorithm that, given a query q = (A,s,act,a,E) in
Q1, computes the answer to q in time O(|E||A|8).
We conclude this section with a few observations. We suspect that many queries
of practical interest have certain properties that could be used to improve the
eﬃciency of our algorithms. For example, it seems unlikely that a set of agreements
will give one principal an exclusive right and give someone else that same right
(possibly under certain conditions). That is, if A is a set of agreements such that an
agreement in A gives a principal prin the exclusive-right to do an action act to an
asset a and another agreement in A gives a principal prin0 the right to do act to a
if certain prerequisites hold, then we expect that subjects(prin0) ⊆ subjects(prin).
A straightforward syntactic check can be used to determine whether this is the
case for a particular query; if it is, then our proof of Lemma 4.3.5 can be easily
modiﬁed to show that the consistency check can be done in time O(|E|); that is,123
in time O(|E|), we can determine whether there is an E-relevant model satisfying
V
agr∈A[[agr]], where A is the set of agreements mentioned in the query.
We conjecture that answering a query (A,s,act,a,E) in ODRL can be done
eﬃciently, provided that, if an agreement in A mentions a prerequisite of the form
xor[prq1,...,prqn], then prqi does not mention a prerequisite of the form not[ps],
where ps is a policy set, for i = 1,...,n. We believe that we can use ideas discussed
in [HW03] to prove this result, however, we have not checked the details because,
as previously discussed, it is not clear that such a result is of practical interest.
4.4 Discussion: Improving ODRL
The process of working through the ODRL speciﬁcation to derive the formal se-
mantics highlighted a number of potential weaknesses in the design of ODRL. In
addition to not having formal semantics, the ODRL speciﬁcation does not discuss
which agreements should be enforced, how conﬂicts should be resolved, how agree-
ments can be revoked, and how the environment can be maintained. We examine
these issues in turn.
The ODRL speciﬁcation does not say which agreements should be used when
evaluating requests. The developers seem to assume that only a legitimate agent
will be able to create a particular agreement; however, it is not clear which agents
should be recognized as legitimate. Are there ODRL agreements that give subjects
the right to create agreements? If so, who is allowed to write those agreements?
A natural approach is simply to assume that everyone can write agreements; it
is up to the enforcing system to determine which are legitimate. A problem with
this design is that an agreement might be meaningless on some systems and quite
signiﬁcant on others. For example, suppose that Bob stores his diary on his home124
machine, which assumes all agreements are legitimate, and on his work machine,
which assumes an agreement is legitimate only if written by a manager of the
company. If Bob’s sister Alice, who is not a manager of the company, writes an
agreement that gives her permission to see Bob’s diary, then the home machine
will permit the access while the work machine will not.
A more satisfying approach is to deﬁne the circumstances under which an agree-
ment is legitimate and require only legitimate agreements to be considered during
query evaluation. A deﬁnition for legitimacy might say that some agreements are
legitimate by ﬁat (e.g., any agreement about an asset a issued by its owner), while
others are legitimate because there is some proof of legitimacy (e.g., an agreement
about an asset a issued by subject s is legitimate, because the owner of a has
written an agreement that gives s permission to regulate access to a). This is
essentially the approach adopted for XrML [Con01].
The ODRL speciﬁcation does not discuss how conﬂicts should be resolved.
For example, suppose that Alice gives Bob the exclusive right to distribute her
movie and she gives Charlie the right to distribute it as well. Is Charlie allowed
to distribute the movie? By the deﬁnition given in Section 4.3, the answer is
“Query inconsistent” because the agreements are inconsistent in the environment
(regardless of what the environment is). We can avoid this situation in at least
two ways. We can store each agreement with the relevant asset; that way, conﬂicts
can be detected, and hopefully resolved, as soon as a conﬂicting agreement is
associated with the asset. Observe that this approach still allows conﬂicts and
requires intervention, however conﬂicts are detected at a more opportune time,
when agreements are made rather than when queries are asked. An alternative is
to remove exclusive policy sets from the language so that conﬂicts cannot occur125
because no agreement can forbid an action. Finally, it is worth noting that, in
languages such as XACML [Mos05] and FAF [JSSS01], conﬂicts are handled by
requiring users to write overriding policies, such as “If an action is both permitted
and forbidden, then it is forbidden”. Unfortunately, applying this solution to
ODRL seems to require a substantial change to the language.
The ODRL speciﬁcation discusses revocation, but does not give a mechanism
for revoking agreements or for checking whether an agreement has been revoked.
Revocation can be added in a fairly straightforward way. In particular, policies
governing revocation could be part of agreements or built-in to ODRL; agreements
revoked by someone with permission could be added to a revocation list stored in
the environment; and only agreements not on the list could be considered during
query evaluation. It is not clear, however, that these changes are necessary. Even
without revocation, ODRL is still useful in practice because policies can “expire”
(e.g., only apply during a speciﬁc time interval or for a ﬁxed number of uses).
Finally, the speciﬁcation does not discuss how the environment is updated while
the system is running. Holzer, Katzenbeisser, and Schallhart [HKS04] propose a
solution to this problem. They associate with every ODRL agreement an automa-
ton that transitions whenever the user of an agreement performs an action. Thus,
to recast their work using our terminology, the states of the automaton corre-
sponding to an agreement are what we call environments. Holzer et al. do not
describe how to compute which actions are allowed in any given environment, but
they do describe how to update the environment. In contrast, we do not describe
how to update environments, but our semantics describes how to compute which
actions are permitted in any given environment. In this sense, the two works solve
complementary problems.126
4.5 Conclusion
ODRL is a popular rights language with features that we have not found in other
approaches. However, the usefulness of ODRL is limited, in part, because the
language does not have formal semantics. To address this deﬁciency, we have pro-
posed a formal semantics for ODRL. In the process of creating this semantics, we
discovered aspects of the speciﬁcation that should be clariﬁed and have discussed
our ﬁndings with the language developers. They are currently working on the next
version of the language, which has formal semantics as one of its seven design
requirements.
In addition to giving the language formal semantics, we have considered the
practical problem of determining whether a set of ODRL statements imply a per-
mission or prohibition. Using our semantics, we have formally deﬁned the problem
and shown that it is, in general, NP-hard. After removing a component of ODRL
whose meaning seems to be somewhat unclear, even to the developers, we can
are left with a tractable fragment of the language. To prove that the fragment
is tractable, we described a polynomial-time algorithm to determine whether a
set of ODRL statements imply a permission (or prohibition). To the best of our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst algorithm for answering such queries in ODRL.
Despite these successes, the work is far from done. We are currently collab-
orating with the language developers on the next version of ODRL. We are also
interested in examining other types of queries, such as what, if anything, a subject
can do to get a desired permission.Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this dissertation, we deﬁned Lithium, a fragment of ﬁrst-order logic that seems
well-suited to reasoning about policies. Using the insights gained from our work
with Lithium, we proposed the ﬁrst formal semantics for XrML and ODRL. The
process of giving the languages semantics revealed signiﬁcant problems with both
languages. We worked with the language developers to correct the problems in the
next versions of the languages.
We examined XrML and ODRL because, when we began our investigations,
they were the two languages that seemed most favored by industry. Since then,
a third language has come to share the limelight. It is called XACML. We give a
brief overview of XACML in the next section and then conclude with our plans for
future work.
5.1 XACML
XACML is an XML-based language that does not have formal semantics. Sev-
eral companies worked together to develop the language including Entrust, IBM,
and Sun Microsystems. On February 1, 2005, XACML was ratiﬁed as an OASIS
Open Standard. More recently, Fedora (the Flexible Extensible Digital Object and
Repository Architecture) has chosen to implement XACML as part of its security
system. In this section, we describe XACML at the level needed to compare it
to Lithium, XrML, and ODRL in a meaningful way. Giving formal semantics to
XACML is left as future work.
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An XACML policy can be represented as a closed formula
∀x1 ...∀xn(f ⇒ (¬)Permitted(t1,t2,t3)),
where f is a quantiﬁer-free Permitted-free formula and (¬)Permitted(t1,t2,t3)
means principal t1 is permitted (or forbidden) to perform action t2 on resource
t3. Observe that f can mention negation and disjunction without restriction. It
is not clear from the speciﬁcation whether f can mention variables that are not
mentioned in the conclusion of the policy (i.e., in t1, t2, or t3).
Policies in XACML are examined in a basic environment; that is, the envi-
ronment can be represented as a conjunction of Permitted-free ground literals.
A speciﬁc permission Permitted(c1,c2,c3) follows from a policy ∀x1 ...∀xn(f ⇒
Permitted(x1,x2,x3)) in an environment E if and only if there is a substitution σ
such that Permitted(x1,x2,x3)σ = Permitted(c1,c2,c3) and E “implies” fσ. In
XACML, E implies fσ if and only if the formula f0 is valid, where f0 is obtained
from fσ by replacing every instance of a literal ` by true if ` is a conjunct of
E, by false if the negation of ` is a conjunct of E, and by a fresh ground literal
otherwise. The intuition is that, whether the conditions of a policy hold under
a particular substitution depends only on E; any literal not mentioned in E is,
roughly speaking, irrelevant.
Example 5.1.1. Suppose that we want to know whether Alice may access the
company’s server given the following statements: employees are permitted to access
the server; non-employees are permitted access if they sign a waiver; Alice has
signed a waiver; and we do not know whether Alice is an employee. As discussed
in Example 3.6.1, Alice should be allowed access because she is either an employee,
in which case access is permitted, or she is not an employee, in which case access
is again permitted because she signed a waiver.129
The environment E can be represented as the literal SignedWaiver(Alice), so
the environment is basic and consistent. We can write a single policy p to capture
both statements about permissions, namely
∀x((Employee(x) ∨ (¬Employee(x) ∧ SignedWaiver(x)))
⇒ Permitted(x,access,server)).
The permission follows from p in E if and only if, according to XACML, E implies
f = Employee(Alice) ∨ (¬Employee(Alice) ∧ SignedWaiver(Alice)). Since
neither Employee(Alice) nor ¬Employee(Alice) are conjuncts of E, E implies
f if and only if ` ∨ (`0 ∧ true) is valid, where ` and `0 are distinct ground literals.
Since ` ∨ (`0 ∧ true) is not true in a model that satisﬁes ¬` ∧ ¬`0, the formula
` ∨ (`0 ∧ true) is not valid and, thus, p does not imply that Alice may access the
server.
Observe that p does imply the permission in the environment
Employee(Alice), because the formula true ∨ (false ∧ `) is valid for all
ground literals `.
A similar deﬁnition is used to determine whether a speciﬁc prohibition, such as
¬Permitted(Alice,access,server), follows from a certain policy in a particular
environment.
The policy writer deﬁnes when a permission is granted or denied by a set P of
policies in an environment E based on whether each policy in P grants or denies
the permission in E. For example, the policy writer could decide that a permission
Permitted(c1,c2,c3) follows from a set P of policies in an environment E if and
only if some policy p ∈ P implies Permitted(c1,c2,c3) in E. Alternatively, a
policy writer could say that Permitted(c1,c2,c3) follows from P in E if and only130
if some policy p ∈ P implies Permitted(c1,c2,c3) in E and no policy p0 ∈ P
implies ¬Permitted(c1,c2,c3) in E.
5.2 Future Work
The conclusions of Chapters 2, 3, and 4 give some ways to continue the work on
Lithium, XrML, and ODRL, respectively. In addition, we would like to address two
research questions. To motivate the ﬁrst question, note that XrML, ODRL, and
XACML are the languages that currently have the most industry support. We have
shown that these languages have problems due to ambiguities and inconsistencies;
the problems became readily apparent when we tried to give the languages formal
semantics. This suggests that any reasonably expressive policy language is likely
to have problems unless that language has formal semantics.
How do we ensure that the next generation of policy languages will have formal
semantics? One answer is to provide semantics for each new language. For exam-
ple, the next version of ODRL will have formal semantics because we are part of
the working group and have the task of providing it. We might also give formal
semantics for XACML. A problem with this solution is that it is fairly ineﬃcient.
To understand the intentions of the language developers at the level necessary to
provide semantics requires a substantial amount of time and energy, both from the
developers trying to clarify their speciﬁcations and from those trying to learn the
language. Another problem is that, if we do not learn about a language until fairly
late in its development, then the semantics have to be “retroﬁtted”, which is likely
to lead to semantics that are not particularly intuitive.
A better solution is to convince language developers to provide their own formal
semantics. As a step in that direction, we want to deﬁne a simple extensible policy131
language Lp that is accessible to developers and has formal semantics. Because Lp
is accessible to developers, a developer can provide a partial translation from her
language to Lp; that is, the developer can provide a translation for the fragment
of her language that can be written in Lp. Experts in formal methods can then
complete the translation by extending Lp as needed. Observe that the translation
provides formal semantics to the developer’s language because Lp has formal se-
mantics and this approach is more eﬃcient than having the experts provide the
complete translation since the experts have to understand only the non-standard
features of the language. In fact, because the same extension can be used for
multiple languages, a new extension is needed only for features that are not in-
cluded in any language that has been translated previously. Of course, translating
several policy languages to Lp (with suitable extensions) does more than provide
semantics; it facilitates comparisons between the languages and interoperability as
well.
In addition, we want a better understanding of which features of a policy lan-
guage are of practical interest. Lithium, XrML, ODRL, and XACML all have
distinct features. For example, using Lithium, we can discover inconsistencies in
a policy set, thereby helping policy writers to ﬁnd mistakes. XrML has Said con-
ditions and a mechanism for determining which policies have been issued by an
appropriate authority (i.e., which are legitimate). ODRL makes the closed world
assumption. Finally, in XACML, policies are considered individually and the policy
writer can choose how queries are evaluated based on the results of each consider-
ation. Given these diﬀerences, it seems reasonable to ask whether the features of
one language can be incorporated into another. For example, it is easy to modify
Lithium, XrML, and XACML to be suitable for applications that make the closed132
world assumption. It is not at all clear whether we can add an error-detection
mechanism to XACML that would in some sense match the Lithium capability.
The problem with considering these types of questions is that each answer is of
practical interest only if the corresponding feature is of practical interest. Contin-
uing the example, if most applications do not make the closed world assumption,
then modifying Lithium, XrML, and XACML to use the assumption is arguably
a waste of time. So our ﬁrst step in this direction is to survey many policy sets
from real applications to gain an understanding of which features are of practical
interest.Appendix A
Proofs for Chapter 2
The following lemma is the key to proving Theorems 2.2.1 and 2.2.3.
Lemma A.0.1. Let L0
0 be a set of closed formulas with no constant symbols whose
only predicate symbol is Permitted. Let L00
0 be the set of closed formulas of the
form
(f ⇒ Permitted(c,c
0)) ⇒ Permitted(c,c
0),
where c and c0 are constants of the appropriate sorts and f ∈ L0
0. If the validity
problem for L0
0 is undecidable, then the validity problem for L00
0 is undecidable.
Proof: We reduce the validity problem for L0
0 to the validity problem for L00
0.
Standard manipulations show that (f ⇒ Permitted(c,c0)) ⇒ Permitted(c,c0) is
equivalent to f∨Permitted(c,c0). Clearly, if f∨Permitted(c,c0) is not valid, then
f is not valid. Suppose that f ∨ Permitted(c,c0) is valid. Since f does not men-
tion a constant symbol, c and c0 do not appear in f, so f ∨ ∀x∀yPermitted(x,y)
is valid. It follows that f is valid iﬀ f is true in all models m that satisfy
∀x∀yPermitted(x,y). To determine whether f is true in m, let f0 be the re-
sult of replacing all occurrences of Permitted(x,y) by true. Clearly f is true in
m iﬀ f0 is true in m. Since f0 has no nonlogical symbols, f0 is true in m iﬀ f0 is
valid. Moreover, the validity of f0 is easy to determine.
Theorem 2.2.1: Let L0 be the set of closed formulas of the form
(f ⇒ Permitted(c,c
0)) ⇒ Permitted(c,c
0),
where c and c0 are constants of the appropriate sorts, f has a single alternation
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of quantiﬁers, and the only nonlogical symbol in f is Permitted. The validity
question for L0 is undecidable.
Proof: Let LA
0 be the set of closed formulas that have a single alternation of
quantiﬁers and whose only nonlogical symbol is Permitted. The proof follows
from Lemma A.0.1, where we take L0
0 to be LA
0 , because the validity problem for
LA
0 is undecidable [BGG97].
Theorem 2.2.3: Let L1 be the set of closed formulas of the form
∀x1∀x2(f ⇒ Permitted(c,c
0)) ⇒ Permitted(c,c
0),
where c and c0 are constants of the appropriate sort and f is a quantiﬁer-free
formula whose only nonlogical symbols are Permitted and a unary function. The
validity problem for L1 is undecidable.
Proof: Let LA
1 be the set of closed formulas of the form ∃x1∃x2f, where f is a
quantiﬁer-free formula whose only nonlogical symbols are Permitted and a unary
function. Because the validity problem for LA
1 is undecidable [BGG97], it follows
from Lemma A.0.1 that the validity problem for the set of formulas of the form
(∃x1∃x2f ⇒ Permitted(c,c
0)) ⇒ Permitted(c,c
0) (A.1)
is undecidable. Standard manipulations show that a formula of the form (A.1) is
equivalent to
∀x1∀x2(f ⇒ Permitted(c,c
0)) ⇒ Permitted(c,c
0).
It follows that the validity problem for L1 is undecidable.
Theorem 2.2.4: Let Φ be a vocabulary that contains Permitted, constants
c and c0 of sorts Subjects and Actions, respectively, and possibly other predicate135
and constant symbols (but no function symbols). Assume that there is a bound on
the arity of the predicate symbols in Φ (that is, there exists some N such that all
predicate symbols in Φ have arity at most N). Finally, let L2 be the set of all
closed formulas in Lfo(Φ) of the form E ∧ p1 ∧ ... ∧ pn ⇒ Permitted(c,c0) such
that E is a conjunction of quantiﬁer-free and universal formulas and each policy
p1,...,pn has the form ∀x1 ...∀xm(f ⇒ Permitted(t1,t2)), where t1 and t2 are
terms of the appropriate sort and f is quantiﬁer-free.
(a) The validity problem for L2 is in ΠP
2 .
(b) If L3 is the set of formulas in L2 in which every policy’s antecedent is a
conjunction of literals, then the validity problem for L3 is ΠP
2 hard.
(c) If L4 is the set of L2 formulas in which E is quantiﬁer-free, then the validity
problem for L4 is both NP-hard and co-NP hard.
Proof: For part (a), straightforward manipulations show that each formula h in
L2 is equivalent to a closed formula of the form g = ∃x1 ...∃xkg0, where g0 is
a quantiﬁer-free formula in Lfo(Φ). Moreover, |g| is polynomial in |h|. Suppose
that g mentions n distinct constant symbols. Let M be the class of models whose
domain size is at most max(n,1). We claim that (1) g is valid iﬀ it is true in
every model in M, and (2) the problem of determining if g is true in every model
m ∈ M is in ΠP
2 .
For part (1), the “only if” direction is trivial. To prove the “if” direction,
suppose by way of contradiction that g is true in every model in M and g is
not true in a model m with domain D and interpretation I. Let D0 = {I(c) |
c is a constant in g} if g mentions at least one constant, and D0 = {d} for some136
ﬁxed element d ∈ D if g does not mention any constants. Let I0 be the inter-
pretation such that I0(c) = I(c) if I(c) ∈ D0, I0(c) = d0 for some ﬁxed d ∈ D0
if I(c) / ∈ D0, and I0(R) = D
0k ∩ I(R) for each k-ary predicate R in Φ. Let m0
be the model with domain D0 and interpretation I0. Notice that m0 is in M. By
assumption, m0 satisﬁes g, so there are domain elements d1,...,dk in D0 such that
by interpreting xi as di for i = 1,...,k, m0 satisﬁes g0. Under the same interpreta-
tion of x1,...,xk, m satisﬁes g0. Therefore m satisﬁes g, and we have the desired
contradiction.
For part (2), ﬁrst note that g is true in all models in M iﬀ it is true in all
models with domain {1,...,m} for each m ≤ max(n,1), since every model in M
is isomorphic to one with domain {1,...,m} for m ≤ max(n,1). The truth of g in
such a model depends only on the the interpretation of the constant and predicate
symbols that actually appear in g. Let a restricted interpretation be one that
interprets only the symbols that appear in g. Because there are mk interpretations
of a k-ary predicate, and the arity of predicates in g is bounded in a domain of
size m, the number of restricted interpretations is polynomial in |g|. It clearly can
be determined in time polynomial in |g| if the formula g0 is true under a given
restricted interpretation in a model with domain {1,...,m}. Thus, determining if
g is true in such a model is in NP (since it involves guessing an interpretation of
x1,...,xk). It follows that the problem of determining if g is true in every model
of M is in ΠP
2 .
For part (b), let QBF2 consist of all Quantiﬁed Boolean Formulas (QBFs) of
the form
∀Q1 ...∀Qm∃P1 ...∃Pnϕ,
where ϕ is quantiﬁer-free. It is well known that the problem of checking whether137
a formula in QBF2 is true is ΠP
2 -complete [Sto77]. We now show how to reduce
this problem to the validity problem for L2.
Let q = ∀Q1 ...∀Qm∃P1 ...∃Pnϕ be an arbitrary formula in QBF2. Let ϕ0 be ϕ
with Qj replaced by the ground literal Qj(c) and Pk replaced by the literal Pk(xk),
for j = 1,...,m and k = 1,...,n. It is not hard to see that q is true iﬀ
q
0 = P1(c) ∧ ... ∧ Pn(c) ∧ ¬P1(c
0) ∧ ... ∧ ¬Pn(c
0) ⇒ ∃x1 ...∃xnϕ
0
is valid. This follows from two observations. First, note that q is true iﬀ, for
every assignment of values to Q1,...,Qm, there is an assignment of truth values
to P1,...,Pn such that ϕ is true. Second, q0 is valid iﬀ, for every interpretation of
Q1(c),...,Qm(c), there is an assignment of domain elements to x1,...,xn such that
ϕ0 is true. The antecedent P1(c)∧...∧Pn(c)∧¬P1(c0)∧...∧¬Pn(c0) of q0 ensures
that assigning xi to c makes Pi(xi) true, while assigning xi to c0 makes P(xi) false.
Thus, the assignment of values to the variables x1,...,xn acts essentially like a
truth assignment to P1,...,Pn.
Straightforward manipulations show that A ⇒ B is valid iﬀ A∧¬B ⇒ false is
valid, and A ∧ ¬B ⇒ false is valid iﬀ ((¬A ⇒ C) ∧ ¬B) ⇒ C is valid, provided
that none of the nonlogical symbols in C appear in A or B. Taking A to be
P1(c) ∧ ...Pn(c) ∧ ¬P1(c0) ∧ ... ∧ ¬Pn(c0), B to be ∃x1 ...∃xnϕ0, and C to be
¬Permitted(d,d0), where d and d0 are distinct from c and c0, it follows that q is
true iﬀ
∀x1 ...∀xn¬ϕ
0 ∧ (¬A ⇒ Permitted(d,d
0)) ⇒ Permitted(d,d
0) (A.2)
is valid. The formula ¬A ⇒ Permitted(d,d0) is equivalent to
n ^
i=1
¬P1(c) ⇒ Permitted(d,d
0) ∧
n ^
i=1
P1(c
0) ⇒ Permitted(d,d
0)).138
Replacing ¬A ⇒ Permitted(d,d0) in (A.2) by the latter formula gives us a formula
in L2. Thus, we have reduced the truth of a QBF formula to the validity of a
formula in L2, as desired.
For part (c), we prove the NP hardness result by reducing the Hamiltonian
path problem to the validity problem for L4. Let G be an undirected graph, where
V = {v1,...,vn} is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. Let Φ be a vocabulary
that includes the constants v1,...,vn, a binary predicate Edge, and Permitted.
Finally, let E =
V
(vi,vj)∈E Edge(vi,vj), and let
p = ∀x1 ...∀xn(
^
i,j≤n;i6=j
(xi 6= xj) ∧
^
i<n
Edge(xi,xi+1)) ⇒ Permitted(c,c
0).
It is not hard to show that E ∧ p ⇒ Permitted(c,c0) is valid iﬀ there is a Hamil-
tonian path in G. The key observations are (1) there is a Hamiltonian path iﬀ
there is an assignment of distinct domain elements to x1,...,xn such that there is
an edge between xi and xi+1 for i < n, and (2) there is such an assignment iﬀ
E ∧ p ⇒ Permitted(c,c0) is valid.
We prove the co-NP hardness result by reducing the validity problem for
propositional logic to the validity problem for L4. Let g be a propositional for-
mula, let v1,...,vn be the propositions in g, and let g0 be the ﬁrst-order formula
obtained by replacing the proposition vi in g with the ground literal R(ci) for
i = 1,...,n. It is easy to see that g is valid iﬀ g0 is valid. Because g0 does
not include Permitted, g0 is valid iﬀ g0 ∨ Permitted(c,c0) is valid. Standard
manipulations show that g0 ∨ Permitted(c,c0) is equivalent to the L4 formula
(g0 ⇒ Permitted(c,c0)) ⇒ Permitted(c,c0).
To prove the theorems in Section 2.3, we need to extend resolution slightly using
techniques of paramodulation [RW83]. Note that if c is the clause ∀x1 ...xn(c0∨tc =139
t0
c), d is the clause ∀y1 ...∀ymd0, td is a term in d0, and σ is a substitution such
that σ(tc) = σ(td), then the following formula is valid:
c ∧ d ⇒ ∀x1 ...∀xn∀y1 ...∀ym(c
0 ∨ d
0[td/t
0
c])σ. (A.3)
A set of clauses is said to be closed under paramodulation if it contains the right-
hand side of (A.3) whenever it contains the clauses on the left-hand side. Let RP(f)
be the set of clauses obtained by closing f under resolution and paramodulation.
In other words, RP(f) is the smallest set of clauses that includes the conjuncts of
f (when f is in CNF) and, if we can infer a clause d from two clauses c and c0 in
RP(f) by using either resolution or paramodulation, then d is in RP(f).
Theorem A.0.2. [Bra75] If f is a formula in CNF one of whose conjuncts is
∀x(x = x), then f is satisﬁable if and only if RP(f) does not include false.
We remark that the clause ∀(x = x) is needed here, although it is valid. For
example, it is easy to check that RP(∀x(x 6= x)) does not include false, even though
∀x(x 6= x) is not satisﬁable. On the other hand, RP(∀(x 6= x) ∧ ∀(x = x)) clearly
includes false.
Corollary A.0.3. Let f be a CNF formula, none of whose clauses mentions a
disjunct of the form t = t0. Then f is satisﬁable iﬀ R(f ∧ ∀x(x = x)) does not
include false.
Proof: Clearly f is satisﬁable iﬀ f ∧ ∀x(x = x) is satisﬁable. Let g = f ∧
∀x(x = x). By Theorem A.0.2, it suﬃces to show that RP(g) = R(g). Clearly,
R(g) ⊆ RP(g). To show that RP(g) ⊆ R(g), it suﬃces to show that R(g) is closed
under paramodulation. It is not hard to see that, because no clause in f mentions
a disjunct of the form t = t0, no clause in R(g)−{∀x(x = x)} mentions a disjunct140
of the form t = t0. Therefore, applying paramodulation does not lead to any new
clauses.
The next four lemmas relate the closures of various formulas and give bounds
on the complexity of computing the closure. In these proofs, it is convenient
to associate a clause c with its set of disjuncts, which we denote as S(c). For
example, if `1,...,`k are literals, then S(`1 ∨...∨`k) = {`1,...,`k}. For the next
four lemmas, let S = {s 6= s | s is a term}.
Lemma A.0.4. Let c be a clause with no bipolar literals and let f be a conjunction
of ground literals. If a clause c0 is in R(c∧f∧∀x(x = x)), then c0 is in R(f∧∀x(x =
x)) or S(c0) ⊆ S(cσ) ⊆ S(c0) ∪ S(¬f) ∪ S for some substitution σ.
Proof: Let R0(c ∧ f) consist of the clauses in R(f ∧ ∀x(x = x)) and all clauses
c0 such that, for some substitution σ, S(c0) ⊆ S(cσ) ⊆ S(c0) ∪ S(¬f) ∪ S. We
want to show that R(c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x)) ⊆ R0(c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x)). Because
every conjunct of c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x) is in R0(c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x)), it suﬃces to
show that R0(c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x)) is closed under resolution. To do this, suppose
that c1 and c2 are clauses in R0(c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x)) that resolve on a literal `
to create the resolvent c3. We want to show that c3 ∈ R0(c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x)).
If both c1 and c2 are in R(f ∧ ∀x(x = x)), then c3 is in R(f ∧ ∀x(x = x)), so
c3 ∈ R0(c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x)). If exactly one of the clauses is in R(f ∧ ∀x(x = x)),
then assume without loss of generality that it is c1. Because f ∧ ∀x(x = x) is
a conjunction of literals, every clause in R(f ∧ ∀x(x = x)) is either a conjunct
of f ∧ ∀x(x = x) or false; c1 is the parent of a resolvent, so it is a conjunct of
f ∧ ∀x(x = x). Since c2 ∈ R0(c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x)) − R(f ∧ ∀x(x = x)), there is a
substitution σ such that S(c2) ⊆ S(cσ) ⊆ S(c2) ∪ S(¬f) ∪ S. Since c1 and c2 are141
the parents of the resolvent c3 and c1 is a conjunct of f ∧ ∀x(x = x), there is a
substitution σ0 such that c2σ0 is c3∨ ∼c1, where ∼c1 is the negation of a conjunct of
f or has the form s 6= s. Because S(c2) ⊆ S(cσ), it follows that S(c3) ⊆ S(cσσ0).
Moreover,
S(cσσ
0) ⊆ S(c2σ
0) ∪ S(¬fσ
0) ∪ S
= S(c3) ∪ {∼c1} ∪ S(¬f) ∪ S
= S(c3) ∪ S(¬f) ∪ S,
since {(s 6= s)σ0|s is a term} ⊆ S, ¬fσ0 = ¬f (because f mentions no variables),
and ∼c1 is either a conjunct of ¬f or a literal in S. So c3 ∈ R0(c∧f ∧∀x(x = x)).
Finally, if neither c1 nor c2 is in R(f ∧ ∀x(x = x)), then it is not hard to see that
there are substitutions σ and σ0 such that ` is a disjunct of cσ and ¬` is a disjunct
of cσ0, contradicting the assumption that c has no bipolar literals.
For the next three lemmas, let f = E0∧∀x(x = x)∧¬Permitted(t,t0) and let
f0 = E1 ∧ P, where t and t0 are closed terms.
Lemma A.0.5. R(f0 ∧ f) =
S
c∈R(f0) R(c ∧ f).
Proof: Let c be a clause in R(f0). Because every conjunct of c∧f is in R(f0 ∧f)
and R(f0 ∧ f) is closed under resolution, R(c ∧ f) ⊆ R(f0 ∧ f). It follows that
S
c∈R(f0) R(c ∧ f) ⊆ R(f0 ∧ f).
For the opposite inclusion, observe that every conjunct of R(f0 ∧ f) is in
S
c∈R(f0) R(c∧f). So, it suﬃces to show that
S
c∈R(f0) R(c∧f) is closed under reso-
lution. To do this, suppose that c1,c2 ∈ R(f0) and that e is a resolvent with parents
d1 ∈ R(c1 ∧ f) and d2 ∈ R(c2 ∧ f). It suﬃces to show that e ∈
S
c∈R(f0) R(c ∧ f).
If d1 ∈ R(f), then clearly d1 ∈ R(c2 ∧ f), so e ∈ R(c2 ∧ f) and we are done.142
Similarly, if d2 ∈ R(f), then e ∈ R(c1 ∧ f). Suppose that neither d1 nor d2 is
in R(f). Then it follows from Lemma A.0.4 that there are substitutions σ1 and
σ2 such that c1σ1 = d1 ∨ d0
1 and c2σ2 = d2 ∨ d0
2, where S(d0
1) ⊆ S(¬f) ∪ S and
S(d0
2) ⊆ S(¬f)∪S. Because d1 and d2 are the parents of e, there are substitutions
σ0
1 and σ0
2, clauses d00
1 and d00
2, and a literal ` such that e = d00
1 ∨ d00
2, d1σ0
1 = d00
1 ∨ `,
and d2σ0
2 = d00
2 ∨ ¬`. Putting the pieces together,
c1σ1σ0
1 = d00
1 ∨ ` ∨ d0
1σ0
1 and c2σ2σ0
2 = d00
2 ∨ ¬` ∨ d0
2σ0
2.
(Note that S(d0
1σ0
1) ⊆ S(¬f) ∪ S and S(d0
2σ0
2) ⊆ S(¬f) ∪ S, because the only
variables that appear in d0
1 or d0
2 are in disjuncts of the form t 6= t.) Clearly c1 and
c2 resolve to create a resolvent e0 ∈ R(f0). Moreover, e0σ1σ2 = e ∨ d0
1σ0
1 ∨ d0
2σ0
2, so
e ∈ R(e0 ∧ f).
Lemma A.0.6. If every clause in f0 has at most one literal that is bipolar in f0,
then R(f0) has O(|f0|2) clauses, each of length at most 2Lf0L0
f0, and R(f0) can
computed in time O(|f0|2).
Proof: Note that the resolvent e of two clauses in f0 has no bipolars, because
every clause in f0 has at most one bipolar. It follows that e is not a parent of a
resolvent in R(f0). So,
R(f
0) = {c | c is in S(f
0) or is the resolvent of two clauses in S(f
0)}.
Thus, R(f0) has O(|f0|2) clauses and each clause has length less than 2Lf0L0
f0. To
ﬁnd R(f0), we simply check each pair of clauses c and c0 in f0 to see if there is a
literal on which they resolve; if so, we resolve them. The check can be done in time
O(|c||c0|); the resolution can be done in time O(|c| + |c0|). Since, by assumption,
each clause contains at most one instance of a bipolar literal, there will be at most143
one resolvent for each pair of clauses. It easily follows that R(f0) can be computed
in time O(|f0|2).
If C is a set of clauses, let kCk =
P
c∈C |c|. For all predicate symbols Q, a
variable v is Q-constrained in a clause c if v appears as an argument to Q in c. Note
that a constrained variable, as deﬁned in Section 2.3.1, is Permitted-constrained.
Lemma A.0.7. Suppose that f mentions m terms and C is a non-empty set of
clauses such that, for every c ∈ C, no literal in c is bipolar in c. Then
(a) false ∈
S
c∈C R(c ∧ f) iﬀ (i) false ∈ R(f) or (ii) there is a clause c ∈ C and
a substitution σ such that S(cσ) ⊆ S(¬f) ∪ S;
(b) we can determine whether (i) holds in time O(|E0|log|E0|);
(c) we can determine whether (ii) holds in time O((RkCk|Permitted(t,t0)| +
|E0|)log|E0|), where R = m if every literal in every clause c in C mentions
at most one variable that is not constrained in c; otherwise R = mk, where
every clause c in C has at most k variables that are not constrained in c.
Proof: For part (a), the “only if” direction follows immediately from Lemma A.0.4.
For the “if” direction, it is easy to see that R(f) ⊆ R(c∧f) for every clause c ∈ C.
So, if false ∈ R(f), then false ∈
S
c∈C R(c ∧ f). Also, if there is a clause c ∈ C
and a substitution σ such that S(cσ) ⊆ S(¬f)∪S, then it readily follows from the
deﬁnition of resolution that false ∈ R(c ∧ f), so false ∈
S
c∈C R(c ∧ f).
For part (b), because f is a conjunction of literals, it is easy to see that false ∈
R(f) iﬀ (1) E0 includes a literal of the form t 6= t or (2) E0 includes a literal
and its negation. Clearly, we can check whether (1) holds in time O(|E0|). To
check whether (2) holds, we use a splay tree [ST83], a form of binary search tree144
for which, starting with an empty tree, K insertions and S searches take time
O((K+S)logK). Speciﬁcally, we insert every negative literal in E0 into the empty
splay tree T. Then, for every positive literal ` in E0, we search T for ¬`. Since at
most |E0| insertion and |E0| search operations are involved, time O(|E0|log|E0|)
is required.
For part (c), recall that f = E0 ∧ ∀x(x = x) ∧ ¬Permitted(t,t0). For any
clause c, let cE and cP be clauses such that c = cE ∨ cP, cE is Permitted-free,
and every disjunct in cP mentions Permitted. Because E0 is Permitted-free,
S(cσ) ⊆ S(¬f) ∪ S iﬀ S(cEσ) ⊆ S(¬E0) ∪ S and S(cPσ) ⊆ {Permitted(t,t0)}.
It follows that we can ﬁnd a substitution σ such that S(cσ) ⊆ S(¬f) ∪ S, if one
exists, by ﬁnding substitutions σ0 and σ00 such that S(cPσ0) ⊆ {Permitted(t,t0)}
and S(cEσ0σ00) ⊆ S(¬E0) ∪ S, and taking σ = σ0 ◦ σ00 We can assume without
loss of generality that σ(x) = x for every variable x that does not appear in
c. Thus, we can clearly check if an appropriate substitution σ exists in time
O(|c||Permitted(t,t0)|), by pattern-matching each occurrence of Permitted in
cP with Permitted(t,t0). Moreover, if σ exists, then |cσ| ≤ |c||Permitted(t,t0)|,
since σ substitutes terms in Permitted(t,t0) for variables in cP.
Let
D = {d : there is a clause c ∈ C and a substitution σ such that σ(x) = x if x
does not appear in c, S(cPσ) ⊆ {Permitted(t,t0)}, and d = cEσ}.
We can clearly construct D in time O(kCk|Permitted(t,t0)|), by considering the
clauses in C one at a time, and kDk < kCk|Permitted(t,t0)|. Thus, to complete
the proof of part (c), it suﬃces to show that we can determine whether there is
a d ∈ D and a substitution σ such that S(dσ) ⊆ S(¬E0) ∪ S in time O((|E0| +
RkDk)log|E0|), where R is as deﬁned in the lemma. We can do this by a brute-145
force search. In more detail, we insert every literal in E0 into an empty splay tree
T; then, for each clause d ∈ D and each possible assignment σ of terms in E0 to
variables in d, we check whether every literal in dσ is the negation of a literal in T
or is of the form t 6= t. Suppose every clause c in C has at most k variables that are
not constrained in c. Then d has at most k variables. Since E0 mentions at most
m terms, it follows that there are at most mk ways of assigning terms in E0 to
variables in d. As we have observed, the O(|E0|) insertions and O(mk|d|) searches
can be done in time O((|E0|+mk|d|)log|E0|). For each literal ` in S(dσ)−S(¬E),
we can determine whether ` is of the form t = t in time O(|`|). Thus, the time
needed to check every clause d ∈ D is O((|E0| + mkkDk)log|E0|).
We may be able to do better if every literal in every clause c in C has at most
one variable that is not constrained in c. In this case, every literal in every clause
d in D has at most one variable. It follows that, given a clause d ∈ D, we can
partition the literals in d into sets according to their variable. That is, in time
O(|d|), we can write d as d1 ∨ ... ∨ dk, where two literals ` and `0 mention the
same variable iﬀ ` and `0 both appear in di for i = 1,...,k. Clearly, there is a
substitution σ such that S(dσ) ⊆ S(¬E0)∪S iﬀ there are substitutions σ1,...,σk
such that S(diσi) ⊆ S(¬E0) ∪ S, for i = 1,...,k. For a particular di, there are
at most m possible substitutions of terms in E0 to the variable in di. So, given
a splay tree T whose entries are the conjuncts in E0, we can determine if there
is an appropriate σi in time O(m|di|log|E0|). Thus, given T, we can determine
if there are appropriate substitutions σ1,...,σk in time O(m|d|log|E0|). Since
we can construct T in time O(|E0|log|E0|), the total time needed for a particular
clause d ∈ D is O((|E0|+m|d|)log|E0|), and the time needed to check every d ∈ D
is O((|E0| + mkDk)log|E0|).146
Proposition 2.3.2: Suppose that E ∧P ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is a standard query
in which E is basic, the equality symbol is not mentioned in E ∧ P, and there are
no bipolars in P. Then E ∧ P ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is valid iﬀ there is a conjunct
p of P such that E ∧ p ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is valid.
Proof: Here and elsewhere, let E+ be an abbreviation for ∀x(x = x) ∧ E. By
Corollary A.0.3, it suﬃces to show that R(E+ ∧ P ∧ ¬Permitted(t,t0)) includes
false iﬀ R(E+ ∧ p ∧ ¬Permitted(t,t0)) includes false for some conjunct p of P.
It follows from Lemma A.0.5, where we take f to be E+ ∧ ¬Permitted(t,t0) and
f0 to be P, that R(E+ ∧ P ∧ ¬Permitted(t,t0)) includes false iﬀ R(E+ ∧ c ∧
¬Permitted(t,t0)) includes false for some c in R(P). Since there are no bipolar
literals in P, R(P) is just the set of conjuncts in P, so we are done.
Theorem 2.3.1: Let L5 consist of all standard queries of the form E ∧ P ⇒
Permitted(t,t0) such that
(1) E is basic (i.e., E is a conjunction of ground literals),
(2) there are no bipolar literals in P,
(3) equality is not mentioned in E ∧ P, and
(4) every variable appearing in a conjunct p of P is constrained in p.
We can determine the validity of formulas in L5 in time O((|P||Permitted(t,t0)|+
|E|)log|E|), where |ϕ| denotes the length of ϕ, when viewed as a string of symbols.
Proof: Let Sp be the set of conjuncts of P. By Proposition 2.3.2, E ∧ P ⇒
Permitted(t,t0) is valid iﬀ E ∧p ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) is valid, for some conjunct p
of P. By Corollary A.0.3, the latter statement holds iﬀ false ∈
S
p∈Sp R(E+ ∧ p ∧
¬Permitted(t,t0)). It follows from Lemma A.0.7(a), where we take C = Sp and147
f = E+ ∧ ¬Permitted(t,t0), that false ∈
S
p∈Sp R(E+ ∧ p ∧ ¬Permitted(t,t0))
iﬀ (a) false is in R(E+ ∧ ¬Permitted(t,t0)) or (b) there is a clause p ∈ Sp
and a substitution σ such that S(pσ) ⊆ S(¬E+ ∨ Permitted(t,t0)) ∪ {s 6= s |
s is a term}. By Lemma A.0.7(b), we can determine whether (a) holds in time
O(|E|log|E|). It follows from Lemma A.0.7(c), where f = E+∧¬Permitted(t,t0),
C = Sp, and k = 0, that we can determine whether (b) holds in time O((|E| +
|P||Permitted(t,t0)|)log|E|).
Rather than just proving Theorem 2.3.5, we prove a slightly stronger result,
from which we will also be able to prove Theorem 2.4.1. Note that part (b) of the
following theorem is equivalent to Theorem 2.3.5.
Theorem A.0.8. Suppose that E is a standard environment, P is a conjunction of
pure permitting policies, and D is a conjunction of (not necessarily pure) denying
policies such that, for every resolvent f created by resolving a conjunct of P and
a conjunct of D on a literal that mentions Permitted, either E ⇒ f is valid or
q ⇒ f is valid for some conjunct q of P ∧ D. Then
(a) E ∧ P is consistent iﬀ E ∧ P ∧ D is consistent
(b) E ∧ P ∧ ¬Permitted(t,t0) is consistent iﬀ E ∧ P ∧ D ∧ ¬Permitted(t,t0)
is consistent, where t and t0 are terms of the appropriate sort.
Proof: We prove part (a) here; the proof of part (b) is identical.
Suppose that the hypotheses of the theorem hold. Since g = E ∧
V
p∈P p is
consistent, it has a Herbrand model, that is, a model whose domain consists of all
the variable-free terms in the language. Of the Herbrand models for g, let m be a
minimally permissive one, that is, one for which the extension of the Permitted
predicate is minimal. We claim that in fact m |= E∧
V
p∈P p∧
V
d∈D d. For suppose148
not. Then there is a denying policy ∀x1 ...∀xnd in D and a variable substitution
σd such that:
(1) m |= ¬dσd and
(2) for all denying policies ∀x1 ...∀xne ∈ D and variable substitutions σe such
that m |= ¬eσe, the number of negative literals in eσe mentioning Permitted
is at least the number of negative literals in dσd mentioning Permitted.
(Note that we are assuming all policies are in CNF, so that the number of
negative literals in a policy is well-deﬁned.)
Since d is a denying policy, dσd has at least one negated Permitted formula
among its clauses; that is dσd = d0 ∨ ¬Permitted(sd,s0
d) for some terms sd and
s0
d. Since m |= ¬dσd, we have that m |= ¬d0 ∧ Permitted(sd,s0
d). Since m is
minimally permissive, there must be a pure permitting policy ∀x1 ...∀xnp ∈ P and
a variable substitution σp such that pσp = p0 ∨ Permitted(sd,s0
d) and m |= ¬p0.
(Otherwise, consider the model obtained by removing (sd,s0
d) from the extension of
Permitted; it must also satisfy g, and is less permissive than m.) Let f = p0 ∨ d0
be the formula created by resolving pσp and dσd on Permitted(sd,s0
d). Note that,
by choice of p0 and d0, m |= ¬f. It follows from the deﬁnition of resolution and the
fact that p is a pure permitting policy that the number of negative literals in f
that mention Permitted is less than the number of such literals in dσd. Moreover,
by hypothesis, either E ⇒ f is valid or q ⇒ f is valid for some q ∈ P ∪ D. Since
m |= E ∧ ¬f, E ⇒ f is not valid, so q ⇒ f is valid for some q ∈ P ∪ D. Since
m |= ¬f, m |= ¬q; and, since m |=
V
p∈P p by assumption, q ∈ D. Therefore, there
is a denying policy ∀x1 ...∀xne ∈ D such that ∀x1 ...∀xne ⇒ f is valid. It is not
hard to show that ∀x1 ...∀xne ⇒ f is valid iﬀ there is a variable substitution σe149
such that eσe = f. Thus, ∀x1 ...∀xne is a denying policy in D and σe is a variable
substitution such that m |= ¬eσe (because m |= ¬f). The number of negative
literals in eσe that mention Permitted (which is the number of negative literals
in f that mention Permitted) is less than the number of such literals in dσd.
Thus, we have a contradiction.
Proposition 2.3.6: If q is an equality-safe standard query, then there is a
standard query q0 of the form E0
0 ∧ E0
1 ∧ P 0 ⇒ Permitted(t,t0) such that (a) q
is valid iﬀ q0 is valid, (b) q0 is equation-free, and (c) |q0| = O(|q||L0
q), where L0
q is
the length of the longest term in q. Moreover, we can ﬁnd such a q0 in time O(|q|).
Proof: Suppose that q has the form F0 ∧F1 ∧E1 ∧P ⇒ Permitted(s,s0), where
F0 is the conjunction of the equality statements, while F1 consists of the remaining
conjuncts in E0. To create q0, we partition the set of terms in E0 into equivalence
classes; terms te and t0
e are in the same class if the equality formulas in E0 imply
te = t0
e. The equivalence classes can be found in linear time.1 Since q is equality-
safe, each equivalence class has at most one term that is not a constant. If an
equivalence class has a term that is not a constant, then we choose that term to
represent the class; otherwise, we select a representative arbitrarily. Let q0 = F 0
1 ∧
E0
1 ∧ P 0 ⇒ Permitted(t,t0), where F 0
1, E0
1, P 0, t, and t0 are the result of replacing
each closed term in F1, E1, P, s, and s0, respectively, that also appears in F0 by its
representative. It suﬃces to show that q is valid if and only if q0 is valid, because
the other statements in the conclusion of Proposition 2.3.6 follow immediately from
1In general, the problem of constructing equivalence classes is harder than linear
time. For example, if c1 = c2, then f(c1) = f(c2). However, we do not have to
worry about drawing such inferences—if E0 ⇒ (c1 = c2) is valid, then it cannot be
the case that f(c1) and f(c2) are both terms in E0, for then E0 ⇒ (f(c1) = f(c2))
is valid, and q would not be equality-safe.150
the construction of q0. Let q00 = F0 ∧ F 0
1 ∧ E0
1 ∧ P 0 ⇒ Permitted(t,t0). It is easy
to see that q is equivalent to q00; substituting a term by its representative in the
equivalence class is justiﬁed in the presence of F0. Thus, it suﬃces to show that
q00 is valid iﬀ q0 is valid. The “if” direction is trivial. For the “only if” direction,
suppose by way of contradiction that q00 is valid and q0 is not. It follows that there
is a model m with interpretation I that does not satisfy q0. Let m0 be a model that
is identical to m except that m0 interprets a constant r as I(r0) if r and r0 are in
the same equivalence class and r0 is the class representative. Clearly, m0 satisﬁes
F0. Moreover, because m does not satisfy q0 and the only diﬀerence between m
and m0 is the interpretation of constants that are not mentioned in q0, m0 does not
satisfy q0. This contradicts the validity of q0.
The following example illustrates the procedure for creating q0 from q.
Example A.0.9. Consider the query “may Bob nap”, given that Alice is Bob’s
wife, Alice may nap, and any individual may nap if his wife may nap. We can
write the query as q = e ∧ p1 ∧ p2 ⇒ Permitted(Bob,nap), where
e = (Alice = wifeOf(Bob)),
p1 = Permitted(Alice,nap), and
p2 = ∀x(Permitted(wifeOf(x),nap) ⇒ Permitted(x,nap)).
The query q0 is the result of removing the conjunct e from q and replacing every oc-
currence of Alice by wifeOf(Bob). Thus, q0 = p0
1∧p0
2 ⇒ Permitted(Bob,nap),
where
p0
1 = Permitted(wifeOf(Bob),nap) and
p0
2 = ∀x(Permitted(wifeOf(x),nap) ⇒ Permitted(x,nap)).
Note that we replace Alice by wifeOf(Bob) because the two terms are in the
same equivalence class and, since wifeOf(Bob) mentions a function symbol, it is151
the class representative. Also note that if we replace wifeOf(Bob) by Alice, then
the resulting query is not valid, even though q is. In general, we do not preserve
validity if we replace a term that includes a function symbol. That is why we
restrict to equality-safe queries in Proposition 2.3.6.
Theorem 2.3.7: The validity of an equation-free Lithium query q = E0∧E1∧P ⇒
Permitted(t,t0) with m terms in E0 can be determined in time O((|E0| + T|E1 ∧
P|2)log|E0|), where T = mLE1∧PL0
E1∧P|Permitted(t,t0)| if every literal in every
conjunct c of E1 ∧ P mentions at most one variable that is not constrained in
c relative to q; otherwise, T = m2kLE1∧PL0
E1∧P|Permitted(t,t0)|, where every
conjunct c of E1 ∧ P has at most k variables that are not constrained in c relative
to q.
Proof: By Corollary A.0.3, the query q is valid iﬀ the set R(E0 ∧ ∀x(x =
x)∧E1∧P ∧¬Permitted(t,t0)) includes false. Let E
+
0 be E0∧∀x(x = x) and let
q+ be the result of replacing E0 in the antecedent of q by E
+
0 . By Lemma A.0.5,
false ∈ R(¬q+) iﬀ there is a clause c ∈ R(E1 ∧ P) such that false ∈ R(c ∧
E
+
0 ∧ ¬Permitted(t,t0)). By Lemma A.0.7(a), the latter statement holds iﬀ (1)
false ∈ R(E
+
0 ∧¬Permitted(t,t0)) or (2) there is a clause c ∈ R(E1∧P) and a sub-
stitution σ such that S(cσ) ⊆ S(¬E
+
0 ∨ Permitted(t,t0)) ∪ {s 6= s | s is a term}.
By Lemma A.0.7(b), we can check whether (1) holds in time O(|E0|log|E0|). To
determine whether (2) holds, we ﬁrst note that, by Lemma A.0.6, we can com-
pute R(E1 ∧ P) in time O(|E1 ∧ P|2). Once we have R(E1 ∧ P), it follows from
Lemma A.0.7(c), where we take C = R(E1∧P), that we can determine whether (2)
holds in time O((|E0| + mk0|R(E1 ∧ P)||Permitted(t,t0)|)log|E0|) if every clause
c ∈ R(E1 ∧ P) has at most k0 variables that are not constrained in c. It follows
from Lemma A.0.6 that |R(E1 ∧ P)| is O(|E1 ∧ P|2LE1∧PL0
E1∧P); it follows from152
the way resolution is deﬁned that k0 ≤ 2k. So, we can determine whether (2) holds
in time O((|E0| + m2k|E1 ∧ P|2LE1∧PL0
E1∧P|Permitted(t,t0)|)log|E0|).
Suppose that every literal in every conjunct c of E1 ∧ P mentions at most one
variable that is not constrained in c relative to q. Then it follows from the deﬁnition
of resolution that every literal ` in every clause c in R(E1 ∧ P) mentions at most
one variable that is not constrained in c. It follows from Lemma A.0.7(c), where we
again take C = R(E1∧P), that we can determine whether (2) holds in this case in
time O((|E0| + m|R(E1 ∧ P)||Permitted(t,t0)|)log|E0|), once we have computed
R(E1∧P). By Lemma A.0.6, we can compute R(E1∧P) in time O(|E1∧P|2) and
|R(E1 ∧ P)| is O(|E1 ∧ P|2LE1∧PL0
E1∧P). So, the total time needed to determine
whether (2) holds is O((|E0|+m|E1 ∧P|2LE1∧PL0
E1∧P|Permitted(t,t0)|)log|E0|).
Theorem 2.4.1: Suppose that E is an environment, P is a conjunction of
pure permitting policies, and D is a conjunction of (not necessarily pure) denying
policies such that the antecedent of Theorem 2.3.5 holds. Then E ∧ P ∧ D is
satisﬁable iﬀ E is satisﬁable.
Proof: If E is satisﬁable, then E ∧ P satisﬁable. (For any model m that satisﬁes
E there is a model m0 that is identical to m, except m0 satisﬁes Permitted(s,s0)
for all terms s and s0 of the appropriate sort; m0 satisﬁes E ∧ P.) The result is
now immediate from Theorem A.0.8(a).Appendix B
Proofs for Chapter 3
Proposition 3.2.7: For all closed conditions d and sets L of licenses,
(a) every execution of Holds(d,L) that terminates returns the same output,
(b) every execution of Holds2(d,L,∅) that terminates returns the same output,
(c) if an execution of Holds(d,L) terminates by returning the truth value t, then
an execution of Holds2(d,L,∅) terminates by returning t.
Proof:
Parts (a) and (b) are immediate from the description of the Holds and Holds2.
To prove part (c), say that a call tree for Holds(d,L) is non-repeating if it is not
the case that there exists a path p in the call tree and two nodes n1 and n2 on the
path such that both nodes are labeled by the same call to Holds. If Holds(d,L)
terminates, then it has a ﬁnite call tree. Moreover, it is easy to see that if there
is a ﬁnite call tree for Holds(d,L), then there is a nonrepeating call tree: If
there is a call to Holds(d0,L0) at two nodes on a path, we simply replace the
subtree below the ﬁrst call to Holds(d0,L0) by the subtree below the last call to
Holds(d0,L0). A non-repeating call tree for Holds(d,L) is essentially a call tree
for Holds2(d,L,∅); the same calls are made at every step (the third component
has to change appropriately).
For the proofs of Proposition 3.2.8 and Lemma B.0.20, we rely on the observa-
tion that, if T is the call tree for an execution of Holds2(d,L,S), then T can be
viewed as an and-or tree, where a node labeled Holds2(d0,L,S0) is an and node if
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d0 is a conjunction with at least two conjuncts, an or node if d0 is a Said condition
and Holds2(d0,L,S0) makes at least one recursive call, and a leaf if d0 is true or if
d0 is a Said condition and Holds2(d0,L,S0) makes no recursive calls. For future
reference, note that each node in T can be assigned a truth value in an obvious
way. An and node is assigned “true” if all its children are; an or node is assigned
“true” if at least one child is; a leaf labeled Holds2(true,L,S0) is assigned “true”;
and a leaf labeled Holds2(Said(p,e),L,S0) is assigned “false”.
Proposition 3.2.8: If d is a closed condition, L is a hierarchical set of licenses,
S is a set of closed Said conditions, and T is the call tree of an execution of
Holds2(d,L,S), then the height of T is at most 2#(L) + 1.
Proof: Because L is hierarchical, there exists a strict partial order ≺ on licenses
such that, if ` and `0 are licenses in L and ` aﬀects `0, then ` ≺ `0. A node v in T
is a non − and node if v is an or node or a leaf. It follows from the description
of Holds2 that every and node has at least two children and every child of an
and node is a non − and node. So, if a path in T from the root to a leaf has
n non − and nodes, then that path has at most 2n total nodes; thus, it suﬃces
to show that every path in T has at most #(L) + 1 non − and nodes. If L = ∅,
then it is immediate from the description of Holds2 that T has height at most
1. Suppose that L 6= ∅. Then, for every path t in T, either t includes at most 2
non − and nodes, in which case t mentions at most #(L)+1 non − and nodes, or
t includes 2 non − and nodes vi and vj such that an or node precedes vi, which
precedes vj, and no or node is between vi and vj. If vi has a label of the form
Holds2(di,L,Si) and vj has a label of the form Holds2(dj,L,Sj), then it follows
from the description of Holds2 that there are licenses (pi,gi) and (pj,gj) in L and
closed substitutions σi and σj such that the antecedent of gi under σi mentions155
di; the antecedent of gj under σj mentions dj; and (pj,gj) aﬀects (pi,gi). Thus,
(pj,gj) ≺ (pi,gi). It follows that t has at most #(L) + 1 non − and nodes.
Deﬁnition B.0.10. Let (e,L,R,E) be a query, let X be some execution of
Query2(e,L,R,E), and let A = A(e,L,R,E,X).
E∗(e,L,R) = {Permitted(p,issue,g) | (p,g) ∈ L} ∪ {e}.
S∗(e,L,R,E,X) = {Said(p,Pr(p0)) | p,p0 ∈ P and Pr ∈ primitiveProp}∪
{Said(p,Permitted(p0,issue,g)) | p,p0 ∈ P and g ∈ A}.
Theorem 3.3.1: For all strings s in the language and all ﬁnite sets L of licenses,
A of closed resources, S of closed Said conditions, and E of closed conclusions,
sL,A,S,E is well deﬁned.
Proof: Let SL be the set of Said conditions that are mentioned in issued grants;
that is, Said(p,e) ∈ SL iﬀ there is a license (p0,g) ∈ L such that g mentions
Said(p,e). Let Ss be the set of Said conditions mentioned in s. Finally, let SL,s =
SL ∪ Ss. We deﬁne a lexicographic order on the tuples (s,S) such that (s,S) <
(s0,S0) iﬀ either (a) #(SL,s − S) < #(SL,s − S0) or (b) #(SL,s − S) = #(SL,s − S0)
and |s| < |s0|. The proof is by induction on this ordering. If #(SL,s − S) = 0 and
|s| = 1, then sL,A,S,E = s, so the translation is well deﬁned. The inductive step is
trivial except when s = Said(p,e) and s 6∈ S.
Suppose that s is of the form Said(p,e) and s 6∈ S. Recall that
Said(p,e)
L,A,S,E = Val(
^
g∈Rp
g
L,A,S0,∅ ⇒ e
L,A,S0,∅),
where Rp = {g | (p0,g) ∈ L for a p0 ∈ p} and S0 = S ∪ {Said(p,e)}. Because
L is a ﬁnite set, Rp is a ﬁnite set and because e is a conclusion, eL,A,S0,∅ is well156
deﬁned. So, to prove that Said(p,e)L,A,S,E is well deﬁned, it suﬃces to show that
gL,A,S0,∅ is well deﬁned for all g ∈ Rp. Suppose that s 6∈ SL. Then #(SL,g − S0) =
#(SL − S0) since SL,g = SL; #(SL − S0) = #(SL − S) since s 6∈ SL; #(SL − S) <
#(SL − S ∪ {s}) since s 6∈ SL; and #(SL − S ∪ {s}) = #(SL,s − S) since s 6∈ S.
So, putting the pieces together, #(SL,g − S0) < #(SL,s − S) and, by the induction
hypothesis, gL,A,S0,∅ is well deﬁned. Suppose that s ∈ SL. Then #(SL,g − S0) =
#(SL − S0) since SL,g = SL; #(SL − S0) < #(SL − S) since s ∈ SL − S; and
#(SL − S) = #(SL,s − S) since s ∈ L. Again, putting the pieces together,
#(SL,g − S0) < #(SL,s − S), so gL,A,S0,∅ is well deﬁned by the induction hypothesis.
We next prove Theorem 3.3.2. We actually prove a stronger result, given as
Theorem B.0.18; Theorem B.0.18(c) is Theorem 3.3.2. The next ﬁve lemmas and
deﬁnition are used in the proof of Theorem B.0.18.
Lemma B.0.11. Suppose that (e,L,R,E) is a query. Then during an execution
X of Query2(e,L,R,E)
(a) every call made to Query2, Auth2, and Holds2 takes L as its second
argument;
(b) every call made to Query2 and Auth2 takes R as its third argument;
(c) if Query2(e0,L,R,E0) is called, then e0 ∈ E∗(e,L,R);
(d) if Auth2(e0,L,R,E0) is called, then e0 ∈ E∗(e,L,R); and
(e) if Holds3(d,L,S) is called, then every conjunct of d is in S∗(e,L,R,E,X)∪
{true}.157
Proof: Parts (a) through (d) follow immediately from the descriptions of Query2,
Auth2, and Holds2. For part (e), suppose that Holds3(d,L,S) is called. Because
d is a closed condition, every conjunct of d is either true or of the form Said(p,e0),
where p is a closed principal and e0 is a closed conclusion. If e0 is of the form
Pr(p0), then Said(p,e0) is clearly in S∗(e,L,R,E,X). Otherwise, e0 is of the form
Permitted(p0,issue,g). Because e0 is an input to a call made during X and g is
mentioned in e0, g ∈ A(e,L,R,E,X).
Lemma B.0.12. Suppose that (e,L,R,E) is a query such that e ∈ E, A is a set
of closed resources, and S is a set of closed Said conditions. Then
V
`∈L `L,A,S,E ∧
V
g∈R gL,A,S,E ⇒ eL,A,S,E is not acceptably valid (and hence not valid).
Proof: Let m be an acceptable model that satisﬁes e0L,A,S,E iﬀ e0 6= e. Recall that,
for a grant g = ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → eg), gL,A,S,E is a conjunction of formulas of the
form
(
^
e∈E
¬Val(e
L,A,S,E ⇐⇒ (egσ)
L,A,S,E) ∧ (dgσ)
L,A,S,E) ⇒ (egσ)
L,A,S,E,
where σ is a closed substitution. If e ∈ E, then m satisﬁes gL,A,S,E because, for all
substitutions σ, either (egσ)L,A,S,E 6= eL,A,S,E, in which case m satisﬁes (egσ)L,A,S,E,
or (egσ)L,A,S,E = eL,A,S,E, in which case
V
e∈E ¬Val(eL,A,S,E ⇐⇒ (egσ)L,A,S,E)
is equivalent to false. Since m satisﬁes every grant, m satisﬁes
V
`∈L `L,A,S,E ∧
V
g∈R gL,A,S,E. By construction, m does not satisfy eL,A,S,E, so m does not satisfy
V
`∈L `L,A,S,E ∧
V
g∈R gL,A,S,E ⇒ eL,A,S,E.
Lemma B.0.13. Suppose that (e,L,R,E) is a query, A is a set of closed resources,
and S is a set of closed Said conditions. Then (a) e0L,A,S,E = e0L,A,S,(E∪{e}) for
every closed conclusion e0 in the language, (b) gL,A,S,E ⇒ gL,A,S,(E∪{e}) is valid for158
every grant g in the language, and (c) `L,A,S,E ⇒ `L,A,S,(E∪{e}) is valid for every
license ` in the language.
Proof: Part (a) follows immediately from the translation.
For part (b), let g = ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → eg). It is easy to see that gL,A,S,E ⇒
gL,A,S,(E∪{e}) is valid if, for all closed substitutions σ, dgσL,A,S,(E∪{e}) ⇒ dgσL,A,S,E
is valid. The latter statement holds because the translation of a condition does not
depend on the ﬁnal input argument (i.e., the set of conditions), so dgσL,A,S,(E∪{e}) =
dgσL,A,S,E.
For part (c), let ` = (p,h). If Permitted(p,issue,h) ∈ E ∪ {e} or (p,h) 6∈
L, then `L,A,S,(E∪{e}) = true, so the formula `L,A,S,E ⇒ `L,A,S,(E∪{e}) is valid. If
Permitted(p,issue,h) 6∈ E ∪ {e} and (p,h) ∈ L, then
`
L,A,S,E = Permitted(p,issue,ch) ⇒ h
L,A,S,E and
`
L,A,S,(E∪{e}) = Permitted(p,issue,ch) ⇒ h
L,A,S,(E∪{e}).
It follows that `L,A,S,E ⇒ `L,A,S,(E∪{e}) is valid if hL,A,S,E ⇒ hL,A,S,(E∪{e}) is valid.
The latter formula is valid by part (b).
Deﬁnition B.0.14. For a set A of closed resources, an A-closed substitution σ is
a closed substitution such that, for all variables x of sort Rsrc, σ(x) ∈ A.
Lemma B.0.15. Suppose that G is a set of grants, L is a set of licenses, A is a
set of closed resources, S is a set of closed Said conditions, E is a set of grants,
and e is a closed conclusion. Then
V
g∈G gL,A,S,E ⇒ eL,A,S,E is acceptably valid iﬀ
gL,A,S,E ⇒ eL,A,S,E is acceptably valid for some g ∈ G. Moreover, for any grant g,
gL,A,S,E ⇒ eL,A,S,E is acceptably valid iﬀ e 6∈ E and, for some A-closed substitution
σ, the formula dgσL,A,S,E is acceptably valid and egσ = e.159
Proof: We ﬁrst show that
V
g∈G gL,A,S,E ⇒ eL,A,S,E is acceptably valid iﬀ gL,A,S,E ⇒
eL,A,S,E is acceptably valid for some g ∈ G. The “if” direction is trivial. For the
“only if” direction, suppose by way of contradiction that
V
g∈G gL,A,S,E ⇒ eL,A,S,E
is acceptably valid and gL,A,S,E ⇒ eL,A,S,E is not acceptably valid for all g ∈ G.
Let m be an acceptable model such that, for all closed conclusions e0, m satisﬁes
e0L,A,S,E iﬀ e0 6= e. Since
V
g∈G gL,A,S,E ⇒ eL,A,S,E is acceptably valid, there is
a g = ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → eg) ∈ G such that m does not satisfy gL,A,S,E. By the
translation, it follows that there is an A-closed substitution σ such that egσ 6∈ E,
dgσL,A,S,E holds in m, and egσ 6= e. Because, for all conditions d0, d0L,A,S,E can be
written as Val(ϕ) for an appropriate formula ϕ, dgσL,A,S,E is acceptably valid since
it holds in an acceptable model. It follows that gL,A,S,E ⇒ eL,A,S,E is acceptably
valid, which contradicts the assumption.
It remains to show that gL,A,S,E ⇒ eL,A,S,E is acceptably valid for a grant
g = ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → eg) iﬀ e 6∈ E and, for some A-closed substitution σ, the
formula dgσL,A,S,E is acceptably valid and egσ = e. The “if” direction is immediate
from the translation. For the “only if” direction, suppose by way of contradiction
that gL,A,S,E ⇒ eL,A,S,E is acceptably valid and either e ∈ E or, for each A-closed
substitution σ, either dgσL,A,S,E is not valid or egσ 6= e. Let m be the acceptable
model deﬁned above; that is, for all conclusions e0, m satisﬁes e0L,A,S,E iﬀ e0 6= e.
We can get a contradiction by showing that m satisﬁes gL,A,S,E. If e ∈ E, then m
satisﬁes gL,A,S,E since either egσ ∈ E (because egσ = e), or egσ holds in m (because
egσ 6= e). Otherwise, by assumption, either dgσL,A,S,E is not acceptably valid or
egσ 6= e, for each A-closed substitution σ. Note that, because dgσL,A,S,E (like every
formula of the form dL,A,S,E for some condition d) is equivalent to a formula of the
form Val(ϕ), then if it is not acceptably valid, it is not true in any acceptable160
model and, in particular, not in m. It then easily follows from the translation that
m satisﬁes gL,A,S,E. This gives us the desired contradiction.
Deﬁnition B.0.16. Let (e,L,R,E) be a query, let X be a terminating execution
of Query2(e,L,R,E), and let A = A(e,L,R,E,X). Then
G(e,L,R,E,X) =
R ∪ {h | for some principal p, (p,h) ∈ L and
((
V
`∈L `L,A,∅,(E∪{e})) ∧ (
V
g∈R gL,A,∅,(E∪{e})))
⇒ Permitted(p,issue,ch) is acceptably valid}.
Lemma B.0.17. Suppose that (e,L,R,E) is a query, X is a terminating ex-
ecution of Query2(e,L,R,E), and A = A(e,L,R,E,X), Then
V
`∈L `L,A,∅,E ∧
V
g∈R gL,A,∅,E ⇒ eL,A,∅,E is acceptably valid iﬀ there is a grant h ∈ G(e,L,R,E,X)
such that hL,A,∅,E ⇒ eL,A,∅,E is acceptably valid.
Proof: For the “if” direction, suppose that h is a grant in G(e,L,R,E,X)
such that hL,A,∅,E ⇒ eL,A,∅,E is acceptably valid. If h ∈ R, then
V
`∈L `L,A,∅,E ∧
V
g∈R gL,A,∅,E ⇒ eL,A,∅,E is acceptably valid. If h ∈ G(e,L,R,E,X)−R, then there
is a principal p such that
(1a) (p,h) ∈ L,
(1b) Permitted(p,issue,h) 6∈ E, and
(1c)
V
`∈L `L,A,∅,(E∪{e}) ∧
V
g∈R gL,A,∅,(E∪{e}) ⇒ Permitted(p,issue,ch) is accept-
ably valid.161
Let ϕ =
V
`∈L `L,A,∅,E ∧
V
g∈R gL,A,∅,E. It follows from (1a) that ϕ ⇒ (p,h)L,A,∅,E
is acceptably valid. It follows from (1a), (1b), and the translation that ϕ ⇒
(Permitted(p,issue,ch) ⇒ hL,A,∅,E) is acceptably valid. It follows from (1c) and
Lemma B.0.13 that ϕ ⇒ Permitted(p,issue,ch) is acceptably valid, so ϕ ⇒
hL,A,∅,E is acceptably valid. By assumption hL,A,∅,E ⇒ eL,A,∅,E is acceptably valid,
so ϕ ⇒ eL,A,∅,E is acceptably valid.
For the “only if” direction, suppose that there is no grant g ∈ G(e,L,R,E,X)
such that gL,A,∅,E ⇒ eL,A,∅,E is acceptably valid. Let m be an acceptable model
that does not satisfy eL,A,∅,E and the formulas in {Permitted(p,issue,h)L,A,∅,E |
(p,h) ∈ L,Permitted(p,issue,h) 6∈ E, and h 6∈ G(e,L,R,E,X)}. Because
m does not satisfy eL,A,∅,E, it suﬃces to show that m satisﬁes
V
`∈L `L,A,∅,E ∧
V
g∈R gL,A,∅,E. We do this by showing that (1) m satisﬁes (p,h)L,A,∅,E for every
license (p,h) such that h 6∈ G(e,L,R,E,X), and (2) m satisﬁes gL,A,∅,E for every
grant g ∈ G(e,L,R,E,X).
For part (1), observe that if Permitted(p,issue,h) ∈ E or (p,h) 6∈ L, then
(p,h)L,A,∅,E = true, so (p,h)L,A,∅,E holds in m. If Permitted(p,issue,h) 6∈ E
and (p,h) ∈ L, then (p,h)L,A,∅,E = Permitted(p,issue,ch) ⇒ hL,A,∅,E and, by
construction, m does not satisfy Permitted(p,issue,ch); so (p,h)L,A,∅,E is again
true in m.
For part (2), let g = ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → eg) ∈ G(e,L,R,E,X), and recall that
gL,A,∅,E is the conjunction of formulas of the form
(
^
e∈E
¬Val(e
L,A,∅,E ⇐⇒ (egσ)
L,A,∅,E) ∧ (dgσ)
L,A,∅,E) ⇒ (egσ)
L,A,∅,E,
where σ is an A-closed substitution. Clearly, m satisﬁes gL,A,∅,E iﬀ, for every
A-closed substitution σ, m satisﬁes ((
V
e0∈E ¬Val(e0L,A,∅,E ⇐⇒ (egσ)L,A,∅,E) ∧
(dgσ)L,A,∅,E) ⇒ (egσ)L,A,∅,E. It is easy to see that the latter statement holds if,162
for all A-closed substitutions σ, either egσ ∈ E, (dgσ)L,A,∅,E is not true in m,
or (egσ)L,A,∅,E is true in m. We claim that this is indeed the case. To prove
the claim, suppose by way of contradiction that egσ 6∈ E, (dgσ)L,A,∅,E is true in
m, and (egσ)L,A,∅,E is not true in m. Since (egσ)L,A,∅,E is not true in m, either
egσ = e or egσ ∈ {Permitted(p,issue,h) | (p,h) ∈ L,Permitted(p,issue,h) 6∈
E, and h 6∈ G(e,L,R,E,X)}.
If egσ = e, then we claim that gL,A,∅,E ⇒ eL,A,∅,E is acceptably valid. To see
this note that gL,A,∅,E ⇒ (
V
e0∈E ¬Val(e0L,A,∅,E ⇐⇒ (eg)σL,A,∅,E) ∧ (dgσ)L,A,∅,E ⇒
(egσ)L,A,∅,E) is acceptably valid. Because egσ 6∈ E,
V
e0∈E ¬Val(e0L,A,∅,E ⇐⇒
(egσ)L,A,∅,E) is equivalent to true; so, gL,A,∅,E ⇒ ((dgσ)L,A,∅,E ⇒ (egσ)L,A,∅,E)
is acceptably valid. Since (dgσ)L,A,∅,E is true in m by assumption, and, as we
have observed, every formula of the form dL,A,∅,E is equivalent to Val(ϕ) for some
formula ϕ, (dgσ)L,A,∅,E is acceptably valid and, as a result, gL,A,∅,E ⇒ (egσ)L,A,∅,E
is acceptably valid. By assumption, egσ = e, so gL,A,∅,E ⇒ eL,A,∅,E is accept-
ably valid. Since g ∈ G(e,L,R,E,X) and, by assumption, none of the grants in
G(e,L,R,E,X) imply eL,A,∅,E, we have a contradiction.
Finally, suppose that egσ 6= e and egσ = Permitted(p,issue,h), where
(p,h) ∈ L, Permitted(p,issue,h) 6∈ E, and h 6∈ G(e,L,R,E,X). We now
prove that gL,A,∅,(E∪{e}) ⇒ Permitted(p,issue,ch) is acceptably valid, so h ∈
G(e,L,R,E,X), which contradicts the assumptions. We begin by noting that
g
L,A,∅,(E∪{e})
⇒ ((
^
e0∈E∪{e}
¬Val(e
0L,A,∅,(E∪{e}) ⇐⇒ (egσ)
L,A,∅,(E∪{e})) ∧ (dgσ)
L,A,∅,(E∪{e}))
⇒ (egσ)
L,A,∅,(E∪{e}))
is acceptably valid. By assumption, egσ 6∈ E ∪ {e}, therefore gL,A,∅,(E∪{e}) ⇒163
((dgσ)L,A,∅,(E∪{e}) ⇒ (egσ)L,A,∅,(E∪{e})) is acceptably valid. Since the conclusions
egσ = Permitted(p,issue,h) and egσL,A,∅,(E∪{e}) = Permitted(p,issue,ch), the
formula gL,A,∅,(E∪{e}) ⇒ ((dgσ)L,A,∅,(E∪{e}) ⇒ Permitted(p,issue,ch)) is accept-
ably valid. It remains to be shown that (dgσ)L,A,∅,(E∪{e}) is acceptably valid. Be-
cause the translation of a condition does not depend on the set of conclusions, it
suﬃces to show that dgσL,A,∅,E is acceptably valid. But, as we observed above, this
follows immediately from the assumption that dgσL,A,∅,E is true in m.
Theorem B.0.18. Suppose that (e,L,R,E) is a query, X is a terminating exe-
cution of Query2(e,L,R,E), and A = A(e,L,R,E,X). Then for all calls of the
form Holds2(d,L,S), Auth2(e0,L,R,E0), or Query2(e0,L,R,E0) made during
execution X, including the initial call,
(a) Holds2(d,L,S) returns true iﬀ dL,A,S,E0 is acceptably valid, where E0 is an
(arbitrary) set of closed conclusions;
(b) Auth2(e0,L,R,E0) returns the set D of closed conditions, where D = {d |
e0 6∈ E0 and, for some grant ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → eg) ∈ G(e0,L,R,E0,X) and
closed substitution σ, dgσ = d and egσ = e0}; and
(c) Query2(e0,L,R,E0) returns true iﬀ
V
`∈L `L,A,∅,E0∧
V
g∈R `L,A,∅,E0 ⇒ e0L,A,∅,E0
is acceptably valid.
Proof: We prove part (a) by induction on #(S∗(e,L,R,E,X) − S), with a subin-
duction on the structure of d. Suppose that #(S∗(e,L,R,E,X) − S) = 0. If
d = true, then Holds2(d,L,S) = true and dL,A,S,E0 = true. Suppose that d is of
the form Said(p,e0). Then, by Lemma B.0.11, d ∈ S∗(e,L,R,E). By assumption,
#(S∗(e,L,R,E) − S) = 0, so d ∈ S. It follows that Holds2(d,L,S) = false and164
dL,A,S,E0 = false. Finally, if d is a conjunction, then the result is immediate from
the induction hypothesis. For the induction step, the argument used for the base
case applies if d = true or if d is a conjunction of conditions. Suppose that d has
the form Said(p,e0). If d ∈ S, then Holds2(d,L,S) = false and dL,A,S,E0 = false.
If d 6∈ S then, by the description of Holds2, Holds2(d,L,S) = true iﬀ there
is a grant g = ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → eg) ∈ Rp and an A-closed substitution σ such
that Holds2(dgσ,L,S ∪ {d}) = true and egσ = e0. By the induction hypothesis,
Holds2(dgσ,L,S ∪ {d}) = true iﬀ dgσL,A,(S∪{d}),E0 is acceptably valid. By the
translation, the latter statement holds iﬀ dgσL,A,(S∪{d}),∅ is acceptably valid. So,
by Lemma B.0.15, Holds2(d,L,S) = true iﬀ (
V
g∈Rp gL,A,(S∪{d}),∅) ⇒ eL,A,(S∪{d}),∅
is acceptably valid. It is immediate from the translation that the latter statement
holds iﬀ dL,A,S,E0 is acceptably valid.
We prove parts (b) and (c) by simultaneous induction on #(E∗(e,L,R) − E0).
If #(E∗(e,L,R) − E0) = 0, then e0 ∈ E∗(e,L,R) by Lemma B.0.11, so e0 ∈ E0.
Because e0 ∈ E0, Auth2(e0,L,R,E0) = ∅, so part (b) holds. For part (c),
Query2 begins by calling Auth2(e0,L,R,E0), which returns the empty set, and
then Query2 returns false. Since e0 ∈ E0, it follows from Lemma B.0.12 that
V
`∈L `L,A,∅,E0 ∧
V
g∈R gL,A,∅,E0 ⇒ e0L,A,∅,E0 is not acceptably valid, so the invariant
holds.
Now consider the inductive step. For part (b), suppose that Auth2(e0,L,R,E0)
is called during the execution of Query2(e,L,R,E). If e0 ∈ E0, then part (b) holds
by the same argument as in the base case. If e0 6∈ E0, then Auth2 returns a set D
of closed conditions such that d ∈ D iﬀ there is a grant ∀x1 ...∀xn(dh → eh) ∈ SL165
and a closed substitution σ such that dhσ = d and ehσ = e, where
SL = R ∪ {h | for some principal p, (p,h) ∈ L and, during execution X,
Query2(Permitted(p,issue,h),L,R,(E0 ∪ {e0})) returns true}.
It clearly suﬃces to show that SL = G(e0,L,R,E0,X). By Lemma B.0.11, e0 ∈
E∗(e,L,R) and, by assumption, e 6∈ E0. So it follows from the induction hypothesis
that
SL = R ∪ {h | for some principal p, (p,h) ∈ L and
V
`∈L `L,A,∅,(E0∪{e0}) ∧
V
g∈R gL,A,∅,(E0∪{e0})
⇒ Permitted(p,issue,ch) is acceptably valid},
which is G(e0,L,R,E0,X).
For part (c), observe that if e0 ∈ E0 then we can use the same reasoning as in
the base case to show that the invariant holds. If e0 6∈ E0 then, during execution X,
Query2(e0,L,R,E0) returns true iﬀ there is a closed condition d in the output of
Auth2(e0,L,R,E0) such that Query2 calls Holds2(d,L,∅), which returns true.
By part (b), Auth2(e0,L,R,E0) returns a set of conditions that includes d iﬀ there
is a grant g = ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → eg) ∈ G(e0,L,R,E0,X) and a closed substitution
σ such that dgσ = d and egσ = e0. Moreover, since Holds2(d,L,∅) is called during
execution X of Query2(e,L,R,E), σ is A-closed. By part (a), Holds2(d,L,∅) =
true iﬀ dL,A,∅,E0 is acceptably valid. So Query2(e0,L,R,E0) returns true iﬀ there is
a grant g = ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg → eg) ∈ G(e0,L,R,E0,X) and an A-closed substitution
σ such that dL,A,∅,E0 is acceptably valid and egσ = e0. By assumption, e0 6∈ E0; so, by
Lemma B.0.15, Query2(e0,L,R,E0) = true iﬀ gL,A,∅,E0 ⇒ e0L,A,∅,E0 is acceptably
valid for some g ∈ G(e0,L,R,E0,X). It follows from Lemma B.0.17 that the latter
statement holds iﬀ
V
`∈L `L,A,∅,E0 ∧
V
g∈R gL,A,∅,E0 ⇒ e0L,A,∅,E0 is acceptably valid.166
Theorem 3.4.1: Determining whether some execution of Query2(e,L,R,E)
returns true is undecidable for the set of queries (e,L,R,E) such that at most one
grant in R ∪ L is not restrained.
Proof: We reduce the Post correspondence problem (PCP) [Pos46] to the problem
of determining whether some execution of Query2(e,L,R,∅) returns true for a
query (e,L,R,∅), where all but one grant in R ∪ L is restrained. Let Σ be an
alphabet; let s1,...,sn and t1,...,tn be strings over Σ; and, for all strings s and
s0, let s · s0 be the concatenation of s and s0. We want to determine if there are
integers i1,...,ik ∈ {1,...,n} such that si1 · ... · sik = ti1 · ... · tik.
To encode the problem as a query, assume that the language includes the
primitive principal pσ for each symbol σ ∈ Σ, the primitive principal p, and
the property Pr. For every string s over Σ, deﬁne a function Gs from grants
to grants by induction on the length of s. If s has length one (s ∈ Σ), then
Gs(g) = Permitted(ps,issue,g). If s = σs0, then Gs = Gσ ◦ Gs0. For all grants
g1 and g2, deﬁne G(g1,g2) to be the grant Said(p,Permitted(p,issue,g1)) →
Permitted(p,issue,g2).
We claim that there are integers i1,...,ik ∈ {1,...,n} such that si1 ·...·sik =
ti1 · ... · tik iﬀ an execution of Query2(Pr(p),L,R,∅) returns true, where
L = {(p,Permitted(p,issue,G(Gsi(Pr(p)),Gti(Pr(p))))) | i = 1,...,n}∪
{(p,∀x1∀x2(Said(p,Permitted(p,issue,G(x1,x2))) →
Permitted(p,issue,G(Gsi(x1),Gti(x2))))) | i = 1,...,n}
and R = {∀x(Said(p,Permitted(p,issue,G(x,x))) → Pr(p))}.
Recall that an execution of Query2(e,L,R,∅) returns true iﬀ an execu-
tion of Auth2(e,L,R,∅) returns a set D of conditions such that an exe-
cution of Holds2(d,L,∅) returns true for some condition d ∈ D. It is167
easy to see that every execution of Auth2(e,L,R,∅) returns the set D =
{Said(p,Permitted(p,issue,G(g,g))) | g is a closed grant}. Moreover, if d is
of the form Said(p,Permitted(p,issue,G(g,g))), where g is a closed grant, then
it is not hard to see that an execution of Holds2(d,L,∅) returns true iﬀ there
are integers i1,...,ik ∈ {1,...,n} such that g = Gsi1(Gsi2(...Gsik(Pr(p))...))
and g = Gti1(Gti2(...Gtik(Pr(p))...)). The latter statements holds iﬀ there are
integers i1,...,ik ∈ {1,...,n} such that si1 · ... · sik = ti1 · ... · tik.
Theorem 3.4.2: The problem of deciding whether at least one execution of
Query2(e,L,R,E) returns true for (e,L,R,E) ∈ L0 ∩ L ∩ L0 is NP-hard for
L,L0 ∈ {L1,L0
2,L2
3}.
Proof: For the NP hardness results, it suﬃces to show that the problem of deciding
whether Query2(e,L,R,E) = true is NP-hard if (a) (e,L,R,E) ∈ L0 ∩ L0
2 ∩ L2
3,
(b) (e,L,R,E) ∈ L0 ∩ L1 ∩ L2
3, and (c) (e,L,R,E) ∈ L0 ∩ L1 ∩ L0
2.
For part (a), we show that we can reduce the Hamiltonian path problem
to the problem of determining whether Query2(e,L,R,E) = true, for some
(e,L,R,E) ∈ L0 ∩ L0
2 ∩ L2
3. Given a graph G(V,E), where V = {v1,...,vn},
we take v1,...,vn to be primitive principles. We also assume that the language
has primitive properties Node, Edge, and Path. For each node v ∈ V , let gv be
the grant Node(v) (recall that this is an abbreviation for true → Node(v)). For
each edge e = (v,v0) ∈ E, let g(v,v0) be the grant Edge({v,v0}) (recall that {v,v0}
is an abbreviation for {v}∪{v0}). Finally, let g be the grant ∀x1 ...∀xn(d1 ∧d2 →
Path({x1,...,xn})), where
d1 =
V
1≤i≤n Said(Alice,Node(xi)) and
d2 =
V
1≤i≤n−1 Said(Alice,Edge({xi,xi+1})).168
Let
L = {(Alice,gv) | v ∈ V } ∪ {(Alice,ge) | e ∈ E} and
R = {g}.
It is not hard to show that Query2(Path({v1,...,vn}),L,R,∅) = true iﬀ G has
a Hamiltonian path. To see this, observe that Auth2(Path({v1,...,vn}),L,R,∅)
returns {d1σ ∧ d2σ | σ(xi) = vπ(i),i = 1,...,n, where π is some permutation
of {1,...,n}}. The condition d2σ holds iﬀ there is a path x1σ,...,xnσ. Thus,
Query2(Path({v1,...,vn}),L,R,∅) = true iﬀ there is a Hamiltonian path in G.
Moreover, it is clear that (Path({v1,...,vn}),L,R,∅) ∈ L0∩L0
2 and it is not hard
to see that (Path({v1,...,vn}),L,R,∅) ∈ L2
3, because the antecedent of every
issued grant is true.
For part (b), we show that we can reduce the 3-satisﬁability problem to the
problem of determining whether Query2(e,L,R,E) = true, for (e,L,R,E) ∈
L0 ∩L1 ∩L2
3. Let f = c1 ∧...∧cn be a formula in propositional logic, where each
ci is a clause with three disjuncts. Let q1,...,qm be the primitive propositions
mentioned in f. We want to determine if f is satisﬁable.
To encode the problem as an XrML query, suppose that p1,...,pn,pt,pf are
distinct primitive principals, Pr is a property, and x1,...,xm are distinct vari-
ables of sort Princ. Let g0 be a ﬁxed closed grant. Given principals t1,...,tm,
we deﬁne grants g1(t1),...,gm(t1,...,tm) inductively as follows: g1(t1) is the
grant true → Permitted(ti,issue,g0) and, for i = 2,...,m, gi is the grant
true → Permitted(ti,issue,gi−1(t1,...,ti−1)). Let e(t1,...,tm) be the conclu-
sion Permitted(tm,issue,gm−1(t1,...,tm−1)). For ease of exposition, let e0 be169
the conclusion e(x1,...,xm). Let
L = {(pi,∀x1 ...∀xm(e
0[xj/pt])) | qj is a disjunct of ci}∪
{(pi,∀x1 ...∀xm(e
0[xj/pf])) | ¬qj is a disjunct of ci} and
R = {∀x1 ...∀xm((
^
i=1,...,n
Said(pi,e
0)) → Pr(pt)}.
We claim that f is satisﬁable iﬀ Query2(Pr(pt),L,R,∅) = true. Note that
(P(pt),L,R,∅) ∈ L1 ∩ L0 ∩ L2
3, since none of the grants mention a variable of
sort Rsrc, the ∪ operator is not mentioned in the query, and the antecedent of
every issued grant is true.
To prove the claim, ﬁrst observe that Query2(Pr(pt),L,R,∅) = true if and
only if
V
i=1,...,n Said(pi,e0)σ holds for some substitution σ. It is not hard to see
that if σ exists, then f is satisﬁed by the truth assignment that sets qi = true if
σ sets xi to pt, and sets qi to false otherwise. Similarly, if f is satisﬁed by a truth
assignment A, then
V
i=1,...,n Said(pi,e0)σ holds for the substitution σ that replaces
xi by pt if A assigns xi to true, and replaces xi by pf otherwise.
For part (c), we show that we can reduce the 3-satisﬁability problem to the
problem of determining whether Query2(e,L,R,E) = true, for (e,L,R,E) ∈
L0 ∩ L1 ∩ L0
2. As in part (b), let f be the 3-CNF formula c1 ∧ ... ∧ cn, whose
primitive propositions are q1,...,qm. Deﬁne the condition e(t1,...,tm) as in part
(b); again, take e0 to be an abbreviation for e(x1,...,xm). Let p0
1,...,p0
m be
fresh principals, distinct from p1,...,pn,pf,pt. We claim that f is satisﬁed iﬀ
Query2(e(p0
1,...,p0
m),L,R,∅) = true, where
L = {(pi,∀x1 ...∀xm(Said(pi+1,e0[xj/pt]) → e0[xj/p])) |
qj is a disjunct of ci, p 6= pf,i = 1,...,n − 1}170
∪ {(pi,∀x1 ...∀xm(Said(pi+1,e0[xj/pf]) → e0[xj/p])) |
¬qj is a disjunct of ci, p 6= pt,i = 1,...,n − 1}
∪ {(pn,∀x1 ...∀xm(e0[xj/p])) |
qj is a disjunct of cn and p 6= pf, or ¬qj is a disjunct of cn and p 6= pt}
R = {Said(p1,e(p
0
1,...,p
0
m)) → e(p
0
1,...,p
0
m)}.
If t1,...,tm are variable-free principals, let A(t1,...,tm) be the set of all truth
assignments to q1,...,qm such that qi is assigned true if ti = pt and qi is assigned
false if ti = pf, for i = 1,...,m. (If ti / ∈ {pt,pf}, then there are no constraints on
qi.) Let Ai(t1,...,tm) be the set of all truth assignments to q1,...,qm under which
ci∧...∧cn is true. We show by induction on n−i that Ai(t1,...,tm) is nonempty
iﬀ Said(pi,e(t1,...,tm)) holds. If n − i = 0, then i = n. It is easy to see that
Ai(t1,...,tm) is nonempty iﬀ, for some j = 1,...,m, either qj is a disjunct of cn
and tj 6= pf, or ¬qj is a disjunct of cn and tj 6= pt. For the inductive step, suppose
that n − i > 0. Clearly, Ai(t1,...,tm) is nonempty iﬀ there is an assignment in
Ai−1(t1,...,tm) under which ci is true. If there is at least one such assignment,
then Ai−1(t0
1,...,t0
m) is nonempty, where t0
1,...,t0
m are variable-free principals such
that, for some j ∈ {1,...,m} and for all i 6= j, t0
i = ti and either qj is a disjunct
of ci, tj 6= pf, and t0
j = pt, or ¬qj is a disjunct of ci, tj 6= pt, and t0
j = pf. It
follows from the induction hypothesis that Said(pi−1,e(t0
1,...,t0
m)) holds and it
follows from L that Said(pi,e(t1,...,tm)) holds as well. If there is no assignment
in Ai−1(t1,...,tm) under which ci is true then, for every disjunct qj in ci, ti = pf
and, for every disjunct ¬qj in ci, tj = pt. It follows that Ai(t1,...,tm) = ∅ and
Said(pi,e(t1,...,tm)) does not hold.
The desired result now follows quickly. It is easy to see that Query2(e,L,R,∅)171
returns true iﬀ Said(p1,e(p0
1,...,p0
m)) holds. Since none of p0
1,...,p0
m is pf or
pt, by deﬁnition, A(p0
1,...,p0
m) consists of all truth assignments. Thus, by the
induction argument, it follows that Query2(e,L,R,∅) = true iﬀ f = c1 ∧ ... ∧ cn
is satisﬁable. Moreover, it is easy to see that (e,L,R,∅) ∈ L0 ∩ L1 ∩ L0
2, because
the query does not mention union and, for every variable x mentioned in a grant
g that is in R ∪ L, x is mentioned in the conclusion of g.
We next prove Theorem 3.4.3, which considers the complexity of determining
whether Query2(e,L,R,E) returns true for (e,L,R,E) ∈ L0 ∩ L1 ∩ Ln
2 ∩ Lh
3. In
the statement of the theorem, we viewed n and h as constants. In our proof, we
treat them as parameters, so as to bring out their role.
To prove the theorem we need three preliminary lemmas. The ﬁrst uses the
fact that, for every condition d, there is a dag (directed acyclic graph) Gd such that
Gd represents d and Gd is no larger than d. To make this precise, recall that |s| is
the length of string s when viewed as a string of symbols. For ease of exposition,
we assume that each pair of parenthesis and set braces has length 2, and each
comma has length 1. For a graph G(V,E), let |G| = #(V ) + #(E). It is easy
to see that a condition d can be represented as a tree Td, where |Td| ≤ |d|. For
example, we can represent the condition d = Said({Alice,Bob},Smart(Amy))∧
Said({Alice,Bob},Pretty(Amy)) as the tree Td shown in Figure B.1. Note
that |d| = 27 and, because the tree has 13 nodes and 12 edges, |Td| = 25. By
“merging” identical subtrees, we can create a dag representation of d that can
be substantially smaller than |d|. Continuing our example, the dag Dd shown in
Figure B.2 represents the condition d and |Dd| = 19.
Lemma B.0.19. Suppose that T is the call tree for an execution of Holds2(d,L,∅);
every license in L is restrained; the ∪ operator is not mentioned in d or in a grant172
Figure B.1: Tree Representation of d
Figure B.2: Dag Representation of d173
in L; and v is a node in T with label Holds2(d0,L,S). If Gd is a dag representing
d, then there exists a dag Gd0 representing d0 such that |Gd0| ≤ h|L| + |Gd|, where
h is the height of T.
Proof: Because v is a node in T, there is a path v0,...,vk in T such that v0 is
the root of T and vk = v. We prove by induction on k that there is a dag Gd0
representing d0 such that |Gd0| ≤ k|L|+|Gd|. Since k ≤ h by assumption, it easily
follows that |Gd0| ≤ h|L| + |Gd|.
If k = 0, then v is the root of T, so d0 = d. If k > 0, then v is the child of a
node vk−1. Let Holds2(d00,L,S0) be the label of vk−1. The proof is by cases on
the structure of d00. It follows from the description of Holds2 that d00 is not true
because d00 is not a leaf in T. If d00 is a conjunction, then d0 is a conjunct of d00. So
the space needed to represent d0 is less than the space needed to represent d00, thus
the result follows easily from the induction hypothesis. Finally, if d00 has the form
Said(p,e), then it follows from the description of Holds2 that there is a license
(p,g) ∈ L, where g = ∀x1 ...∀xm(dg → eg), and a closed substitution σ such that
d0 = dgσ and egσ = e. A dag representing dgσ (i.e., d0) can be obtained by taking
a dag representing dg and replacing every variable x by a dag representing σ(x).
Because every grant in L is restrained, g is restrained, so σ assigns every variable
of sort Rsrc mentioned in dg to a term in e. Since σ(x) is a subterm of e or a
primitive principal, given a dag Gdg representing dg and a dag Ge representing e,
we can construct a dag Gd0 representing d0 such that |Gd0| ≤ |Gdg|+|Ge|. Since, for
every condition d, there is a tree representation of d whose size is at most |d|, there
is a dag Gdg representing dg such that |Gdg| ≤ |dg|. Because dg is the antecedent
of a grant in L, |dg| < |L| so it follows that |Gdg| < L. Because e is a subterm of
d00 = Said(p,e), and by the induction hypothesis, there is a dag Gd00 representing174
d00 such that |Gd00| ≤ (k−1)|L|+|Gd|, there is surely a dag Ge representing e such
that |Ge| ≤ (k − 1)|L| + |Gd|. Putting this all together, it follows that there is a
dag Gd0 representing d0 such that |Gd0| ≤ k|L| + |Gd|.
Lemma B.0.20. If Holds2(d,L,∅) is h-bounded, the ∪ operator is not mentioned
in d or in a grant in L, L is both restrained and n-restricted, and Gd is a dag
representing d, then the output of Holds2(d,L,∅) can be determined in time
O(max(|Gd|,|L||P0|
n)(|L||P0|
n)
h−2(|L||P0|
n + (h|L| + |Gd|)(h + |L|))).
Proof: Let T be the call tree for an execution of Holds2(d,L,∅). Our goal is to
compute the truth value associated with the root of T, since that truth value is
the output of Holds2(d,L,∅).
It is clear that once we have written the call tree, computing the truth value of
the root can be done in time linear in the number of nodes in the tree. The obvious
way to construct the tree is to start at the root and, for each node v, construct
the successors of v (if there are any). In constructing the call tree, we assume that
the condition d0 and the elements of the set S in a node labeled Holds2(d0,L,S)
are described using the dags of Lemma B.0.19. Consider a node v in T that is
labeled Holds2(d0,L,S) and is neither the root nor a leaf. Since v is not a leaf,
d0 6= true. If d0 is a conjunction, then a bound on the number of conjuncts (and
hence on the successors of the node) is |L| since d0 is of the form dgσ, where dg is
the antecedent of a grant g that is in L, and σ is a closed substitution. It is easy to
see that dg, and hence dgσ, has at most |L| conjuncts, and these can be computed
in time O(|L|).
Suppose that d0 is of the form Said(p,e). If d0 ∈ S, then v is a leaf. Since the
height of T is at most h, S has at most h elements. It follows from Lemma B.0.19175
that each of these elements can be represented using a dag of size at most h|L| +
|Gd|, so checking whether Said(p,e) ∈ S can be done in time O(h2|L|+h|Gd|). If
d0 / ∈ S, then each child of v has the form dgσ, where g = ∀x1 ...∀xi(dg → eg) is
a grant in L and σ is a closed substitution such that egσ = e. Since every grant
in L is restrained and n-restricted, dg mentions at most n variables that are not
mentioned in eg and each of these variables is of sort Princ. Since d and the grants
in L do not mention the ∪ operator and #(P0) = |P0|, there are at most |P0|
substitutions for each variable and thus |P0|n possible substitutions σ. Finding
σ(x) for all of the variables x that are mentioned in eg takes time linear in the size
of the dag representing e (since egσ = e). Clearly the dag representing e has size
less than that representing d0 = Said(p,e). By Lemma B.0.19, the latter dag has
size at most h|L| + |Gd|. Since #(L) ≤ |L|, there are at most |L||P0|n children of
v and computing what they are takes time O(|L||P0|n + (h|L| + |Gd|)(h + |L|)).
Similarly, the root of T has at most max(|Gd|,|L||P0|n) children since the root
has zero children if d = true, less than |Gd| children if d is a conjunction, and at
most |L||P0|n children if d is a Said condition. The children of the root can be
computed in time O(|Gd|) if d is a conjunction and in time O(|L||P0|n + |Gd||L|)
if d is a Said condition. This follows from the reasoning given for the case when
the node is neither the root nor a leaf modiﬁed to account for the fact that d 6∈ S,
since S = ∅, and there is a dag representation of d that has length |Gd|.
To determine the number of non-leaf nodes of T, observe that, if the root
of T has n children and each subtree of T has at most m non-leaf nodes,
then T has at most 1 + nm non-leaf nodes. It follows that T has at most
1 + 2max(|Gd|,|L||P0|n)(|L||P0|n)h−2 non-leaf nodes, since a tree with outdegree176
at most c and height h has ch/(c − 1) ≤ 2ch−1 non-leaf nodes. Thus, it takes time
O(max(|Gd|,|L||P0|
n)(|L||P0|
n)
h−2(|L||P0|
n + (h|L| + |Gd|)(h + |L|)))
to compute the children of the max(|Gd|,|L||P0|n)(|L||P0|n)h−2 non-leaf nodes other
than the root. Since this time dominates the time to compute the children of the
root, it is also the time required to compute T.
Once T is constructed, the truth value of its root can be computed in time
linear in the number of nodes of T. Thus, Holds2(d,L,∅) can be computed in
time
O(max(|Gd|,|L||P0|
n)(|L||P0|
n)
h−2(|L||P0|
n + (h|L| + |Gd|)(h + |L|))).
Lemma B.0.21. Suppose that (e,L,R,E) is a query in L0 ∩ L1 ∩ Ln
2 ∩ Lh
3 such
that e 6∈ E and D is the output of Auth2(e,L,R,E). Then
(a) #(D) is at most #(P0)n(#(R) + #(L));
(b) if d is a closed condition in D, then there is a dag Gd representing d such
that |Gd| ≤ |R| + |L| + |e|; and
(c) D can be computed in time O(|L||E ∪ {e}| + |L|2 log(|R| + 1) +
|L|2(|L||P0|n)h+1h2).
Proof: Let X be an execution of Query2(e,L,R,E) and let G = G(e,L,R,E,X).
For part (a), by Theorem B.0.18(b), if e / ∈ E, then
D = {d | for some grant ∀x1 ...∀xm(dg → eg) ∈ G and
closed substitution σ,dgσ = d and egσ = e}.
(B.1)177
Since every grant in G is either in R or L, #(G) ≤ #(R) + #(L). Moreover,
because (e,L,R,E) ∈ L0 ∩ Ln
2, for every grant g = ∀x1 ...∀xm(dg → eg) ∈ G,
there are at most n variables mentioned in dg that are not mentioned in eg, and
each of these variables is of sort Princ. As in the proof of Lemma B.0.20, it follows
that there are at most #(P0)n substitutions of variables in g to closed terms such
that egσ = e because (e,L,R,E) ∈ L1. Part (a) follows immediately.
For part (b), let d be a closed condition in D. By (1), d = dgσ, where dg is the
antecedent of a grant g ∈ G and σ is a closed substitution. By the proof of part (a),
σ assigns every variable in dg to a term in e or to a principal in P0. Given dags Ge
and Gdg representing e and dg, respectively, we can obtain a dag Gd representing
d by replacing every variable in Gdg by either a subgraph of Ge or by some p ∈ P0.
So there is a dag Gd representing d such that |Gd| ≤ |Gdg| + |Ge|. Recall that, for
every string s, there is a dag Gs representing s such that |Gs| ≤ |s|. So there is a
dag Gd representing d such that |Gd| ≤ |dg| + |e|. Since dg is the antecedent of a
grant in G and every grant in G is a grant in R or L, |dg| < |R| + |L|, and we are
done.
For part (c), by (B.1), we can compute D by (i) checking whether e ∈ E; (ii)
computing G; and (iii) for each grant g = ∀x1 ...∀xm(dg → eg) ∈ G, computing
Dg = {d | for some closed substitution σ,dgσ = d and egσ = e}. (Observe that
these are the same steps taken in Auth2; however, our approach computes G more
eﬃciently.) Step (i) takes time O(|E|). We show below that G can be completed
in time O(|L|h|P0|n(2h−1 + |L|2|P0|n(h−1))(|P0|n + h2 + h|L|) + |L|2 log(|R| + 1) +
|L|(|E| + |e|)). For step (iii), essentially the same arguments as those used in
Lemma B.0.20 show that, given grant g ∈ G, Dg can be computed in time O(|e|+
|eg| + |P0|n|dg|). So, {Dg | g ∈ G} can be computed in time O(|G|(|e| + |P0|n)).178
Since |G| ≤ |R|+|L|, the total time needed to compute D is O(|E|+|L|h|P0|n(2h−1+
|L|2|P0|n(h−1))(|P0|n+h2+h|L|)+|L|2 log(|R|+1)+|L|(|E|+|e|)+|R|(|e|+|P0|n)).
For step (ii), let A = A(e,L,R,E,X). For all integers k ≥ 0, de-
ﬁne the set G0
k of grants inductively as follows: G0
0 = R and, for i > 0,
G0
i = R ∪ {g | for some principal p, (p,g) ∈ L and
V
g0∈G0
i−1 g0L,A,∅,(E∪{e}) ⇒
Permitted(p,issue,cg) is acceptably valid}. We claim that G0
#(L) = G.
To show that G0
#(L) ⊆ G, we prove by induction that G0
i ⊆ G for all i ≥ 0.
The base case is immediate because G0
0 = R. For the inductive step, it suﬃces
to show that, if there is a license (p,g) ∈ L and a subset G0 ⊆ G such that
V
g0∈G0 g0L,A,∅,(E∪{e}) ⇒ Permitted(p,issue,cg) is acceptably valid, then g ∈ G.
Let ϕ = ((
V
`∈L `L,A,∅,(E∪{e})) ∧ (
V
g∈R gL,A,∅,(E∪{e}))). Because (p,g) ∈ L, it is im-
mediate from the deﬁnition of G that g ∈ G if ϕ ⇒ Permitted(p,issue,cg)
is acceptably valid. Because G0 ⊆ G, every grant g0 ∈ G0 is either in R or
there is a principal p0 such that (p0,g0) ∈ L and ϕ ⇒ Permitted(p0,issue,cg0)
is acceptably valid. It follows that ϕ ⇒
V
g0∈G0 g0L,A,∅,(E∪{e}) is acceptably
valid. Since
V
g0∈G0 g0L,A,∅,(E∪{e}) ⇒ Permitted(p,issue,cg) is acceptably valid,
ϕ ⇒ Permitted(p,issue,cg) is acceptably valid.
To show that G ⊆ G0
#(L), we ﬁrst observe that, for all i, G0
i ⊆ G0
i+1 and, if
G0
i = G0
i+1, then G0
i = G0
i+j for all j > 0. Since G0
0 = R and G0
i ⊆ R ∪ {g |
for some principal p, (p,g) ∈ L}, it follows that G0
#(L) = G0
#(L)+1. To show that
G ⊆ G0
#(L), it suﬃces to show that for all licenses (p,g) ∈ L such that ϕ ⇒
Permitted(p,issue,cg) is acceptably valid, g ∈ G0
#(L). Suppose by way of con-
tradiction that there is a license (p,g) ∈ L such that ϕ ⇒ Permitted(p,issue,cg)
is acceptably valid and g 6∈ G0
#(L). Let ϕ0 =
V
g0∈G0
#(L) g0L,A,∅,(E∪{e}). Since
G0
#(L) = G0
#(L)+1, the grant g 6∈ G0
#(L)+1 so, by the deﬁnition of G0
#(L)+1, the179
formula ϕ0 ⇒ Permitted(p,issue,cg) is not acceptably valid. It follows that
there is an acceptable model m that satisﬁes ϕ0 ∧ ¬Permitted(p,issue,cg) and
is “most forbidding” in the sense that, for all principals p0 and grants g0, either m
does not satisfy Permitted(p0,issue,cg0) or the model m0 that does not satisfy
Permitted(p0,issue,cg0) and is otherwise identical to m does not satisfy ϕ0. Since
m satisﬁes ¬Permitted(p,issue,cg) and ϕ ⇒ Permitted(p,issue,cg) is accept-
ably valid, m does not satisfy ϕ. Because R ⊆ G0
#(L) and m satisﬁes ϕ0, m satisﬁes
V
g0∈R g0L,A,∅,(E∪{e}). So, there is a license (p0,g0) ∈ L such that m does not satisfy
(p0,g0)L,A,∅,(E∪{e}). If Permitted(p0,issue,g0) ∈ E∪{e}, then (p0,g0)L,A,∅,(E∪{e}) =
true, so m satisﬁes (p0,g0)L,A,∅,(E∪{e}). Thus, Permitted(p0,issue,g0) 6∈ E ∪ {e}.
But then (p0,g0)L,A,∅,(E∪{e}) = Permitted(p0,issue,cg0) ⇒ g0L,A,∅,(E∪{e}). Since
m does not satisfy this formula, m satisﬁes Permitted(p0,issue,cg0). By the
construction of m, the model m0 that does not satisfy Permitted(p0,issue,cg0)
and is otherwise identical to m does not satisfy ϕ0. So there is a grant g00 =
∀x1 ...∀xn(dg00 → eg00) ∈ G0
#(L) such that m0 does not satisfy g00L,A,∅,(E∪{e}). Be-
cause m satisﬁes g00L,A,∅,(E∪{e}) and the two models m and m0 diﬀer only in their in-
terpretation of Permitted(p0,issue,cg0), it follows from the translation of g00 that
there is a substitution σ such that eg00σ = Permitted(p0,issue,g0), eg00σ 6∈ E∪{e},
and dg00σL,A,∅,(E∪{e}) is valid. So g00L,A,∅,(E∪{e}) ⇒ Permitted(p0,issue,cg0) is ac-
ceptably valid. Since g00 ∈ G0
#(L), ϕ0 ⇒ Permitted(p0,issue,cg0) is acceptably
valid, g0 ∈ G0
#(L)+1. Because G0
#(L)+1 = G0
#(L), the grant g0 ∈ G0
#(L) and, since
m satisﬁes ϕ0, m satisﬁes g0L,A,∅,(E∪{e}). So m satisﬁes (p0,g0)L,A,∅,(E∪{e}), which
contradicts the assumptions.
We next consider the complexity of computing G = G0
#(L). Let L0 = {(p,g) ∈
L | Permitted(p,issue,g) 6∈ E ∪ {e}}. Clearly, we can compute L0 in time180
c0|L||E ∪ {e}| for some constant c0. For all k > 1, let L0
k = {(p,g) ∈ L0 | g / ∈ G0
k}
and let G00
k = G0
k−G0
k−1. We plan to compute G0
k inductively, It will be useful in the
induction to represent the elements of G0
k in a splay tree. (Recall that a splay tree
is a form of binary search tree such that k insertions and searches can be done in a
tree with at most n nodes in time O(k logn) [ST83].) If G0
k is represented as a splay
tree, then we can compute L0
k in time O(|L|log(|L| + |R|)) (since G0
k ⊆ L ∪ R).
For 0 < k < #(L),
G00
k+1 = {g | for some principal p, (p,g) ∈ L0
k and
V
g0∈G00
k g0L,A,∅,(E∪{e}) ⇒ Permitted(p,issue,cg) is acceptably valid}.
By Lemma B.0.15,
G
00
k+1 = ∪(p,g)∈L0
k ∪g0∈G00
k {g | g0L,A,∅,(E∪{e}) ⇒ Permitted(p,issue,cg)
is acceptably valid}.
Moreover, it follows from Lemma B.0.15 that, for (p,g) ∈ L0, g0L,A,∅,(E∪{e}) ⇒
Permitted(p,issue,cg) is acceptably valid iﬀ the formula dg0σ is valid for some
A-closed substitution σ such that eg0σ = Permitted(p,issue,cg), where g0 =
∀x1 ...∀xn(dg0 ⇒ eg0). Given (p,g) ∈ L0 with g / ∈ G0
k and g0 ∈ G00
k, we can clearly
check in time c1(|eg0|+|(p,g)|) if there exists an A-closed substitution σ such that
eg0σ = Permitted(p,issue,g), where c1 is a constant independent of k. If so,
as in part (a), there are at most #(P0)n distinct formulas of the form dg0σ (since
there are at most #(P0)n possible substitutions for the free variables in dg0). It fol-
lows from Theorem B.0.18(a) that dg0σL,A,∅,(E∪{e}) is valid iﬀ Holds2(dg0σ,L,∅) =
true. We show shortly that there is an execution of Query2(e,L,R,E) that
calls Holds2(dg0σ,L,∅), so Holds2(dg0σ,L,∅) is h-bounded. It follows from
Lemma B.0.20 that we can determine if Holds2(dg0σ,L,∅) = true in time
c2 max(|Gdg0σ|,|L||P0|n)(|L||P0|n)h−2(|L||P0|n +(h|L|+|Gdg0σ|)(h+|L|)), where c2181
is a constant independent of k and Gdg0σ is a dag representing dg0σ. As in the proof
of part (b), we can obtain Gdg0σ from a dag Gdg0 representing dg0 by replacing every
variable with a principal in P0 or a resource mentioned in Permitted(p,issue,g).
So there is a dag Gdg0σ representing dg0σ such that |Gdg0σ| < |dg0| + |g|. Repeat-
ing this process for each of the at most |P0|n formulas dg0σ, it follows that we
can check if g0L,A,∅,(E∪{e}) ⇒ Permitted(p,issue,cg) is acceptably valid in time
c2|P0|n max(|dg0|+|g|,|L||P0|n)(|L||P0|n)h−2(|L||P0|n+(h|L|+|dg0|+|g|)(h+|L|)).
Assuming we have already computed L0
k and G00
k, we can repeat the process
above for all g0 ∈ G00
k and (p,g) ∈ L0
k. It is not hard to show that we can compute
G00
k+1 in time
P
g0∈G00
k
P
(p,g)∈L0
k c1(|eg0| + |(p,g)|)+
c2|P0|n max(|dg0| + |g|,|L||P0|n)(|L||P0|n)h−2·
(|L||P0|n + (h|L| + |dg0| + |g|)(h + |L|))
≤ 2c1|G00
k||L| + c2|P0|n(|L||P0|n)h−2(h + |L|)·
P
g0∈G00
k
P
(p,g)∈L(|dg0| + |g| + |L||P0|n)(|L||P0|n + h|L| + |dg0| + |g|)
≤ 2c1|G00
k||L|+
c2|P0|n(|L||P0|n)h−2(h + |L|)2|G00
k||L|2|P0|n(|L||P0|n + h|L| + |G00
k| + |L|)
≤ 2c1|G00
k||L| + 2c2|G00
k|(|L||P0|n)h(h + |L|)(|L||P0|n + h|L| + |G00
k| + |L|)
≤ c3|G00
k|(|L||P0|n)h(h + |L|)(|L||P0|n + h|L| + |G00
k| + |L|)
for some constant c3. We can then build the splay tree for G0
k+1 by inserting the
grants in G00
k into the splay tree for G0
k; this can be done in time O(|G00
k|log(|L| +
|R|)).
Since ∪
|L|
k=1G00
k ⊆ L, the total time to compute G00
1,...,G00
k (ignoring the time to
compute the sets L0 and L0
k, and to build the splay trees for G0
k) is at most
c4|L|2(|L||P0|n)h+1h2182
for some constant c4; i.e., it is O(|L|2(|L||P0|n)h+1h2).
Now taking into account the complexity of computing L0 and L0
k and to build
the splay trees, and using the observation that log(a+b) ≤ log(a+1)+log(b+1),
we get that the complexity for computing G is
O(|L||E ∪ {e}| + |L|
2 log(|R| + 1) + |L|
2(|L||P0|
n)
h+1h
2).
It remains to show that if g0 = ∀x1 ...∀xn(dg0 → eg0) ∈ G0
k − G0
k−1,
(p,g) ∈ L0 with g / ∈ G0
k, and eg0σ = Permitted(p,issue,g) with A-
closed substitution σ, then there is an execution X of Query2(e,L,R,E) that
calls Holds2(dg0σ,L,∅). By assumption, e 6∈ E, so Query2(e,L,R,E) calls
Auth2(e,L,R,E), which calls Query2(Permitted(p,issue,g),L,R,E ∪ {e}),
which calls Auth2(Permitted(p,issue,gR),L,R,E ∪ {e}).
Since (p,g) is in L0, the conclusion Permitted(p,issue,g) is not
in E ∪ {e}. It follows that Auth2(Permitted(p,issue,g),L,R,E ∪
{e}) computes G(Permitted(p,issue,g),L,R,E ∪ {e},X) and, if g0 is
in G(Permitted(p,issue,g),L,R,E ∪ {e},X), then every execution of
Auth2(Permitted(p,issue,g),L,R,E ∪ {e}) returns a set D that includes
dg0σ. After Auth2(Permitted(p,issue,g),L,R,E ∪ {e}) returns D, it is
easy to see that some execution of Query2(Permitted(p,issue,g),L,R,E ∪
{e}) calls Holds2(dg0σ,L,∅). So, in short, it suﬃces to show that g0 ∈
G(Permitted(p,issue,g),L,R,E ∪ {e},X). The proof is by induction on k. If
k = 0, then g0 ∈ R ⊆ G(Permitted(p,issue,g),L,R,E ∪ {e},X). If k > 0 then,
by the induction hypothesis, G0
k−1 ⊆ G(Permitted(p,issue,g),L,R,E∪{e},X),
so
V
`∈L `L,A,∅,E∪{e∪Permitted(p,issue,g)} ∧
V
g000∈R g000L,A,∅,E∪{e∪Permitted(p,issue,g)} ⇒
V
g00 ∈ G0
k−1g00L,A,∅,E∪{e∪Permitted(p,issue,g)} is acceptably valid. Since g0 ∈ G0
k −
G0
k−1, there is a grant g00 ∈ G0
k−1 and a principal p0 such that (p0,g0) ∈183
L and g00L,A,∅,E∪{e} ⇒ Permitted(p0,issue,g0) is acceptably valid. Be-
cause g0 ∈ G0
k and g 6∈ G0
k, g 6= g0 and, thus, it follows from
the translation that g00L,A,∅,E∪{e∪Permitted(p,issue,g)} ⇒ Permitted(p0,issue,g0)
is acceptably valid. Putting the pieces together, there is a princi-
pal p0 such that (p0,g0) ∈ L and
V
`∈L `L,A,∅,E∪{e∪Permitted(p,issue,g)} ∧
V
g000∈R g000L,A,∅,E∪{e∪Permitted(p,issue,g)} ⇒ Permitted(p0,issue,g0) is acceptably
valid, so g0 ∈ G(Permitted(p,issue,g),L,R,E ∪ {e},X).
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.4.3.
Theorem 3.4.3: For ﬁxed n and h, if (e,L,R,E) ∈ L0 ∩ L1 ∩ Ln
2 ∩ Lh
3, then
determining whether Query2(e,L,R,E) returns true takes time O(|L||E|+(|R|+
|L|)(|L|h−1(|L| + |R| + |e|)2)).
Proof: Let D be the output of Auth2(e,L,R,E). It is immediate from the
description of Query2 that Query2(e,L,R,E) = true iﬀ there is some condition
d ∈ D such that Holds2(d,L,∅) = true. So the output of Query2(e,L,R,E)
can be determined in time T + #(D)T 0, where T is the time needed to compute
D and T 0 is the time needed to determine the output of Holds2(d,L,∅) for a
condition d ∈ D. By Lemma B.0.21(c), Holds2(d,L,∅) for a condition d ∈ D. By
Lemma B.0.21(c), T = c1(|L||E ∪{e}|+|L|2 log(|R|+1)+|L|2(|L||P0|n)h+1h2) for
some constant c1. If n and h are treated as constants, then T = c0
1(|L||E ∪ {e}| +
|L|2 log(|R|+1)+|L|h+3) for some constant c0
1; i.e., T is O(|L||E ∪{e}|+|L|2|R|+
|L|h+3).
By Lemma B.0.21(a), #(D) ≤ #(P0)n(#(R)+#(L)). By Lemma B.0.20, T 0 is
at most c2(|Gd|+|L||P0|n)(|L||P0|n)h−2(|L||P0|n +(h|L|+|Gd|)(h+|L|)), for some
constant c2. If n and h are treated as constants, then there is a constant c0
2 such184
that T 0 is at most
c0
2(|Gd| + |L|)|L|h−2(|L| + (|L| + |Gd|)|L|)
= c0
2|L|h−1(|Gd| + |L|)(1 + (|L| + |Gd|))
= c0
2|L|h−1(|Gd| + |L|)(2(|Gd| + |L|))
≤ 2c0
2|L|h−1(|Gd| + |L|)2.
Since, by Lemma B.0.21(b), |Gd| ≤ |R| + |L| + |e|, it follows that T 0 ≤
2c0
2|L|h−1(2|L| + |R| + |e|)2, i.e., O(|L|h−1(|L| + |R| + |e|)2).
Since #(D) ≤ #(P0)n(#(R) + #(L)) ≤ |P0|n(|R| + |L|), a straightforward
computation shows that T + #(D)T 0, the time needed to determine whether
Query2(e,L,R,E) returns true, is O(|L||E|+(|R|+|L|)(|L|h−1(|L|+|R|+|e|)2)).
Theorem 3.6.2: Let (e,L,R,E) be a tuple in L0 ∩ L1 ∩ L0
2 ∩ L2
3 extended to
include negated Said conditions and negated conclusions. The problem of deciding
whether
^
`∈L
`
L,A,S,E ∧
^
g∈R
g
L,A,S,E ⇒ e
L,A,S,E
is valid is NP-hard. This result holds even if e, all of the licenses in L, and all of
the conclusions in E are in XrML, all but one of the grants in R is in XrML, and
the one grant that is in in XrML¬ – XrML is of the form ∀x1 ...∀xn(¬e).
Proof: The proof is by reduction of the 3-satisﬁability problem. The reduction
is identical to the reduction given in the proof for the case of L0 ∩ L1 ∩ L2
3 in
Theorem 3.4.2, except that R = {∀x1 ...∀xm((
V
i=1,...,n Said(pi,e0)) → e0),¬e0}.
To show that Query2(e,L,R,∅) = true if and only if f is valid, we observe that
Query2(e,L,R,∅) = true if and only if L and R imply false, which occurs if
and only if
V
i=1,...,n Said(pi,e0)σ holds for some substitution σ. The rest of the
argument proceeds as in the proof of Theorem 3.4.2.Appendix C
Proofs for Chapter 4
In the proofs below, we use the notation #(S) for the cardinality of set S. We also
use the notation f[t/x] for the capture-avoiding substitution of term t for variable
x in formula f.
Theorem 4.3.1: The problem of deciding, for a query q = (A,s,act,a,E),
whether f+
q is E-valid is decidable and NP-hard. Similarly, the problem of deciding,
for a query q = (A,s,act,a,E), whether f−
q is E-valid is decidable.
Proof. To prove decidability, we present an algorithm to determine whether f+
q
is E-valid. The algorithm ﬁrst checks if E is inconsistent, by simply scanning
E. (Recall that E is inconsistent if and only if E has two conjuncts of the form
count(s,id) = n and count(s,id) = n0 with n 6= n0.) If E is inconsistent, then
there are no E-relevant models, f+
q is trivially E-valid, and the algorithm returns
“Yes”.
If E is consistent, then the set of E-relevant models is not empty, and the
algorithm proceeds as follows. Let g be the formula obtained from f+
q by replacing
every subformula of the form ∀x(h) by
V
s∈S(h[s/x]) and every subformula of the
form ∃x(h) by
W
s∈S(h[s/x]), where S is the set of variable-free terms mentioned
in q that have the same sort as x. We claim that f+
q is E-valid if and only if g
is E-valid. We prove this claim by constructing g in steps; during this process,
we consider in some detail the subformulas of the form ∀x(h) and ∃x(h) that can
appear in f+
q .
• Let g0 be the formula obtained from f+
q by replacing every subformula of the
185186
form
∀x((x = s1 ∨ ... ∨ x = sn ∧ g
0) ⇒ (g
00 ⇒ Permitted(x,act
0,a
0)))
by
^
s∈S
((x = s1 ∨ ... ∨ x = sn ∧ g
0) ⇒ (g
00 ⇒ Permitted(x,act
0,a
0)))[s/x],
where S is the set of variable-free terms of sort Subjects mentioned in q.
Since {s1,...,sn} ⊆ S, it is easy to see that f+
q is E-valid if and only if g0 is
E-valid.
• Let Σ be the set of substitutions σ such that, for all variables t of sort Times
in g0, σ(t) is a variable-free term of sort Times that appears in q and, for
all other variables x, σ(x) = x. Note that Σ is ﬁnite. Let g1 be the formula
obtained from g0 by replacing every formula of the form ∃t1 ...∃tn(h), where
every free variable of h is of sort Times, with
W
σ∈Σ(hσ). It follows from
the translation that, if t is a free variable in h, then h is a conjunction of
formulas and one of those conjuncts has either the form Paid(r,I,t) or the
form Attributed(s,t). It follows from the closed-world assumption that g0
is E-valid if and only if g1 is E-valid.
• It follows from the translation that every variable remaining in g1 is of sort
Subjects; g1 includes a subformula of the form ∀x(h) if and only if h can be
written as x 6= s1 ∧ ... ∧ x 6= sn ⇒ ¬Permitted(x,act0,a0), where si is a
variable-free term in q, for i = 1,...,n. Let g2 be the formula obtained from
g1 by replacing every subformula of the form ∀x(h) by
V
s∈S h[s/x], where S
is the set of variable-free terms of sort Subjects mentioned in q. Note that
g2 = g. So, it remains to show that g1 is E-valid if and only if g2 is E-valid.187
The “if” direction is trivial. For the “only if” direction, suppose by way of
contradiction that g1 is E-valid and g2 is not. Note that g1 is of the form
g0
1 ⇒ Permitted(s,act,a) and g2 is of the form g0
2 ⇒ Permitted(s,act,a)
for appropriate formulas g0
1 and g0
2. Since g2 is not E-valid, there is an E-
relevant model M that satisﬁes g0
2 ∧ ¬Permitted(s,act,a). Let M0 be the
E-relevant model that is identical to M, except that the domain of M0 is
limited to the closed terms that are mentioned in q. It is easy to see that
g0
2 holds in M0 since the formula holds in M, is variable-free, and mentions
only those terms that appear in q. It follows from the construction of g2
that, because g0
2 holds in M0, g0
1 holds in M0. Since, by construction, M0
does not satisfy Permitted(s,act,a), M does not satisfy g1, which gives us
the desired contradiction.
Since g is variable-free, the algorithm proceeds by replacing every Permitted-
free literal appearing in g by either true or false depending on E and the standard
interpretations of =, < and ≤. Let h be the formula obtained from g by doing
this replacement. Clearly, g is E-valid if and only if h is E-valid. Moreover, since
Permitted is the only predicate symbol appearing in h, h is E-valid if and only
if h is valid. The algorithm determines the validity of h by checking if h holds for
all assignments of true or false to the Permitted literals in h (where a positive
literal ` is not given the same assignment as ¬`). Obviously, h is valid if it holds
under every substitution and is not valid otherwise.
The same strategy can be used to derive an algorithm that determines the
E-validity of f−
q .
We now reduce the 3-satisﬁability problem to the problem of determining
whether f+
q is E-valid for an appropriate query q, thereby showing that the latter188
problem is NP-hard. Let ϕ = C1 ∧ ... ∧ Cn be a formula in propositional logic,
where each Ci is a clause with three disjuncts. Without loss of generality, we
assume that no conjunct Ci is valid. Let P1,...Pm be the primitive propositions
mentioned in ϕ. We want to determine if ϕ is satisﬁable.
Let s0,...,sm be subjects and let a be an asset. For each conjunct Ci =
L1 ∨ L2 ∨ L3 of ϕ, let agri be the agreement
agreement for {s0,...,sm} about a with and[prq1,prq2,prq3] ⇒ display,
where
prqj ,

  
  
and[s0,not[sk ⇒ print]] if Lj is Pk
and[s0,xor[true,not[sk ⇒ print]]] if Lj is ¬Pk.
Let q be the query ({agr1,...,agrn},s0,display,a,E), where E is the empty envi-
ronment (i.e., true). We claim that ϕ is satisﬁable if and only if f+
q is not E-valid.
For every assignment A of truth values to P1,...,Pm, let MA be the E-relevant
model that satisﬁes ¬Permitted(si,print,a) if and only if A assigns Pi to false or
si = 0. It is not hard to show that a truth assignment A satisﬁes a conjunct ci of
ϕ if and only if MA satisﬁes [[agri]]. The key observation is that, for each conjunct
Ci = L1 ∨ L2 ∨ L3 of ϕ, we can write [[agri]] as
fi,1 ∧ fi,2 ∧ fi,3 ⇒ Permitted(s0,display,a),
where
fi,j =

  
  
¬Permitted(sk,print,a) if Lj is Pk
Permitted(sk,print,a) if Lj is ¬Pk.
So, if ϕ is satisﬁable, then there is a truth assignment A that satisﬁes ϕ, the
model MA satisﬁes
V
agr∈A[[agr]]∧¬Permitted(s0,display,a), and, thus, f+
q is not
E-valid. If ϕ is not satisﬁable then, for every truth assignment A, MA does not189
satisfy some [[agri]], so MA satisﬁes f+
q . Let M be the set of models M such that,
for all truth assignments A, M 6= MA. It is not hard to see that every model in M
satisﬁes Permitted(s0,display,a), thereby satisfying f+
q . Since every E-relevant
model satisﬁes f+
q , the formula is E-valid.
The following result is used in Lemmas 4.3.2 and 4.3.4.
Lemma C.0.22. Suppose that f is a Permitted-free formula and E is an envi-
ronment such that the set of E-relevant models is nonempty. Then f holds in at
least one E-relevant model if and only if f is E-valid.
Proof. Follows immediately from the deﬁnitions.
Given a policy set ps, let S+
ps be the set of tuples (prq,I,prq0,id,act0) such that
ps mentions the policy set prq −→ p or prq 7−→ p, I is the set of policy identiﬁers
appearing in p, and p mentions the policy prq0 =⇒id act0. Finally, let S−
ps be the set
of actions such that an action act0 is in S−
ps if and only if ps mentions an exclusive
policy set that mentions a policy of the form prq =⇒ act0.
Lemma C.0.23. Suppose agr is an agreement of the form
agreement for prinu about a with ps.
Then [[agr]] holds in model M if and only if
(a) M satisﬁes ¬Permitted(s0,act0,a) for every act0 ∈ S−
ps and every s0 6∈
subjects(prinu), and
(b) for every (prq,I,prq0,id,act0) ∈ S+
ps and s0 ∈ subjects(prinu), either M satis-
ﬁes Permitted(s0,act0,a) or M does not satisfy [[prq]]
I,prinu
s0 ∧[[prq0]]
{id},prinu
s0 .
Proof. Immediate by the deﬁnition of S+
ps and S−
ps and the translation [[·]].190
Lemma 4.3.2: There are algorithms that, given a query q = ({agr},s,act,a,E)
in Q1:
(a) determine whether f+
q is E-valid in time O(|E||agr|6), and
(b) determine whether f−
q is E-valid in time O(|E| + |agr|).
Proof. Let agr be an agreement agreement for prinu about a0 with ps.
For part (a), we claim that [[agr]] ⇒ Permitted(s,act,a) is E-valid if and only
if the set of E-relevant models is empty, or all of the following conditions hold:
(i) s ∈ subjects(prinu),
(ii) a0 = a, and
(iii) there is a tuple (prq,I,prq0,id,act) ∈ S+
ps such that [[prq]]
I,prinu
s ∧[[prq0]]
{id},prinu
s
is E-valid.
• For the “if” direction, if the set of E-relevant models of agr is empty, then
the formula [[agr]] ⇒ Permitted(s,act,a) is trivially E-valid. If (i), (ii),
and (iii) hold, then it is immediate from the translation that [[agr]] ⇒
Permitted(s,act,a) is E-valid.
• For the “only if” direction, suppose by way of contradiction that the formula
[[agr]] ⇒ Permitted(s,act,a) is E-valid, the set of E-relevant models of agr
is not empty, and either (i), (ii), or (iii) does not hold. Because the set of
E-relevant models is not empty, there is a model M that is E-relevant and
that satisﬁes Permitted(t1,t2,t3) if and only if t1 ∈ subjects(prinu), t3 = a0,
and Permitted(t1,t2,t3) 6= Permitted(s,act,a), for all closed terms t1,
t2, and t3 of the appropriate sorts. We claim that M satisﬁes [[agr]], thus191
contradicting the assumption that [[agr]] ⇒ Permitted(s,act,a) is E-valid.
By Lemma C.0.23, it suﬃces to show that C.0.23(a) and C.0.23(b) hold.
C.0.23(a) follows from the construction of M. If (i) or (ii) does not hold, then
M satisﬁes Permitted(s0,act0,a0), for every tuple (prq,I,prq0,I0,act0) ∈ S+
ps,
so C.0.23(b) holds. Suppose that (iii) does not hold. Then, for each tuple
(prq,I,prq0,I0,act0) ∈ S+
ps and subject s0 ∈ subjects(prinu), either s0 6= s, in
which case M satisﬁes Permitted(s0,act0,a0); act0 6= act, in which case M
satisﬁes Permitted(s0,act0,a0); or s0 = s, act0 = act, and f = [[prq]]
I,prinu
s ∧
[[prq0]]
{id},prinu
s is not E-valid. It follows from Lemma C.0.22 that f does not
hold in M because it is Permitted-free (neither prq nor prq0 mention a
policy set), so C.0.23(b) holds again.
It follows that we can determine the E-validity of [[agr]] ⇒ Permitted(s,act,a)
by running the following algorithm: determine whether the set of E-relevant mod-
els is empty; if so, return “Yes”, otherwise check conditions (i), (ii), and (iii);
if all hold, then return “Yes”, else return “No”. The set of E-relevant mod-
els is non-empty if and only if E is inconsistent, which can be checked in time
O(|E|). We can check whether (i) and (ii) hold in time O(|agr|). We can also
compute S+
ps in time O(|agr|). Finally, the cardinality of S+
ps is less than |agr|. We
show that, for each tuple (prq,I,prq0,id,act) in S+
ps, we can determine whether
[[prq]]
I,prinu
s ∧ [[prq0]]
{id},prinu
s is E-valid in time O(|E||agr|5), so the total running
time of the algorithm is O(|E||agr|6).
Using the translation as a guide, we can construct an algorithm for determin-
ing whether [[prq]]
I,prinu
s (or [[prq0]]
{id},prinu
s ) is E-valid. The ﬁrst step is to rewrite
the prerequisites prq and prq0 so that they do not contain nested forEachMember192
constraints. Examining the translation, it is clear that the constraint
forEachMember[prin;forEachMember[prin
0;cons
0],cons]
translates to a formula that is logically equivalent to the translation of
and[forEachMember[prin;cons],forEachMember[prin
0;cons
0]].
Generalizing this idea, we can rewrite, in time O(|prq|), the prerequisite prq
to an equivalent prerequisite prq0 of size O(|prq|) that does not contain nested
forEachMember constraints, and similarly rewrite prq0 to an equivalent prerequi-
site prq0
0. We then determine whether [[prq0]]
I,prinu
s and [[prq0
0]]
I,prinu
s are E-valid.
Checking whether a prerequisite is E-valid is straightforward. The key observation
is that, if prq0 is a constraint or a condition, then [[prq0]]
I,prinu
s is a variable-free
formula in which each literal is equivalent to true or false based on E; the formula
is E-valid iﬀ it is equivalent to true. If prq0 is a requirement, then determin-
ing the E-validity of [[prq0]]
I,prinu
s is straightforward, unless prq0 is of the form
inSeq[req1,...,reqm]; in this case, we determine the E-validity of [[prq0]]
I,prinu
s by
considering the events (payments made and attributions given) in the order in
which those events occurred as described in E. It is not hard to write a naive
recursive algorithm that determines the E-validity of [[prq0]]
I,prinu
s and [[prq0
0]]
I,prinu
s ,
and that runs in time O(|E||agr|5). (The assumption that there are no nested
forEachMember in prq is crucial to ensure this running time; without this assump-
tion, running time may be exponential in the size of the prerequisite.) We leave
the straightforward details to the reader.
For part (b), we claim that [[agr]] ⇒ ¬Permitted(s,act,a) is E-valid if and
only if the set of E-relevant models is empty or all of the following conditions hold:
(i) s 6∈ subjects(prinu),193
(ii) a0 = a, and
(iii) agr includes an exclusive policy set that mentions a policy of the form prq ⇒
act.
• For the “if” direction, if the set of E-relevant models is empty, then the
formula [[agr]] ⇒ ¬Permitted(s,act,a) is trivially E-valid. If (i), (ii), and
(iii) hold then [[agr]] can be written as a conjunction of formulas, one of which
says that every subject who is not mentioned in prinu is forbidden to do act
to a, so [[agr]] ⇒ ¬Permitted(s,act,a) is again E-valid.
• For the “only if” direction, suppose that the set of E-relevant models is non-
empty. It follows that there is an E-relevant model M such that, for all closed
terms t1, t2, and t3 of the appropriate sorts, M satisﬁes ¬Permitted(t1,t2,t3)
if and only if t1 6∈ subjects(prinu), t3 = a0, and ¬Permitted(t1,t2,t3) 6=
¬Permitted(s,act,a). We claim that, if at least one of the conditions
((i), (ii), or (iii)) does not hold, then [[agr]] holds in M and, thus, [[agr]] ⇒
¬Permitted(s,act,a) is not E-valid. To prove the claim, observe that,
by Lemma C.0.23, it suﬃces to show that C.0.23(a) and C.0.23(b) hold.
Since M satisﬁes Permitted(t1,t2,t3) for all closed terms such that t1 ∈
subjects(prinu), C.0.23(b) holds. If either (i) or (ii) does not hold, then
M satisﬁes ¬Permitted(t1,t2,t3) if and only if t1 6∈ subjects(prinu) and
t3 = a0. It follows that, for all subjects s0 6∈ subjects(prinu) and all actions
act00 ∈ S−
ps, M satisﬁes ¬Permitted(s0,act00,a0); so C.0.23(a) holds. If (iii)
does not hold, then act 6∈ S−
ps. It follows from the construction of M that,
for each action act00 6= act and each subject s0 6∈ subjects(prinu), M satisﬁes
¬Permitted(s0,act00,a0), so C.0.23(b) holds.194
Thus, we can determine the E-validity of [[agr]] ⇒ ¬Permitted(s,act,a) by
running the following algorithm: determine whether the set of E-relevant models
is empty; if so, return “Yes”, otherwise check conditions (i), (ii), and (iii); if all
hold, then return “Yes”, else return “No”. Checking that the set of E-relevant
models is empty can be done in time O(|E|). Checking conditions (i), (ii), and
(iii) can be done in time O(|A|).
Lemma 4.3.4: Suppose that q = (A,s,act,a,E) is a query in Q1 such that
V
agr∈A[[agr]] is satisﬁed in at least one E-relevant model. For every agr ∈ A, let
qagr be the query ({agr},s,act,a,E). Then
(a) f+
q is E-valid if and only if f+
qagr is E-valid for some agr ∈ A, and
(b) f−
q is E-valid if and only if f−
qagr is E-valid for some agr ∈ A.
Proof. For part (a), the “if” direction is trivial. For the “only if” direction, sup-
pose by way of contradiction that
V
agr∈A[[agr]] ⇒ Permitted(s,act,a) is E-valid
and [[agr]] ⇒ Permitted(s,act,a) is not E-valid for every agr ∈ A. By as-
sumption, there is an E-relevant model M that satisﬁes
V
agr∈A[[agr]]. Let M0 be
the model that is identical to M except that M0 satisﬁes ¬Permitted(s,act,a).
Because M is E-relevant and M0 diﬀers from M only on the interpretation of
Permitted, M0 is E-relevant. Since M0 satisﬁes ¬Permitted(s,act,a) and, by
assumption,
V
agr∈A[[agr]] ⇒ Permitted(s,act,a) is E-valid, there is an agreement
agr in A such that M0 does not satisfy [[agr]]. We now show that [[agr]] implies
Permitted(s,act,a), which contradicts the assumptions. Because no agreement
in A mentions a condition of the form not[ps], it follows from the translation that
we can write [[agr]] as ∀x(f1) ∧ ··· ∧ ∀x(fn), where each fi is of the form g ⇒195
(¬)Permitted(x,act0,a0), g is Permitted-free, and both act0 and a0 are closed
terms of the appropriate sorts. Because [[agr]] holds in M and does not hold in M0,
there exists integer i such that fi = g ⇒ Permitted(x,act,a) and g[s/x] is satis-
ﬁed in M0. Since g[s/x] is Permitted-free and is satisﬁed in a E-relevant model, it
follows from Lemma C.0.22 that g[s/x] is E-valid. Putting the pieces together, we
can write [[agr]] as ∀x(h∧(g ⇒ Permitted(x,act,a))), for an appropriate formula
h, and g[s/x] is E-valid. It readily follows that [[agr]] ⇒ Permitted(s,act,a) is
E-valid.
The proof for part (b) is nearly identical to the proof for part (a); in fact, the
former can be obtained from the latter by replacing every occurrence of Permitted
by ¬Permitted and vice versa.
Lemma 4.3.5: There is an algorithm that, given a query q = (A,s,act,a,E) in
Q1, determines whether
V
agr∈A[[agr]] is satisﬁed in at least one E-relevant model
in time O(|E||A|8).
Proof. We claim that
V
agr∈A[[agr]] holds in an E-relevant model if and only if
(i) the set of E-relevant models is not empty, and
(ii) for every pair of agreements
agreement for prinu about a with ps, and
agreement for prin
0
u about a
0 with ps
0
in A, either
(a) a 6= a0, or196
(b) for all actions act ∈ S−
ps, tuples (prq,I,prq0,id,act) ∈ S
+
ps0, and subjects
s ∈ subjects(prin0
u)\subjects(prinu), [[prq]]
I,prin0
u
s ∧ [[prq0]]
{id},prin0
u
s is not
E-valid.
For the “if” direction, observe that if (i) holds, then there is an E-relevant model
M such that, for all closed terms t1, t2, and t3 of the appropriate sort, M sat-
isﬁes ¬Permitted(t1,t2,t3) if and only if there is an agreement agr of the form
agreement for prinu about a with ps in A such that t1 6∈ subjects(prinu), ps
includes an exclusive policy set that mentions a policy of the form prq ⇒ t2, and
t3 = a. It is not hard to see that, if (ii) holds, then M satisﬁes
V
agr∈A[[agr]]
and we are done. For the “only if” direction, observe that, if (i) does not hold,
then
V
agr∈A[[agr]] clearly does not hold in an E-relevant model. If (ii) does not
hold, then there is a subject s, action act, and asset a such that, for an agree-
ment agr ∈ A, [[agr]] ⇒ Permitted(s,act,a) is E-valid and, for an agreement
agr0 ∈ A, [[agr]] ⇒ ¬Permitted(s,act,a) is E-valid. Since no model can sat-
isfy both Permitted(s,act,a) and ¬Permitted(s,act,a), no E-relevant model
can satisfy both [[agr]] and [[agr0]], so
V
agr∈A[[agr]] does not hold in any E-relevant
model.
We can determine whether (i) holds in time O(|E|), since (i) holds if and only
if E is consistent. To check whether (ii) holds, we ﬁrst construct the sets S+
ps
and S−
ps, which takes time O(|A|); then we compare all |A|2 pairs of agreements.
For every agreement agr in every pair of agreements, we determine whether cer-
tain prerequisites hold; this takes time O(|E||agr|6), because there are at most
|agr| prerequisites per agreement agr and evaluating each requirement takes time
O(|E||agr|5), as shown in the proof of Theorem 4.3.2. Since |agr| ≤ |A| for every
agreement agr ∈ A, we get a total running time of O(|E||A|8).197
Theorem 4.3.6: There is an algorithm that, given a query q = (A,s,act,a,E)
in Q1, computes the answer to q in time O(|E||A|8).
Proof. First, run the algorithm of Lemma 4.3.5 to determine if
V
agr∈A[[agr]] is
satisﬁed in at least one E-relevant model. This can be done in time O(|E||A|8). If
the result is “No”, then return “Query inconsistent”. If the result is “Yes”, then
use the algorithms of Lemma 4.3.2 to check whether f+
qagr and f−
qagr are E-valid
for each query q = ({agr},s,act,a,E) such that agr ∈ A. This can be done in
time O(|E||A|7): there are less than |A| agreements in A, and for every agr ∈ A,
|agr| ≤ |A|. By Lemma 4.3.4, f+
q is E-valid if and only if f−
qarg is E-valid for an
agr ∈ A, and similarly for f−
q . Thus, if f+
qarg is E-valid for an agr ∈ A, and f−
qarg
is not E-valid for all agr ∈ A, then return “Permission granted”. Similarly, if f−
qarg
is E-valid for an agr ∈ A, and f+
qarg is not E-valid for all agr ∈ A, then return
“Permission denied”. Otherwise, return “Permission unregulated”.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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